JERMAINE ORSON YANCEY V COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ( 2002 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Frank, Humphreys and Agee
    Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
    JERMAINE ORSON YANCEY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.     Record No. 2647-01-2              JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
    JULY 30, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY
    John Richard Alderman, Judge
    L. Willis Robertson, Jr. (Cosby & Robertson,
    on brief), for appellant.
    Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
    General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General;
    Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee.
    Jermaine Orson Yancey appeals his conviction, after a bench
    trial, for grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95.     Yancey
    contends the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
    support the conviction.
    Specifically, Yancey argues there was no evidence to
    establish an unlawful taking, nor that he intended to steal the
    car.   For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication. Further, because this memorandum
    opinion has no precedential value, we recite only those facts
    necessary to our holding.
    Code § 18.2-95 provides as follows, in pertinent part:
    Any person who (i) commits larceny from the
    person of another of money or other thing of
    value of $5 or more, (ii) commits simple
    larceny not from the person of another of
    goods and chattels of the value of $200 or
    more, or (iii) commits simple larceny not
    from the person of another of any firearm,
    regardless of the firearm's value, shall be
    guilty of grand larceny.
    "Larceny . . . is the wrongful or fraudulent taking of personal
    goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another, without his
    assent and with the intention to deprive the owner thereof
    permanently.     The animus furandi must accompany the taking.   But
    the wrongful taking of property in itself imports the animus
    furandi." 1
    Thus, the Commonwealth must prove that Yancey took Gerald
    Sykes' 1999 Cadillac Escalade with the intention to deprive Sykes
    permanently of his possession of it. 2    However, intent may, and
    often must, be proved by circumstantial evidence.3    Thus, in
    determining whether the Commonwealth has proven a specific intent,
    1
    Slater v. Commonwealth, 
    179 Va. 264
    , 266, 
    18 S.E.2d 909
    ,
    910 (1942).
    2
    Welch v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 518
    , 521-22, 
    425 S.E.2d 101
    , 104 (1992).
    3
    See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 
    249 Va. 95
    , 101, 
    452 S.E.2d 669
    , 673-74 (1995).
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    "the factfinder may consider the conduct of the person involved
    and all the circumstances revealed by the evidence." 4
    Under the circumstances of this case, it is necessary to
    first recognize that larceny also involves a "trespassory"
    taking. 5   In Pritchard v. Commonwealth, 
    225 Va. 559
    , 
    303 S.E.2d 911
     (1983), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[t]he owner
    of personal property may deliver it to another upon conditions, or
    in circumstances, which give the recipient bare custody of the
    property.      [However,] [c]onstructive possession remains in the
    owner."6    For example, "a watch handed to a friend to time a race,
    the owner expecting its return at the end of the race." 7    "'A
    felonious conversion of another's property by one having bare
    charge or custody of it involves a trespass and constitutes
    larceny.'" 8
    4
    Wynn v. Commonwealth, 
    5 Va. App. 283
    , 292, 
    362 S.E.2d 193
    ,
    198 (1987).
    5
    See Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 234
    , 236, 
    435 S.E.2d 906
    , 908 (1993).
    6
    225 Va. at 562, 303 S.E.2d at 913.
    7
    Id.
    8
    Overstreet, 17 Va. App. at 236, 435 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting
    50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 23 (1970)); see also Code § 18.2-117,
    which states, in relevant part:
    If any person comes into the possession as
    bailee of any animal, aircraft, vehicle,
    boat or vessel, and fail to return the same
    to the bailor, in accordance with the
    bailment agreement, he shall be deemed
    guilty of larceny thereof and receive the
    - 3 -
    Despite Yancey's claims to the contrary, the circumstantial
    evidence, particularly Yancey's conduct, established that he
    intended to permanently deprive Sykes of the Cadillac.   Yancey
    took the car to wash it, as directed, but did not attempt to
    return the Cadillac to Sykes or even contact Sykes about his
    possession of the car, prior to embarking upon a trip to New York
    in the car.   Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to
    establish larceny and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
    same punishment, according to the value of
    the thing stolen, prescribed for the
    punishment of the larceny of goods and
    chattels.
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