Joe R. Jackson, s/k/a Joe Ralph Jackson v. CW ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Agee and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
JOE R. JACKSON, S/K/A
JOE RALPH JACKSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0147-01-4 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE
MARCH 5, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PAGE COUNTY
John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge
S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Public
Defender Commission, on brief), for
appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Joe R. Jackson (Jackson) was found guilty by the Page
County Circuit Court of driving under the influence, third or
subsequent offense, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-266 and
18.2-270, and operating a motor vehicle after having been
declared an habitual offender, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-266
and 46.2-357(B)(3). On appeal he contends the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he had been previously declared a
habitual offender. For the following reasons, we affirm
Jackson's conviction.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this
case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential
value, only those facts necessary to a disposition of this
appeal are recited.
Where the sufficiency of the evidence
is challenged after conviction, it is our
duty to consider it in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth and give it
all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. We should affirm the judgment
unless it appears from the evidence that the
judgment is plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.
Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534,
537 (1975).
The Commonwealth established a prima facie case against
Jackson. The Commonwealth introduced into evidence Jackson's
DMV transcript establishing his status as a habitual offender.
This evidence alone is generally sufficient to prove a defendant
has been adjudicated a habitual offender. See Hall v.
Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 170, 421 S.E.2d 887 (1992); Ingram v.
Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 335, 338 S.E.2d 657 (1986).
Jackson concedes that the Commonwealth established a prima
facie case against him. However, he contends that the show
cause summons contradicts the evidence establishing the prima
facie case and he is therefore entitled to a reversal of his
conviction. We disagree.
We find that Dicker v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 658, 472
S.E.2d 655 (1996), controls this case. As in the case at bar,
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the Commonwealth in Dicker submitted a DMV transcript reflecting
the habitual offender adjudication and showing the conviction
there in question. See id. at 660, 472 S.E.2d at 656. "In
rebuttal, Dicker introduced a certified copy of a pre-printed
arrest warrant, which contained the April 19, 1994 conviction
order." Id. at 660, 472 S.E.2d at 656-57. He argued that the
order was void because the general district court failed to
check the appropriate boxes indicating his plea and whether he
was found guilty, not guilty, or guilty of a lesser-included
offense. See id. "The trial court ruled that Dicker had failed
to rebut the Commonwealth's prima facie proof of the requisite
convictions . . . ." Id. We upheld the habitual offender
determination and agreed with the trial court that the appellant
had not rebutted the prima facie presumption. See id. at 662,
472 S.E.2d at 657. We held that, while the conviction order
failed in several respects to corroborate the DMV transcript, it
did not contradict the transcript. See id.
In the case at bar, Jackson did not rebut the prima facie
case. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the DMV transcript was not inconsistent with the habitual
offender show cause summons. The DMV transcript evidences
Jackson's adjudication as a habitual offender. The summons
demonstrates Jackson (1) was the person named in the record, (2)
had been previously convicted of each offense provided in the
transcript presented to the general district court, (3) had his
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license revoked by the general district court, and (4) was
ordered not to operate a motor vehicle within the Commonwealth.
Jackson argues the markings over the block "the respondent
is an habitual offender" show that the judge did not intend to
mark that block. However, it is not apparent in viewing the
summons that is the case or whether the judge simply marked this
block more firmly than the others. No other evidence is in the
record to otherwise substantiate Jackson's view. Further, the
show cause summons indicates that the general district court did
not adjudicate Jackson not to be a habitual offender nor did it
dismiss the matter.
The record, taken as a whole, is consistent with the DMV
transcript. Jackson, therefore, presented no evidence to rebut
the Commonwealth's prima facie case against him, and his
contention that he is not an adjudicated habitual offender is an
impermissible collateral attack on the April 15, 1999
adjudication. See England v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 121, 442
S.E.2d 102 (1994); Pigg v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 756, 441
S.E.2d 216 (1994) (en banc) (holding a habitual offender may not
challenge an adjudication collaterally in a subsequent criminal
proceeding).
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to convict Jackson
of driving after having been declared a habitual offender.
Jackson's conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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