Jaquane Antre Hines v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Annunziata and
Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
JAQUANE ANTRE HINES
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2557-00-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
FEBRUARY 26, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY
Thomas V. Warren, Judge
(William R. Blandford, Jr.; Blandford,
Carrico & Newlon, P.C., on brief), for
appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney
General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Jaquane Antre Hines was convicted by a jury for unlawfully
and feloniously entering or attempting to enter a vending
machine, in violation of Code § 18.2-153, and petit larceny of
the coins, in violation of Code § 18.2-96. Hines claims on
appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
We state the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be
drawn in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below,
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the Commonwealth. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 643, 646,
525 S.E.2d 72, 73 (2000). At approximately 3:33 a.m. on January
21, 2000, Deputy Randy Reynolds of the Powhatan Sheriff's
Department noticed a "grey older model Volvo" parked near the
vending machines at the Academy Road Exxon station during his
patrol. He also noticed a black, heavy-set male with bushy hair
returning to the car from the vending machines. Reynolds
circled his car back to the Exxon, but the Volvo was already on
the road by the time Reynolds returned to the scene.
Reynolds followed the Volvo to obtain the license plate
number and identify its owner. He found the owner to be
appellant's mother, Phyllis Hines. Towanda Williams, Hines'
witness, testified that Hines had had possession of his mother's
car for the past month.
Reynolds then went back to the Exxon station. He
discovered that the soda machine on the right sustained damage
and that the money box had been removed. He also discovered two
locks in the trash. When Reynolds had purchased a soda for
himself from one of the machines an hour earlier, before he
noticed the Volvo, he had seen no damage to either of the soda
machines. Accordingly, Reynolds issued a "Be On the Lookout,"
or BOL, for the Hines' Volvo.
Later that morning, the owner of Academy Road Exxon arrived
to open the gas station for business and discovered the thefts.
He noticed that both drink machines had been broken into and
- 2 -
that the coin boxes had been removed. They had contained money
from a few days of business. The locks had been broken off from
the T-type handle and the plates that cover the handle. He
testified that if the machines had been broken into on an
earlier occasion, he would have noticed because the money placed
into it to purchase the drinks would have fallen out.
The Volvo was spotted later that day in southside Richmond.
Upon investigation, Powhatan Deputy John Mattox noted that it
was grey and carried North Carolina tags. When the car was
being driven from its Richmond location, Mattox made a traffic
stop and found Hines, a passenger in the car, and Williams, his
girlfriend, driving it. Two crowbars, a pair of channel lock
pliers, a coin box, three locks and a Christmas present bag
filled with nickels, dimes, and quarters, totaling approximately
$500 were found in the vehicle. The station owner was able to
identify two of the three locks found in Hines' car as similar
to those that were on his vending machines. He also identified
a coin box found in Hines' car as the same type used in his
machines.
In cases where the sufficiency of the evidence is
challenged on appeal, "[w]e view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible from the evidence." Cooper, 31 Va.
App. at 646, 525 S.E.2d at 73. The appellate court must
"discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of
- 3 -
the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence
favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may
be drawn" from the credible evidence. Watkins v. Commonwealth,
26 Va. App. 335, 348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998). Accordingly,
we will not disturb the decision of the trial court unless it is
plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. McGee v.
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261
(1997) (en banc). "If there is evidence to support the
conviction," this Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the trier of fact, even were our opinion to differ.
Commonwealth v. Presley, 256 Va. 465, 466, 507 S.E.2d 72, 72
(1998).
Hines claims that the trial court erred by "fail[ing] to
give due weight to the testimony of the Appellant and his
witnesses that someone else may have come to Powhatan during the
early hours of January 21, 2000 . . . ." 1 We disagree.
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence are matters to be determined solely by the trier of
fact. Swanson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 376, 378-79, 382
1
Hines testified that the tools found in the Volvo "came
with the car" and were used to fix the other car they had.
Hines and Williams, his witness, both stated that the coin box
was found at a car wash in Midlothian and that Williams was
going to use it as a makeshift mailbox. The coins, they
explained, were those they had saved, after they sorted out the
pennies, and which they were taking to Ukrops to exchange for
bills. Neither Hines nor the codefendant could explain why the
Volvo was seen in Powhatan the night someone broke into the
vending machines.
- 4 -
S.E.2d 258, 259 (1989). Hence, the trier of fact is not
required to believe all aspects of a witness' statement or
testimony. Rather, it may reject that which it finds
implausible, and accept other parts that it finds believable.
Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 169, 198 S.E.2d 603, 606
(1973). Furthermore, a defendant's exculpatory account may be
treated, by inference, as an attempt to conceal guilt. See
Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d
233, 235 (1998). In this case, the trier of fact did not credit
the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses, and based its
determination of guilt on the circumstantial evidence presented.
See Feigley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 717, 724, 432 S.E.2d
520, 525 (1993) ("The fact finder resolves all conflicts in the
evidence.").
Hines also claims that the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth requires conjecture and suspicion to conclude that
Hines was the same individual observed by Deputy Reynolds at the
Exxon. However, we find that the circumstantial evidence in
this case amply supports the jury's finding that Hines was the
criminal agent beyond a reasonable doubt. See McNair v.
Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 76, 86, 521 S.E.2d 303, 308 (1999)
("Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt so long as 'all necessary circumstances
proved . . . exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.'"
(quoting Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 169, 313 S.E.2d
- 5 -
390, 393 (1984))). The evidence at trial proved that the car
driven by Hines was at the Exxon station at the time the crime
was committed. The car contained locks similar to those used by
the owner of the machines, a coin box similar to the ones used
for the machines, a pair of channel lock pliers, two crowbars,
and $500 in coins, without pennies. Furthermore, the jury
discredited the story of Hines and his girlfriend that they were
at home all night with a close friend. See Durham, 214 Va. at
169, 198 S.E.2d at 606. Thus, the jury had sufficient evidence
to find Hines guilty of the two charges beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, we affirm his convictions.
Affirmed.
- 6 -