Craig Leon Pulley, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Bumgardner and Frank
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
CRAIG LEON PULLEY, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0415-01-1 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
FEBRUARY 5, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Junius P. Fulton, III, Judge
Duncan R. St. Clair, III (Duncan R.
St. Clair, III & Associates, P.C., on brief),
for appellant.
Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General
(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
The trial court convicted Craig Leon Pulley, Jr., of
possessing a firearm while under the age of twenty-nine after
being convicted of a felony as a juvenile in violation of Code
§ 18.2-308.2. 1 The defendant contends the statute violates his
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
1
Code § 18.2-308.2(A) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for . . . any person
under the age of twenty-nine who was found
guilty as a juvenile fourteen years of age
or older at the time of the offense of a
delinquent act which would be a felony if
committed by an adult . . . to knowingly and
intentionally possess or transport any
firearm . . . .
rights to due process and equal protection by discriminating on
the basis of age. The trial court concluded the statute had a
rational basis and denied his motion to dismiss. 2 Finding no
error, we affirm.
The defendant was born November 16, 1981 and was convicted
of grand larceny as a juvenile on September 10, 1997. He was
eighteen years old on the date of the offense when a police
officer lawfully removed a firearm from his person.
"All legislation is presumed to be constitutional, and
. . . the party attacking [it must prove] . . . it is
unconstitutional." Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 427,
497 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1998) (citation omitted); Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 313 (1993). "In Equal Protection cases
classifications based upon alienage, race, or national origin
are inherently suspect and subject to close scrutiny. When the
classification is not suspect it is permissible if the
governmental objective is 'legitimate' and the classification
bears a 'reasonable' or 'substantial' relation thereto." Duke
v. County of Pulaski, 219 Va. 428, 432, 247 S.E.2d 824, 827
(1978) (citations omitted). The rational basis test applies to
2
The trial court noted that "the [age] classification is
rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of
keeping firearms out of the hands of felons and extending the
prohibition to those who committed a felony as a juvenile." It
concluded that the "age restriction is rationally related to
both the public safety interest and the state's interest in
establishing reasonable laws."
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age classification cases. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
470 (1991). The defendant must negate "'any reasonably
conceivable state of facts which could provide a rational basis
for the classification.'" Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (quoting
Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
The purpose of Code § 18.2-308.2 is to keep "firearms out
of the hands of convicted felons." Armstrong v. Commonwealth,
36 Va. App. 312, 318, 549 S.E.2d 641, 644 (2001). It is also to
keep firearms out of the hands of young adults who were
convicted of what would have been a felony if they had been
tried as adults. That is a permissible public safety concern
and a legitimate governmental objective. Limiting this
proscription to those under twenty-nine years of age balances
concerns for the public safety with the policy of giving
preferential treatment to juvenile offenders. Lifting the
prohibition after ten years as an adult mitigates the penalty or
accountability for youthful crimes. The classification is
rationally and reasonably related to the legitimate governmental
objective. It does not discriminate against the defendant.
Accordingly, we affirm his conviction.
Affirmed.
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