Virginia Electric & Power Company v. W. Crawford ( 2001 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Humphreys
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.   Record No. 2939-00-3              JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    DECEMBER 11, 2001
    WILLIAM FREZELL CRAWFORD
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Iris W. Redmond (Susan Moloney Smith;
    Midkiff, Muncie & Ross, P.C., on brief), for
    appellant.
    A. Thomas Lane, Jr., for appellee.
    Virginia Electric & Power Company appeals the Workers'
    Compensation Commission's award of benefits to William Frezell
    Crawford.    The employer contends the commission erred in finding
    the worker (1) established a change in condition, (2) was not
    barred by the statute of limitations, and (3) was not estopped
    from asserting his claim.    For the following reasons, we affirm.
    The award arises from a change of condition application
    filed February 22, 1999.    It alleged the worker's condition from
    a 1992 injury had deteriorated to a temporary total disability.
    The deputy commissioner awarded benefits, and the commission
    affirmed the award.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    The worker suffered a compensable injury by accident to his
    back on January 17, 1992 while working as a lineman.   On
    February 27, 1992 he had L5-S1 surgery and has suffered from S1
    radiculopathy on the right side since then.   He received a number
    of different awards after the 1992 injury, was restricted to
    light duty, and worked thereafter in selective employment as a
    meter reader.
    The worker twisted his back exiting a truck in March, 1997.
    The employer terminated the worker in April, 1997 when he was no
    longer able to work.    He continued to have pain and weakness in
    his back and legs, wore a lumbar support belt and had a second
    laminectomy on October 30, 1997.   After the operation his pain
    increased, and he needed a walker.
    The worker applied for benefits alleging the injury arose
    out of the March, 1997 accident.   He maintained that he could
    never go back to work because of that injury to his back, but
    the commission found that the injury did not arise out of the
    March, 1997 accident.    This Court affirmed the commission on
    October 5, 1999.    The worker then proceeded with this change of
    condition application.
    First, we review the finding that the worker proved his
    current condition was a change of condition of the injury
    received in 1992.   We review the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the worker, the prevailing party below.    R.G. Moore
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    Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    ,
    788 (1990).
    In an application for review of an award on the ground of a
    change in condition, the worker has the burden to prove his
    allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.     J.A. Jones
    Constr. Co. v. Martin, 
    198 Va. 370
    , 373, 
    94 S.E.2d 202
    , 204
    (1956).   The commission's determination of causation is a
    factual finding that is binding on appeal when supported by
    credible evidence.    Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).     "In determining whether
    credible evidence exists, the appellate court does not retry the
    facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its
    own determination of the credibility of the witnesses."      
    Id. (citation omitted). After
    the laminectomy in October, 1997, the worker had
    increased pain and was unable to walk without a walker.    On
    June 8, 1998, Dr. E. Franklin Pence, Jr. opined, "[B]ased on my
    examinations of the patient combined with the above testing and
    conversations with the patient's physical therapists, he has
    been and is still unable to work including a sedentary type
    position."    Dr. Pence confirmed the presence of a radiculopathy
    on the right side and noted the "onset of pain in 1992."
    Dr. David S. Klein examined the worker on July 6, 1999 and
    opined, "Clearly, the patient is suffering from the injury
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    sustained in 1992, which never resolved, resulted in a second
    surgery and worsening following that."
    Dr. Bart W. Balint also examined the worker and reviewed
    his medical records.   He opined on December 20, 1999:   "[The]
    case is one of clear causality between his Worker Comp injury of
    1992 and subsequent picture presenting at this time.     His early
    studies show significant disc changes at both L4-5 and L5-S1.
    Unfortunately, his second work related injury caused the L4-5
    disc to rupture and cause significant problems."    Dr. Balint
    concluded in a letter to the worker's counsel:   "It is my
    medical opinion that more probably than not, the above diagnosed
    conditions as correlated to [the worker] are directly related to
    [his] January 17, 1992 industrial accident.   Furthermore, it is
    my medical opinion that Mr. Crawford is totally disabled as a
    result of the January 17, 1992 industrial accident."
    Dr. Willie Thompson reviewed the worker's medical records
    at the employer's request.    Dr. Thompson was "unable to
    establish a causal relationship between the patient's present
    symptoms and the injury of January 17, 1992."    He concluded it
    was "impossible to relate the patient's present symptoms to a
    fall that occurred in January of 1992" and was in "total
    disagreement" with Dr. Balint's opinion.
    Medical evidence is subject to the commission's
    consideration and weighing.    Hungerford Mech. Corp. v. Hobson,
    
    11 Va. App. 675
    , 677, 
    401 S.E.2d 213
    , 215 (1991).   Drs. Klein
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    and Balint attributed the worker's current disability to his
    1992 injury.    They had reviewed the worker's medical records and
    examined him.    While Dr. Thompson totally disagreed with their
    conclusion, he never examined the worker.   As a result, the
    commission gave Dr. Thompson's opinion little weight.     The fact
    that there is contrary evidence in the record "is of no
    consequence if there is credible evidence to support the
    commission's finding."    Wagner 
    Enters., 12 Va. App. at 894
    , 407
    S.E.2d at 35.    We conclude the commission did not err in finding
    that the worker proved a change in condition and that such
    change was caused by the 1992 injury.
    Next, we consider whether the statute of limitations or
    doctrine of estoppel barred the worker's change-in-condition
    claim.    The commission ruled that Code § 65.2-708 controlled and
    subsection (C) 1 extended the statute of limitations to March,
    1999, which made the February, 1999 claim timely.   The
    commission also ruled estoppel did not bar the claim because
    "the present Claim was not 'inconsistent' with prior
    1
    Code § 65.2-708(C) provides:
    All wages paid, for a period not exceeding
    twenty-four consecutive months, to an
    employee (i) who is physically unable to
    return to his pre-injury work due to a
    compensable injury and (ii) who is provided
    work within his capacity at a wage equal to
    or greater than his pre-injury wage, shall
    be considered compensation.
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    litigation," and it was "for benefits relating to disability
    that was established by medical evidence dated after March
    1997."
    The employer maintains the applicable statute of
    limitations is the one-year limitation in Code § 65.2-501.    That
    section applies when the worker has not had a change in
    condition and is at the same disability level before and after
    an award.   Armstrong Furniture v. Elder, 
    4 Va. App. 238
    , 244,
    
    356 S.E.2d 614
    , 617 (1987) (citing Code § 65.1-56, now Code
    § 65.2-501).   This case was a claim for change of condition:
    the worker had returned to light duty work, payments had ceased,
    and he claimed he was currently totally disabled.    Having
    concluded the evidence supported the commission's finding of a
    change of condition, we also conclude that Code § 65.2-501 does
    not control.
    Code § 65.2-708(A) establishes a two-year statute of
    limitations for a change of condition application.   Subsection
    (C) extends that period "to prevent employers from lulling
    partially disabled workers into a false sense of security during
    this two year period by providing employees light duty work at
    their pre-injury wage for two years and then terminating the
    employee without liability for future disability benefits."
    Scott v. Scott & Am. Cas. Co., 
    16 Va. App. 815
    , 819, 
    433 S.E.2d 259
    , 262 (1993) (citation omitted).
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    In this case, the worker was restricted to light-duty work
    and worked as a meter reader after 1992.    The medical records
    demonstrate continued weakness in his back and legs, inability
    to walk or sit for long periods of time, radiculopathy on the
    right side, and continued lifting and climbing restrictions.
    The worker never returned to his work as a lineman and was
    unable to do that work.    The employer paid the worker for
    selective employment as a meter reader in lieu of benefits at a
    wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury wage until March,
    1997.    The two-year statute of limitations did not run until
    March, 1999, making the worker's application filed February,
    1999 timely.
    Finally, we consider whether the worker is estopped from
    claiming a change of condition.    The employer contends that the
    worker asserted facts inconsistent with those used to prove his
    earlier claim that the March 17, 1997 accident caused his
    current disability.    It maintains the worker filed the identical
    claim and alleged the 1992 accident caused the same condition
    after the commission found against him on the first claim.
    We are not able to review this part of the decision by the
    commission because the appendix does not include the
    commission's earlier opinion or the evidence given in support of
    the first claim.    We cannot decide the issue of estoppel without
    that information.     Anderson v. Commonwealth, 
    251 Va. 437
    , 439,
    
    470 S.E.2d 862
    , 863 (1996) (adequate record required to consider
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    estoppel argument).    Rule 5A:25(C)(3) provides that "[a]n
    appendix shall include . . . any testimony or other incidents of
    the case germane to the questions presented."    "The appendix is
    a tool vital to the function of the appellate process in
    Virginia. . . .   By requiring the inclusion of all parts of the
    record germane to the issues, the Rules promote the cause of
    plenary justice."     Thrasher v. Burlage, 
    219 Va. 1007
    , 1009-10,
    
    254 S.E.2d 64
    , 66 (1979).    Because the appendix does not contain
    essential parts of the record, we do not decide this issue.
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's award of
    benefits.
    Affirmed.
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