Adam Keating Wyatt v. Melanie Kay-Wyatt ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Bumgardner and
Senior Judge Hodges
ADAM KEATING WYATT
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1410-01-2 PER CURIAM
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
MELANIE KAY-WYATT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG
Horace A. Revercomb, III, Judge
(Winfred R. Mundle; Robert M. Alexander, on
brief), for appellant.
(Paul A. Simpson; Chandra D. Lantz;
Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen,
on brief), for appellee.
Adam Keating Wyatt (husband) appeals from a final decree of
divorce entered by the circuit court awarding Melanie Kay-Wyatt
(wife) a divorce on the ground of desertion pursuant to Code
§ 20-91(6). On appeal, husband contends the trial court erred in
(1) granting wife a divorce on the ground of desertion, (2)
finding husband had the ability to pay $2,200 monthly support to
wife, (3) finding that $2,200 monthly support would provide wife
with a standard of living at a level to which she had become
accustomed during the marriage, (4) calculating wife's attorney's
fees as a financial obligation under its support analysis, (5)
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
failing to consider all the statutory factors in its support
determination, (6) allocating the marital debt, (7) allocating the
marital assets, (8) allowing the commissioner to rely on his notes
rather than the transcripts, and (9) determining the parties' net
worth in its equitable distribution analysis. Upon reviewing the
record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of
the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to appellee as the party
prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250,
391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990).
Background
The parties married on June 25, 1994. During the course of
their marriage, the couple had two children. Following an
argument on the evening of December 4, 1998, husband left the
marital home and began living above his dental practice in a
building the couple owned. Husband never again stayed at the
marital home.
Husband established his own dental practice in 1996. By
March 1997, he was treating more than 200 patients per month, had
a waiting list for new patients and, during his second full year
practicing, realized net profits of $93,396. Soon after the
couple's separation, husband began neglecting his practice.
Husband cancelled at least one HMO agreement, decreased his
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patient load, reduced the hours in which he saw patients, and
spent extended periods away from his practice. In January 2000,
husband left his private practice and accepted a position as a
staff dentist, substantially reducing his income.
Husband also refused to make the mortgage payments on the
marital home, causing the home to be lost to foreclosure.
Similarly, the office building the couple owned was lost through a
conveyance in lieu of foreclosure when husband failed to maintain
the payments. Husband then filed for bankruptcy protection and
discharged a substantial portion of his debts.
Analysis
Desertion
I.
The choice of divorce grounds is submitted to the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be affirmed absent an
abuse of that discretion. See Konefal v. Konefal, 18 Va. App.
612, 613-14, 446 S.E.2d 153, 153 (1994). "'Where dual or
multiple grounds for divorce exist, the trial judge can use
. . . sound discretion to select the grounds upon which . . . to
grant the divorce.'" Sargent v. Sargent, 20 Va. App. 694, 707,
460 S.E.2d 596, 602 (1995) (quoting Lassen v. Lassen, 8 Va. App.
502, 505, 383 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1989)).
"[D]esertion is a breach of matrimonial duty - an actual
breaking off of the matrimonial cohabitation coupled with an
intent to desert in the mind of the deserting party."
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Petachenko v. Petachenko, 232 Va. 296, 298-99, 350 S.E.2d 600,
602 (1986). Husband left the marital home on December 4, 1998.
He announced that he was leaving and in a letter to wife dated
December 7, 1998, husband wrote, "I think that the time has come
to an end in our relationship . . . ." Husband never returned
to the marital home to sleep or stay from the time he left.
"[I]n order to end a desertion, the parties must resume the
matrimonial cohabitation with the intent to end the desertion."
Id. at 299, 350 S.E.2d at 602. Because there is evidence to
support the court's chosen ground for divorce, we shall not
disturb it on appeal.
Support
II. through V.
"Whether and how much spousal support will be awarded is a
matter of discretion for the trial court." Barker v. Barker, 27
Va. App. 519, 527, 500 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1998). "In fixing the
amount of the spousal support award, . . . the court's ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. We will reverse the trial court only when
its decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it." Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 574, 421 S.E.2d 635,
644 (1992) (citations omitted).
The trial court's discretion must not be exercised without
reference to Code § 20-107.1, which "commands that, in order to
exercise its discretion, '[t]he court shall . . . consider' the
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specific factors contained therein. Failure to do so is
reversible error." Bristow v. Bristow, 221 Va. 1, 3, 267 S.E.2d
89, 90 (1980) (citation omitted). In his report, the
commissioner listed and discussed each statutory factor set
forth in Code § 20-107.1. The commissioner concluded that
wife's annual income was $30,039.12 and husband earned $60,762.
The commissioner also noted that husband's annual income
previously had been as high as $84,378. The commissioner noted
the couple's high standard of living during the marriage and
reported that husband was currently working at less than his
full earning capacity. Wife retained custody of the couple's
two minor children. The commissioner and the trial court
carefully considered the household expenses of each party.
Based upon consideration of all the factors, the commissioner
recommended that wife receive $2,200 per month in support.
"In setting or modifying spousal support or child support,
a court may impute income to a party voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed." Blackburn v. Michael, 30 Va. App. 95, 102, 515
S.E.2d 780, 783 (1999). The trial court found that husband, in
allowing his practice to diminish shortly after the separation,
and in accepting a lower paying staff dentist position, was
voluntarily underemployed.
The trial court stated that "each of the parties shall bear
his or her own attorney's fees." The commissioner did not err
in considering wife's attorney's fees as a financial obligation
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in determining the amount of support to award her. See Code
§ 20-107.1(E). Considering the obligation as one of wife's
debts did not result in husband being ordered to pay wife's
attorney's fees. In fact, the commissioner's report
specifically states that each party is responsible for his or
her attorney's fees.
In his report, the commissioner found that during the
marriage, wife contributed monetarily to the well-being of the
family by working full time, earning approximately $30,000 per
year as a teacher. She also provided the major care for the
children and took care of the household chores. Additionally,
she assisted husband in establishing his dental practice.
"When a party to a divorce suit establishes an entitlement
to support, the law imposes upon the party liable for that
support a duty to maintain the dependent party according to the
parties' marital lifestyle." McCombs v. McCombs, 26 Va. App.
432, 436, 494 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1998). After considering all of
the relevant factors, the trial court determined that an award
of $2,200 per month afforded wife an appropriate standard of
living and was within husband's ability to pay. We find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of spousal
support to wife.
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Equitable Distribution
VI., VII. and IX.
The commissioner's report, adopted by the trial court,
recites in detail the equitable distribution factors set forth
in Code § 20-107.3.
"In reviewing an equitable distribution
award on appeal, we have recognized that the
trial court's job is a difficult one, and we
rely heavily on the discretion of the trial
judge in weighing the many considerations
and circumstances that are presented in each
case." Klein v. Klein, 11 Va. App. 155,
161, 396 S.E.2d 866, 870 (1990). Unless the
record shows that the judge has abused his
or her discretion by misapplying the
statutory factors, the judge's determination
will not be reversed on appeal. See id.
Anderson v. Anderson, 29 Va. App. 673, 692-93, 514 S.E.2d 369,
379 (1999). The record clearly demonstrates that the
commissioner and the trial court considered and weighed each of
the required statutory factors in determining the distribution
of the parties' debts and assets.
Commissioner's Notes
VIII.
In his brief, husband's eighth question presented is:
"Whether the trial court committed error when he adopted fully
without modification the commissioner's practice of using his
notes of testimonial evidence instead of the actual transcript
that he had in his possession at the relevant times?" Husband,
however, provided neither argument nor precedent in support of
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this question presented. See Littlejohn v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.
App. 401, 409, 482 S.E.2d 853, 857 (1997) (a party waives an
issue on appeal if he does not submit written argument on the
issue in his appellate brief); Rule 5A:20(e). Accordingly, we
will not address this question presented.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial
court. See Rule 5A:27.
Affirmed.
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