Michael Lee Sammons v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Clements and Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MICHAEL LEE SAMMONS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0089-00-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
MAY 29, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge
D. Gregory Carr (Bowen, Bryant, Champlin &
Carr, on brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Appellant Michael Lee Sammons was convicted in a bench trial
of first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of
murder, robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of
robbery. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he gave to police.
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this
case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential
value, this opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of this appeal.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Specifically, Sammons asserts on appeal that the police, over
a lengthy period of time in a cramped room, made numerous promises
of leniency, applied psychological pressures, threatened to
prosecute members of his fiancee's family, and led him to believe
that his freedom or life depended on his cooperation with them.
His inculpatory statements, he argues, were not voluntary and it
was error, therefore, on the part of the trial court to deny his
motion to suppress them.
On appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress, the burden is on the appellant to show that the denial
of the motion constituted reversible error. See Fore v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). We review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to the Commonwealth
all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from it. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47,
48 (1991).
"The Commonwealth has the burden to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that a defendant's confession was freely and
voluntarily given." Bottenfield v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 316,
323, 487 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1997). The voluntariness issue is a
question of law requiring an independent determination on appeal.
E.g., Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 551, 413 S.E.2d
655, 656 (1992). "In assessing voluntariness, the court must
determine whether 'the statement is the product of an essentially
- 2 -
free and unconstrained choice by its maker, or . . . whether the
maker's will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired.'" Roberts v.
Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 557, 445 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1994)
(quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140, 314 S.E.2d
371, 381 (1984) (internal quotations omitted)). In making that
independent determination, "we are bound by the trial court's
subsidiary factual findings unless those findings are plainly
wrong." Wilson, 13 Va. App. at 551, 413 S.E.2d at 656.
"Conflicts in evidence present factual questions that are to be
resolved by the trial court," which "'must evaluate the
credibility of the witnesses, resolve the conflicts in their
testimony and weigh the evidence as a whole.'" Mills v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 459, 468, 418 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1992)
(quoting Albert v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 734, 738, 347 S.E.2d
534, 536 (1986)).
In determining voluntariness, we look to the "'totality of
all the surrounding circumstances,' including the defendant's
background, experience, mental and physical condition and the
conduct of the police." Commonwealth v. Peterson, 15 Va. App.
486, 488, 424 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1992) (citation omitted). In
considering the conduct of the police, we "must consider the
interrogation techniques employed, including evidence of trickery
and deceit, psychological pressure, threats or promises of
leniency, and duration and circumstances of the interrogation."
- 3 -
Terrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 285, 291, 403 S.E.2d 387, 390
(1991).
Here, Sammons was arrested and taken into custody by
Chesterfield County police on January 16, 1998, for unrelated
charges in a "church burglary." After Sammons signed a waiver of
his Miranda rights, he was interviewed by Detectives Truehart and
Baker. Truehart told Sammons,
I expect you to tell me the truth. I told
you I'd be square with you and I'd help you
to the fullest, didn't I? If I catch you in
a lie, I'm gonna hammer you. And you got a
baby coming here, be due, in what, a couple
months.
After the officers questioned Sammons about the unrelated
"church burglary," the interview shifted to the murder of James
Lambrecht. Sammons first asked what was going to happen to him,
whether he would be going to jail or would "get off." Truehart
told Sammons he had no control over whether Sammons went to jail,
but he would put in a "very good word" for him with the
Commonwealth's attorney. Truehart implored Sammons to tell him
the truth, and Baker told Sammons it would help him a lot if he
told them about the murder. Truehart reminded Sammons again about
the baby Sammons was expecting and told Sammons he needed to think
of himself. Thereafter, Sammons gave a version of the murder that
implicated solely his codefendant, Jason Gregory.
Later during the same interview, Sammons asked for the
officers' help, reminding them that he had a baby on the way.
- 4 -
Truehart responded that he was going to help Sammons and that
Sammons had to look out for himself. Truehart also told Sammons
that the more he did for the officers, the more they would do for
him. Truehart further advised Sammons, "[Y]our life depends on
you this moment and you got to tell us everything you know."
Later in the interview, Baker and Sammons engaged in the
following exchange:
Baker: Mike, we will help you out the
best we can. We'll go to the Commonwealth's
attorney and help you out the best we can.
But we're going to need your help on this,
too.
Sammons: I will go to court and testify
for you all, but I cannot go to jail. I will
not be able to handle that mentally. Not
again.
Baker: Well, we can't tell you that
you're not going to go to jail. Okay.
That's not up to us. That's not our shot.
You know what will happen. Right here today
you'll have to go in front of the magistrate.
And we can, we, Detective Truehart and I,
will both go to the magistrate and tell that
you've cooperated with us. But we can't make
any promises to you. You know that.
Baker also implored Sammons to be totally honest and assured him
that they knew Gregory was the "bad guy" and that they were "not
looking to hammer" Sammons.
During the interview, the officers twice offered Sammons a
drink and permitted him to go to the restroom when he requested to
do so. Throughout the interview, Sammons blamed Gregory for the
murder, insisting that Gregory had acted independently and that
- 5 -
Sammons was unaware of Gregory's intention to rob or kill
Lambrecht.
Subsequently, Baker and Detective Steve Smith interviewed
Sammons. Smith began the interview by accusing Sammons of having
lied to the officers earlier. He told Sammons that Gregory had
accused Sammons of shooting Lambrecht. Smith also implied that,
if Sammons did not tell the truth, the police might have to
involve Sammons's future father-in-law in the murder investigation
and charge Sammons's fiancee's sister, who was in the car after
the murder, as an accessory after the fact.
When Sammons refused to change his version of what happened,
Smith, who knew from other evidence that Sammons was involved in
the killing, told Sammons:
Let me tell you something, son. You're
lying. I'm telling you that straight up.
Now do you want to face a capital murder
charge, robbery, and death in result of a
robbery? . . . Now let me tell you one more
time. You better start telling the truth.
If you don't, you're going to be the worst
guy in this whole scenario.
Smith further told Sammons that a jury would not believe his
inconsistent story and that he had better start "singing," because
he was "digging [his] hole deeper."
When Smith and Baker suggested to Sammons that they knew
where to get the gun Sammons used to shoot Lambrecht, Sammons
confessed his part in the robbery and murder and apologized for
- 6 -
lying to the officers. At no time did Sammons seek to terminate
the interview or talk to an attorney.
The record in this case contains a transcript of the initial
interview with Sammons; an audiotape, videotape, and transcript of
the second interview; and brief testimony of Detectives Smith and
Baker regarding the second interview. Other than what is revealed
in the transcript of the first interview, we have no record of the
circumstances of that interview. Nor can we ascertain from the
record when the second interview occurred or how long it
continued, although the videotaped portion of that interview
lasted no more than two hours, including breaks in the
questioning. Sammons is seen smoking a cigarette during that
interview.
At the suppression hearing, the trial court determined that,
while the police "were alternately leaning on [Sammons],
challenging his statements, telling him he was lying on matters,
and . . . making other [vague and oblique charges] as to his
[fiancee's] sister, to his potential father-in-law and to what may
happen with him vis-à-vis the co-defendant," the police did not as
a matter of law, overbear the will of the accused. Thus, the
trial court concluded, even though it was the result of a
"spirited interrogation," Sammons's confession was voluntary. We
agree.
From our independent review of the record, we conclude that
Sammons made no inculpatory statements to the police during the
- 7 -
first interview. He was advised of his Miranda rights and chose
to talk to the officers. He was given breaks and a drink upon
request. At various points during the interview, the officers
expressed their opinion that Sammons's cooperation and
truthfulness would help him. They advised Sammons that they would
speak to those in authority on his behalf if he cooperated and
told the truth. But they further indicated they had no authority
themselves to make any promises regarding the nature of the
charges or their outcome. In telling Sammons that he needed to
think about his unborn child and himself, the detectives, who were
unaware at the time of Sammons's role in the killing, were, it
could reasonably be surmised, simply warning Sammons that he
needed to take the interview seriously, as his answers would have
an important effect on his and his future family's lives.
By the time the second interview commenced, the officers had
obtained Gregory's version of the events, which incriminated
Sammons. The officers then used that information, along with
other information from their investigation, to encourage Sammons
to reveal his true involvement in the crimes. In asking Sammons
if he wanted "to face a capital murder charge," the police were,
we believe, advising, rather than threatening, Sammons that
Gregory, the suspected triggerman, was fingering Sammons as
Lambrecht's killer. Without the truth from Sammons, Gregory's
version of the facts might prevail and Sammons might be prosecuted
for capital murder. The police further advised Sammons that, in
- 8 -
weighing his credibility, a jury might disbelieve him because he
was telling so many versions of what occurred. Furthermore, the
officers knew that one of the guns involved in the murder belonged
to Sammons's future father-in-law and that Sammons's fiancee's
sister, Victoria DeMaio, was a passenger in the car with Sammons
and Gregory after the killing. This knowledge formed the basis of
the officers' claims that Sammons, because he was being
untruthful, was "dragging [his future father- and sister-in-law]
into this."
Thus, in considering the totality of the circumstances, we
hold that the officers merely persuaded, rather than coerced,
Sammons to confess and that, as evidenced by Sammons's apology to
the officers for his previous lies, Sammons's confession was
voluntary. Hence, the trial court did not err in refusing to
suppress Sammons's inculpatory statements.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling denying
Sammons's motion to suppress his confession and affirm appellant's
convictions.
Affirmed.
- 9 -