Joseph McDonald Lynch v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Clements
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
JOSEPH McDONALD LYNCH
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0512-00-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
MAY 22, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Thomas N. Nance, Judge
S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Public
Defender Commission, on brief), for
appellant.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant
Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Appellant Joseph McDonald Lynch was convicted of assault and
battery in violation of Code § 18.2-57 and assault and battery of
a police officer in violation of Code § 18.2-57(C). On appeal, he
contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to
withdraw his guilty pleas before sentencing. We disagree and
affirm the convictions.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this
case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential
value, this opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of this appeal.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Specifically, Lynch argues he was entitled to withdraw his
guilty pleas before sentencing because he learned after entering
the pleas that he had a defense. 1 Lynch claims he originally pled
guilty because inmates who witnessed the alleged assaults were no
longer at the jail and, thus, were unavailable to testify.
Without their testimony, he "didn't think [he] had a case."
However, according to Lynch, he changed his mind when two more
witnesses told him they "would come forward" and testify on his
behalf about the alleged assaults.
"Code § 19.2-296 allows a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea
before sentence is imposed." Jones v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App.
503, 511, 513 S.E.2d 431, 435 (1999). "Whether a defendant should
be permitted to withdraw a guilty plea rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court to be determined based on the facts
and circumstances of each case." Hall v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.
App. 74, 79, 515 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1999). "The court's finding as
to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence in
support of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be
disturbed unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."
Jones, 29 Va. App. at 512, 513 S.E.2d at 435.
1
Lynch also argues at length on appeal that Code
§ 19.2-296's post-sentence standard of "manifest injustice" does
not apply to his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because he
made his motion before sentence was imposed. Such an argument,
however, is moot in this case as the trial court did not apply
the "manifest injustice" standard in determining Lynch's motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas.
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"As in other cases of discretionary power, no
general rule can be laid down as to when a
defendant will be permitted to withdraw his
plea. The decision in each case must depend
to a great extent on the particular attendant
circumstances. Generally, however, it may be
said that the withdrawal of a plea of guilty
should not be denied in any case where it is
in the least evident that the ends of justice
will be subserved by permitting not guilty to
be pleaded in its place. The least surprise
or influence causing a defendant to plead
guilty when he has any defense at all should
be sufficient grounds for permitting a change
of plea from guilty to not guilty. Leave
should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea
of guilty if it was entered by mistake or
under a misconception of the nature of the
charge; through a misunderstanding as to its
effect; through fear, fraud, or official
misrepresentation; was made involuntarily for
any reason; or even where it was entered
inadvisedly, if any reasonable ground is
offered for going to the jury."
Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 325, 52 S.E.2d 872, 874
(1949) (quoting 14 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 287 (1938)).
Determining whether the trial court erred in denying Lynch's
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas "requires an examination of
the circumstances confronting [Lynch] immediately prior to and at
the time he pleaded to the charge[s]." Id. at 322, 52 S.E.2d at
872. On December 21, 1999, Lynch, who was represented by an
attorney, was arraigned and tendered pleas of guilty to both the
charge of assault and battery and the charge of assault and
battery of a police officer. The trial judge questioned Lynch
extensively to ensure that he was entering the pleas voluntarily,
knowingly, and with a clear understanding of their effect. The
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Commonwealth then proffered its evidence, which was not challenged
by Lynch. The trial judge found Lynch guilty on both counts and
continued the case for sentencing. On January 7, 2000, Lynch
filed a pro se motion for withdrawal of his pleas. Lynch's motion
was heard on January 13, 2000 prior to sentencing. Lynch was
represented at that hearing by his attorney.
Lynch put on no evidence in support of his motion at the
hearing. He merely told the trial judge he originally pled guilty
because he was unable to locate fellow inmates who had witnessed
the incident and consequently did not think he had a case. He
added, however, that two inmates who said they saw the assault and
would testify on his behalf had come forward since then. He did
not identify those witnesses or proffer what they would say that
might benefit Lynch.
Asked by the trial court if he had ever interviewed the
possible witnesses, Lynch's attorney told the trial court that
prior to Lynch's entry of the guilty pleas, Lynch had given him a
couple of names of witnesses. One of them had been transferred to
the Department of Corrections, but the other was still in jail and
Lynch's attorney had been prepared to bring him to trial on the
trial date. Lynch's attorney also told the trial court that,
since pleading guilty, Lynch had given him the name of one other
witness, but provided no other information about that person
except that Lynch could find him if Lynch was able to get out of
jail. Likewise, Lynch did not identify at the hearing on his
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motion any defense he might have as a result of his newly found
witnesses' testimony.
Nor did Lynch establish that he entered the guilty pleas
involuntarily, by mistake or under a misconception of the nature
of the charges, through a misunderstanding as to the effect of the
guilty pleas, or through fear, fraud, or official
misrepresentation.
The trial court chose not to believe or accept Lynch's stated
reasons for seeking leave to withdraw his guilty pleas. Instead,
the court made specific findings that Lynch understood the
situation when he pled guilty and that the pleas were willingly,
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. The court's
ruling is supported by the record and was not plainly wrong. We
hold, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm appellant's convictions.
Affirmed.
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