George Douglas Young, Jr. v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2001 )


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  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Bray
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    GEORGE DOUGLAS YOUNG, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1228-00-2                  JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    MAY 15, 2001
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY
    William L. Wellons, Judge
    (Robert H. Morrison, Bennett & Morrison,
    P.L.C., on brief), for appellant. Appellant
    submitting on brief.
    Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    George Young, Jr. (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial
    of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine with
    intent to distribute, possession of a firearm while in possession
    of cocaine and possession of marijuana, all "on or about
    January 27, 1998 through January 30, 1998."   On appeal, defendant
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
    convictions for possession of cocaine and related possession of a
    firearm.   We disagree and affirm the trial court.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
    memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of the appeal.
    I.
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
    the record, "in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    giving it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom."
    Watkins v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 335
    , 348, 
    494 S.E.2d 859
    ,
    866 (1998) (citation omitted).    "[T]he fact finder is not
    required to accept entirely either the Commonwealth's or the
    defendant's account of the facts [but] may reject that which it
    finds implausible, [and] accept other parts which it finds
    believable."   Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 82
    , 92, 
    428 S.E.2d 16
    , 24 (1993) (citation omitted).     Thus, the credibility of
    the witnesses, the weight accorded testimony, and the inferences
    drawn from proven facts are matters to be determined by the fact
    finder.   Long v. Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 194
    , 199, 
    379 S.E.2d 473
    , 476 (1989).   The judgment of the trial court will not be
    disturbed unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.
    See Code § 8.01-680.
    Viewed accordingly, the instant record discloses that, on
    January 30, 1998, Jimmy Thomas, special agent for the Virginia
    Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, and Halifax County
    Police Sergeant Richard Pulliam executed a search warrant at a
    residence in the town of Virgilina.      Entering the residence
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    "through the front door . . . into a hallway," Thomas observed
    defendant asleep on "a bed in the middle of the living room."
    Five other persons, including Mack Kincy, were gathered in "a
    smaller room" adjacent to and at "the back of the living room."
    The resulting search yielded an array of contraband,
    including a "nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol," a "forty
    caliber semiautomatic pistol," cocaine, marijuana, large amounts
    of cash, cellular phones, pagers, razor blades, and "marked money
    . . . from a controlled buy."   Defendant concedes on brief that
    "the majority of these items . . . were in plain view and laying
    about the [smaller] room," within several feet of defendant.
    Searching defendant's person, police discovered $163 in his
    pocket, which he explained was won "playing cards," but no drugs
    or weapons.
    Interviewed by police, defendant admitted smoking marijuana
    earlier in the evening.   Defendant denied selling drugs on the day
    of the search, although he had witnessed twelve people purchase
    drugs from others at the house and had advised a person seeking
    drugs to "hold up," while he summoned Mack Kincy from "inside" to
    make the sale.   However, defendant admitted distributing crack
    cocaine the preceding evening, including trading the drug for a
    shotgun, a transaction observed by Pulliam during his undercover
    surveillance.    Defendant acknowledged his fingerprints would
    appear on the razor blades and "guns," because he had "busted open
    cigars" with the razor blades and had "touched all" the weapons.
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    Mack Kincy testified defendant "sometimes . . . would stay"
    at the residence, a house "used . . . for selling cocaine" by
    several persons, including defendant, and sold cocaine on several
    occasions during the period embraced by the subject indictment.
    Kincy noted defendant regularly purchased the drug for resale,
    both from another resident and a "person that lived upstate."
    On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
    evidence to establish "that [he] constructively possessed the
    cocaine confiscated . . . during the raid at issue," together with
    firearms, although he does not contest the related conviction for
    conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
    II.
    Actual or constructive possession of drugs and firearms will
    support a conviction for such offenses.    Logan v. Commonwealth,
    
    19 Va. App. 437
    , 444, 
    452 S.E.2d 364
    , 368 (1994) (en banc).       The
    principles that govern a determination of constructive
    possession of illegal drugs also apply to like possession of a
    firearm.    Blake v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 706
    , 708-09, 
    427 S.E.2d 219
    , 220-21 (1993).   Constructive possession may be
    established by "evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of the
    accused or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that
    the defendant was aware of both the presence and the character
    of the substance and that it was subject to his dominion and
    control."    
    Logan, 19 Va. App. at 444
    , 452 S.E.2d at 368-69
    (citation omitted).   "[P]ossession need not always be exclusive.
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    The defendant may share it with one or more" persons and "[t]he
    duration of the possession is immaterial."   Gillis v.
    Commonwealth, 
    215 Va. 298
    , 302, 
    208 S.E.2d 768
    , 771 (1974).
    "[P]roof that a person is in close proximity to contraband is a
    relevant fact that, depending on the circumstances, may tend to
    show that, as an owner or occupant of property . . ., the person
    necessarily knows of the presence, nature and character of the
    [item] that is found there."   Burchette v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.
    App. 432, 435, 
    425 S.E.2d 81
    , 83 (1992).
    Here, defendant confessed to trading crack cocaine 1 for a
    shotgun and other cocaine sales during the several days
    immediately preceding the search, January 30, 1998, assisting
    Kincy in a cocaine sale earlier that day, and handling both drug
    paraphernalia and firearms found scattered about the home.
    Defendant's statements, his continuing involvement with others in
    the distribution of cocaine from the premises and the related
    possession of firearms were corroborated by the testimony of
    Kincy.   Such evidence clearly established defendant actually and
    1
    In the absence of a certificate of chemical analysis,
    defendant contends the Commonwealth failed to prove the
    substance traded for the shotgun was cocaine. However, "[t]he
    nature of an illegal substance may be demonstrated by
    circumstantial evidence." Myrick v. Commonwealth, 
    13 Va. App. 333
    , 339-40, 
    412 S.E.2d 176
    , 179 (1991). Defendant admitted
    trading "cocaine" for the shotgun, and the transaction occurred
    in a house dedicated to sale of the drug, harboring several
    persons, including defendant, then conspiring in such
    distribution. Thus, the record sufficiently established the
    identity of the substance traded and otherwise sold by
    defendant.
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    constructively possessed both cocaine and firearms during the
    period embraced by the indictment, January 27 through 30, 1998.
    Further, "[a] co-conspirator may be criminally liable for an
    act of another member of the conspiracy if the act is 'done in
    the furtherance of the conspiracy' and can 'be reasonably
    foreseen as a necessary and natural consequence of the'
    conspiracy."   Cotter v. Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 382
    , 386, 
    452 S.E.2d 20
    , 22 (1994).   The Commonwealth proved defendant's
    co-conspirators possessed the cocaine and firearms discovered in
    the house during the search, all in furtherance of the
    conspiracy to distribute cocaine, criminal conduct that renders
    defendant equally culpable.
    Accordingly, the evidence sufficiently supported the
    convictions, and we affirm the trial court.
    Affirmed.
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