Daniel Stith v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Bray
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DANIEL STITH
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1210-00-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
MAY 8, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL
James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge
Robert L. Lichtenstein for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Daniel Stith (appellant) appeals from his bench trial
conviction for assault on a police officer pursuant to Code
§ 18.2-57. 1 On appeal, he contends the evidence failed to prove
he knew or had reason to know that the individuals were police
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
1
Although the transcript and sentencing order indicate that
appellant was convicted of assaulting a police officer, a
violation of Code § 18.2-57, the sentencing order incorrectly
cites Code § 18.2-57.1. Prior to 1997, Code § 18.2-57.1
proscribed assault on a police officer. However, in 1997, the
General Assembly repealed Code § 18.2-57.1 and reenacted the
offense formerly proscribed therein as subsection (C) of Code
§ 18.2-57. See 1997 Va. Acts, ch. 833. Thus, when appellant
committed the instant offense on April 10, 1999, it was a
violation of Code § 18.2-57(C) rather than Code § 18.2-57.1, and
we remand to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting
the clerical error in the sentencing order. See Tatum v.
Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 585, 592, 440 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1994).
officers. 2 We hold the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, supports the trial court's
finding that appellant acted with the requisite knowledge.
Therefore, we affirm his conviction, subject to remand solely
for the correction of a clerical error.
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
in a criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The
conclusions of the fact finder on issues of witness credibility
may be disturbed on appeal only if this Court finds that the
witness' testimony was "inherently incredible, or so contrary to
human experience as to render it unworthy of belief." Fisher v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 299-300, 321 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1984).
In all other cases, we must defer to the conclusions of "the
fact finder[,] who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the
witnesses." Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337
S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985). The fact finder is not required to
believe all aspects of a witness' testimony; it may accept some
2
Appellant makes passing mention on brief that he "lacked
the requisite knowledge that the individuals were Police
Officers in the performance of their duties." (Emphasis added).
He did not make this argument at trial, however, and his brief
focuses on whether he knew the individuals were police officers,
not whether he knew they were in the performance of their
duties. Thus, we do not consider this argument separately.
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parts as believable and reject other parts as implausible. See
Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24
(1993).
Intent or knowledge, like any element of a crime, may be
proved by circumstantial evidence, see Servis v. Commonwealth, 6
Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988), such as a
person's conduct and statements, see Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.
App. 194, 198, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). "Circumstantial
evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as
direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt."
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876
(1983). "[T]he Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable
hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those
that spring from the imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993).
Code § 18.2-57(C) provides that "if any person commits an
assault . . . against another knowing or having reason to know
that such other person is a law-enforcement officer . . .
engaged in the performance of his public duties as such, such
person shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony . . . ." What
constitutes an assault is defined by common law:
An assault is an attempt or offer, with
force and violence, to do some bodily hurt
to another . . . by means calculated to
produce the end if carried into execution;
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as . . . by levelling a gun at another
within a distance from which, supposing it
to be loaded, the contents might injure, or
any similar act accompanied with
circumstances denoting an intention coupled
with a present ability, of using actual
violence against the person of another.
Harper v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 723, 733, 85 S.E.2d 249, 255
(1955) (emphasis added; citation and emphasis omitted). One may
commit an assault even though the victim is not aware of or
frightened by any acts directed at him, provided the perpetrator
has the specific intent to commit a battery and commits an overt
act in furtherance of that intent. Adams v. Commonwealth, 33
Va. App. 463, 469, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000); Park Oil Co. v.
Parham, 1 Va. App. 166, 170, 336 S.E.2d 531, 534 (1985).
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, supports the trial court's finding that appellant
intentionally shot at a group of people whom he knew or had
reason to know were police officers engaged in the performance
of their duties. When appellant testified at trial, he admitted
firing the gun. Although appellant claimed to have fired it
into the air to scare two would-be robbers, witness Linda Pace
saw appellant pointing the gun "straight out" toward Winston
Churchill Drive in the direction of 1204 Liberty Avenue
immediately after she heard the gunshot. At that same instant,
a bullet passed so close to Officer Bayes' position at the edge
of the yard at 1204 Liberty that he heard the bullet as it
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traveled through the trees overhead. Bayes was an experienced
hunter and said that the sound and motion of the leaves
indicated to him the path of a bullet.
Shortly before appellant fired the shot, the police
officers had walked up Liberty Street to the residence at 1204,
and at least six of the seven were in uniforms indicating in
various ways that they were police officers. All the uniforms
were dark blue or black. Some of the uniforms bore the word,
"Police," in large white letters, while others contained large
patches denoting the men were police officers. All wore gun
belts. The location on Liberty Street where the officers parked
their unmarked vehicles was visible from the intersection of
Liberty and Granby Avenue, where appellant stood when he fired
the shot, and the driveway of 1204 Liberty Street, where the
officers were gathered, was only 144 feet from that same
intersection. Finally, when appellant was apprehended
immediately after the shooting, he admitted at various times to
Detectives McQuage and Hartman and Officer Dean that "[he] knew
[they] were there" and knew they were police officers.
Detective McQuage's testimony about appellant's admission
stood unimpeached. That Hartman and Dean gave conflicting
testimony at the preliminary hearing about whether appellant
made such statements was not dispositive; the trial court was
free to assess the officers' credibility and to conclude they
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were testifying truthfully at appellant's trial. In addition,
the trial court specifically concluded, as it was entitled to
do, that appellant's testimony about an attempted robbery was
incredible. Appellant did not report the attempted robbery when
he was arrested, and the police officers did not see anyone pass
them as they proceeded to the intersection, despite appellant's
claim at trial that the would-be robbers fled in the same
direction from which the officers had come.
Once the trial court resolved these credibility questions
against appellant, the only reasonable hypothesis flowing from
the circumstantial and direct evidence was that appellant knew
the men were police officers engaged in the performance of their
duties and that he intentionally shot at them on the afternoon
of April 10, 1999.
For these reasons, we affirm appellant's conviction for
assaulting a police officer in the performance of his duties in
violation of Code § 18.2-57. However, due to the clerical error
in the sentencing order regarding the statute under which
appellant was convicted, see supra note 1, we remand this matter
to the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting the
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sentencing order to reflect that appellant was convicted under
Code § 18.2-57 rather than Code § 18.2-57.1.
Affirmed on the merits
and remanded with
instructions.
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