Patrick Timothy Jeffers v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Frank
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
PATRICK TIMOTHY JEFFERS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1350-00-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
MARCH 6, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY
William H. Shaw, III, Judge
B. Elliott Bondurant (Hudson and Bondurant,
P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Patrick Timothy Jeffers (appellant) was convicted in a bench
trial of solicitation to commit a felony in violation of Code
§ 18.2-29 and contributing to the delinquency of a minor in
violation of Code § 18.2-371. On appeal, he contends the trial
court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to convict him of
both offenses. Finding no error, we affirm the convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
"Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party below, granting to it all reasonable inferences
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
fairly deducible therefrom." Green v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App.
438, 442, 528 S.E.2d 187, 189 (2000) (citing Juares v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997)).
So viewed, the evidence established that on October 18, 1999,
fourteen-year-old Kimberly, whose last name we choose not to
reveal, was walking on Bray Road in Gloucester County near her
home when appellant approached her in his car. He initially
passed by her, but then turned around and came back towards her.
He stopped and told her, "If you sit on my face, I'll lick your
clit." She responded, "What?" He repeated the statement. She
told him to go away and turned to begin walking toward her house.
Appellant again drove up to her and asked, "Are you sure?" He
also asked if she wanted a ride. She told him to "leave her
alone." Appellant drove off again.
Appellant drove down the street, turned around, and
approached Kimberly a third time. In a demanding tone of voice,
he ordered her to get in the car. Kimberly testified she was
"scared" that he might try to make her get in the car. When she
again rebuffed him and continued to walk on, appellant turned
around and again approached her. He said, "Are you sure you don't
want a ride?" By then Kimberly had reached her house. She put
her hands up and told him to leave her alone. When her mother
came out of the house, appellant left.
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At no time did appellant reach out for Kimberly, nor did he
make any gestures toward her. After the initial encounter,
Kimberly did not run to her house but "walk[ed] fast."
Appellant admitted to a deputy sheriff that he was present at
the location described by Kimberly and asked her if she wanted a
ride. Appellant indicated he was on the dead-end road looking for
a friend who "might be working in a construction site in that
area." Deputy Sheriff Guire testified there was no construction
in that area.
Kimberly's mother testified she saw a car next to her
daughter. Kimberly was coming toward her and "became hysterical."
The driver of the car looked at the mother and "took off."
Appellant denied that he made any sexual comment to Kimberly,
although he did comment that "she had a pretty face" and indicated
he would give her a ride to "any place she wanted to go." On
cross-examination, appellant admitted he approached Kimberly four
times while in his car, but he denied telling her to get into the
car.
Appellant moved to strike the evidence at the conclusion of
the Commonwealth's case and at the conclusion of his own evidence.
The trial court overruled both motions finding the evidence
sufficient to support the convictions.
II. ANALYSIS
In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider the record "'in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
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giving it all reasonable inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. In so doing, we must
discard the evidence of the accused in
conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and
regard as true all the credible evidence
favorable to the Commonwealth . . . .'"
Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335,
348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998) (citation
omitted). The credibility of the witnesses,
the weight accorded testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from proven facts are
matters to be determined by the fact finder.
See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194,
199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). "When
weighing the evidence, the fact finder is not
required to accept entirely the
Commonwealth's or defendant's account of the
facts," but "may reject that which it finds
implausible, [and] accept other parts which
it finds to be believable." Pugliese v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d
16, 24 (1993). The judgment of the trial
court, finding guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, will not be set aside unless plainly
wrong or unsupported by the evidence. See
Code § 8.01-680.
DeAmicis v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 437, 440, 524 S.E.2d 151,
152 (2000) (en banc).
Code § 18.2-29 states:
Any person who commands, entreats, or
otherwise attempts to persuade another person
to commit a felony, shall be guilty of a
Class 6 felony. Any person age eighteen or
older who commands, entreats, or otherwise
attempts to persuade another person under age
eighteen to commit a felony, shall be guilty
of a Class 5 felony.
Thus, "[c]riminal solicitation involves the attempt of the
accused to incite another to commit a criminal offense." Branche
v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 480, 490, 489 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1997).
"'It is immaterial whether the solicitation is of any effect and
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whether the crime solicited is in fact committed . . . . The gist
of [the] offense is incitement.'" Id. (quoting Huffman v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 823, 827, 284 S.E.2d 837, 840 (1981)).
"[T]he act of solicitation may be completed before any attempt is
made to commit the solicited crime . . . ." Ford v. Commonwealth,
10 Va. App. 224, 226, 391 S.E.2d 603, 604 (1990) (citing Pedersen
v. Richmond, 219 Va. 1061, 1067-68, 254 S.E.2d 95, 99 (1979)).
In Pederson, the Supreme Court of Virginia wrote,
"Solicitation may comprise a course of conduct, intended to induce
another to act, that continues over an extended period. All the
evidence bearing upon [the accused's] intent is relevant to a
determination of his [or her] guilt or innocence." Pedersen, 219
Va. at 1067, 254 S.E.2d at 99.
In order to determine if appellant's words and conduct
commanded, entreated or attempted to persuade Kimberly to commit a
felony, we examine appellant's total course of conduct.
First, it is reasonable to infer that appellant referred to
an act of sodomy in violation of Code § 18.2-361(A) 1 when he said,
"If you sit on my face, I'll lick your clit." The trial court
1
Section 18.2-361(A) states:
If any person carnally knows in any
manner any brute animal, or carnally knows
any male or female person by the anus or by
or with the mouth, or voluntarily submits to
such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be
guilty of a Class 6 felony, except as
provided in subsection B.
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could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's words
and conduct did in fact encourage or incite Kimberly to commit a
felony.
Appellant contends our holding in Ford controls. In Ford,
two female students from Randolph-Macon College were waiting at
the drive-through at a McDonald's restaurant. Ford, 10 Va. App.
at 225, 391 S.E.2d at 603-04. Ford, a McDonald's employee, walked
toward their car. Id. at 225, 391 S.E.2d at 604. He leaned
against the driver's side of the car and asked the women if they
attended Randolph-Macon. Id. They answered affirmatively and
resumed their conversation. Id. Then, Ford mumbled something.
Id. One of the women asked Ford what he wanted. Id. Ford stated
he wanted sex and said, "'I want to lick your pussy.'" Id. The
women rolled up their windows until a woman returned with their
food. Id. They asked the woman at the drive-through window for
Ford's name. Id. at 226, 391 S.E.2d at 604. Ford volunteered his
name, and the women drove to the front of McDonald's, went inside
and spoke with the manager. Id.
This Court reversed Ford's conviction, finding that Ford's
statements were nothing but an expression of his desire and did
not constitute a command, entreaty or attempt to persuade either
woman to engage in oral sodomy. Id. at 228, 391 S.E.2d at 605.
We wrote, "During both of the exchanges between Ford and the
women, Ford made no movement toward the car after initially
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walking up to it, nor did he offer the women money or ask them to
get out of the car." Id. at 226, 391 S.E.2d at 604.
Unlike Ford, appellant's words and actions were more than an
expression of his desire for oral sex. The trial court could have
properly concluded that appellant expressed both a desire and
entreaty to induce Kimberly to allow him to sodomize her. Once
rebuffed, he asked, "Are you sure?" This question belies
appellant's contention that he only expressed a desire. By asking
this question, appellant was challenging Kimberly's negative
response to his request for oral sex. Clearly, a statement of
desire does not elicit a response that would be challenged by
appellant. Further, appellant, in a demanding tone of voice,
ordered her to get in his car. To accomplish his incitement to
commit sodomy appellant needed Kimberly to enter his vehicle. The
facts in this case are similar to those in Pedersen. Appellant's
entire course of conduct underscored his desire for Kimberly to
act upon his entreaty.
Appellant further contends because he did not solicit
Kimberly to commit a felony, he cannot be convicted pursuant to
Code § 18.2-371 of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 2
2
Section 18.2-371 states:
Any person eighteen years of age or
older, including the parent of any child,
who (i) willfully contributes to,
encourages, or causes any act, omission, or
condition which renders a child delinquent,
in need of services, in need of supervision,
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Based on our view that appellant did solicit Kimberly, we find no
merit in his contention. By soliciting Kimberly to commit a
felony, he encouraged an act which would render a child
delinquent.
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all elements of both offenses. We, therefore,
affirm appellant's convictions for violating Code § 18.2-29 and
Code § 18.2-371.
Affirmed.
or abused or neglected as defined in
§ 16.1-228, or (ii) engages in consensual
sexual intercourse with a child fifteen or
older not his spouse, child, or grandchild,
shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
This section shall not be construed as
repealing, modifying, or in any way
affecting §§ 18.2-18, 18.2-19, 18.2-61,
18.2-63, 18.2-66, and 18.2-347.
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