Charles Mayland Limbrick v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CHARLES MAYLAND LIMBRICK
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2568-99-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
DECEMBER 12, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY
William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge
Michael R. McCarthy (Jarrell, Hicks, Sasser &
McCarthy, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Charles Mayland Limbrick was indicted and tried for
statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91 and grand
larceny in violation of Code § 18.2-95 for his part in breaking
and entering seventeen manufactured mobile homes. The mobile
homes were on display and serving as models on a mobile home
sales lot located in Spotsylvania County. Limbrick stole
appliances and furniture from nine of the homes. Following a
jury trial, while the jury was deliberating, but before
returning its verdicts, Limbrick pled guilty to single counts of
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
statutory burglary and grand larceny, and the court accepted his
guilty pleas pursuant to the holding in North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). On appeal of the statutory burglary
conviction, Limbrick attempts to raise two issues: (1) whether
the trial court erred, prior to his pleading guilty, in denying
his motion to strike the evidence as to statutory burglary
because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the mobile homes
were permanently affixed to realty, and (2) whether the trial
court erred, prior to his pleading guilty, in refusing to
instruct the jury that, as to statutory burglary, they must find
the mobile homes were permanently affixed to the realty.
Because a defendant who has entered an Alford plea may, on
appeal, only challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court,
Perry v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 410, 412-13, 533 S.E.2d 651,
653 (2000), the dispositive issue is whether Limbrick's two
questions presented on appeal raise a jurisdictional issue. We
find that neither of the two questions raises a jurisdictional
issue, but rather raises questions of alleged trial error.
Because Limbrick waived his right to appeal any claims of trial
error by pleading guilty, we dismiss the appeal and we do not
decide whether the trial judge correctly construed the elemental
requirements of Code § 18.2-91 or correctly instructed the jury
as to the elements of the offense.
- 2 -
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At trial, Limbrick pled not guilty to one count of
statutory burglary and one count of grand larceny and elected to
be tried by a jury. At the close of the Commonwealth's case,
Limbrick moved to strike the evidence as to the burglary charge,
arguing that in order to be convicted of a violation of Code
§ 18.2-91, the Commonwealth must prove that the manufactured
mobile homes were affixed to the realty and the Commonwealth had
failed to prove that fact. The trial judge denied the motion,
ruling that the 1985 amendment to Code § 18.2-90, by
specifically designating "manufactured home" as a structure
subject to burglary, abolished the requirement that a
manufactured home be affixed to realty in order to constitute a
violation under Code § 18.2-91. In accordance with that same
ruling, the trial judge denied Limbrick's proffered jury
instruction on statutory burglary that contained a requirement
that the "manufactured home" must be permanently affixed to
realty in order to be the subject of statutory burglary.
After Limbrick entered his Alford plea, but prior to
sentencing, he filed a motion to set aside the statutory
burglary conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding
that Limbrick's plea "was accepted by the Court" and that the
plea barred his "ability to raise this or any non-jurisdictional
issue." Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Limbrick and
entered the conviction order.
- 3 -
ANALYSIS
Under an Alford plea, a defendant
maintains innocence while entering a plea of
guilty because the defendant concludes that
his interests require entry of a guilty plea
and the record before the court contains
strong evidence of actual guilt . . . .
Guilty pleas must be rooted in fact before
they may be accepted. Accordingly, courts
treat Alford pleas as having the same
preclusive effect as a guilty plea.
Perry, 33 Va. App. at 412, 533 S.E.2d at 652-53 (citations
omitted). A voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty "is a
waiver of all defenses other than those jurisdictional . . . .
Where a conviction is rendered upon such a plea and the
punishment fixed by law is in fact imposed in a proceeding free
of jurisdictional defect, there is nothing to appeal." Dowell
v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1145, 1148, 408 S.E.2d 263, 265
(1991) (internal quotation and citation omitted), aff'd on reh'g
en banc, 14 Va. App. 58, 414 S.E.2d 440 (1992); see also Clauson
v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 282, 294, 511 S.E.2d 449, 455
(1999) (holding that a plea of nolo contendere, like a guilty
plea, constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all
non-jurisdictional issues).
Limbrick attempts to frame his claims as raising
jurisdictional issues by asserting that he entered an Alford
plea only after the trial court refused to properly instruct the
jury regarding the applicable law defining the basic elements of
the offense of statutory burglary. He reasons that his plea was
- 4 -
not a knowing and voluntary plea because he entered it only
because the trial court had "misinformed [him] regarding the
law" and the elements of the offense to which he pled guilty.
"The term 'subject matter jurisdiction' refers to the power
granted to the courts by constitution or statute to hear specified
classes of cases." Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 405, 409, 527
S.E.2d 415, 417 (2000) (citation omitted). There is a
distinction, however, between subject matter jurisdiction and the
authority of a court to exercise that power in a particular case.
See Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 431, 437, 527 S.E.2d 406, 409
(2000).
[Subject matter jurisdiction] cannot be
waived and any judgment rendered without it
is void ab initio. Moreover, lack of
subject matter jurisdiction "may be raised
at any time, in any manner, before any
court, or by the court itself." In
contrast, "[a] court's authority to exercise
its subject matter jurisdiction over a case
may be restricted by a failure to comply
with statutory requirements that are
mandatory in nature and, thus, are
prerequisite to a court's lawful exercise of
that jurisdiction."
Id. (citations omitted).
Code § 17.1-513 provides that the circuit courts "shall
. . . have original jurisdiction of all indictments for felonies
and of presentments, informations and indictments for
misdemeanors." Here, it is clear that the circuit court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the charged offense, a
violation of Code § 18.2-91. In this case, we also find that
- 5 -
the court had authority to exercise that jurisdiction.
Moreover, we find unavailing any argument that the circuit court
lacked authority to exercise that jurisdiction in the present
case because the elements the Commonwealth was required to prove
did not constitute an offense under the statute.
Here, Limbrick was charged with a violation of Code
§ 18.2-91, statutory burglary, and he was informed of the
elements the Commonwealth was required to prove in order to
sustain a conviction. To the extent the trial court may have
erroneously interpreted the statutory elements of the offense,
such an error may provide a basis to appeal, but such an error
does not divest the court of jurisdiction. See generally
Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 250-51, 402 S.E.2d 678,
680-81 (1991) (holding that the court's failure to inform the
jury of a material element of the offense charged and the
failure of the Commonwealth to produce evidence relating to that
element was reversible error). See also Campbell v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 988, 991-95, 421 S.E.2d 652, 654-56
(1992) (en banc) (holding that failure of the trial court to
instruct the jury as to an essential element of the offense was
a trial court error that could be considered on appeal for "good
cause" despite the fact that no contemporaneous objection was
made as required by Rule 5A:18), aff'd in part on other grounds,
246 Va. 174, 431 S.E.2d 648 (1993).
- 6 -
Limbrick entered an Alford plea as to one count of statutory
burglary in order to be sentenced by the trial judge and to avoid
the possibility that the jury would impose a harsher sentence.
After obtaining the benefit of entering a guilty plea, Limbrick
now seeks to challenge on appeal those trial court rulings and
alleged errors that occurred during the jury trial proceedings
which were superceded by the guilty plea. "Where a conviction is
rendered upon . . . a [guilty] plea and the punishment fixed by
law is in fact imposed in a proceeding free of jurisdictional
defect, there is nothing to appeal." Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194,
196-97, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969). Because Limbrick voluntarily
and knowingly entered an Alford plea, he is precluded from
challenging the alleged trial errors. See generally Allen v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 726, 732, 501 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1998)
(finding that defendant, who amended his plea during trial after
he testified, does not waive any trial rights, but rather fully
exercises them). The proper avenue for Limbrick to have
challenged the alleged trial errors would have been to proceed
with trial, obtain verdicts from the jury, and challenge the
alleged errors on appeal.
Limbrick entered his Alford plea knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently. Before entering his plea, Limbrick was
informed by the trial judge of the elements of the offense under
Code § 18.2-91, as construed by the judge, that the Commonwealth
was required to prove and of the evidence against him. That
- 7 -
became the law of the case. If the trial court erred by failing
to properly instruct the jury or by erroneously construing the
elements of the offense as defined by Code §§ 18.2-90 and
18.2-91, Limbrick's remedy was to proceed to final judgment and
appeal the trial court's ruling. By pleading guilty under
Alford, Limbrick waived his right to challenge whether the trial
court erroneously instructed the jury and misinformed him as to
the elements of the offense. Accordingly, we decline to consider
these non-jurisdictional issues on appeal.
We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
- 8 -