Renard C. Fields v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Bray, Clements and Senior Judge Hodges
    Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
    RENARD C. FIELDS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2192-99-1                   JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    OCTOBER 3, 2000
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
    Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge
    Christopher P. Reagan, Assistant Public
    Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Renard C. Fields (defendant) was convicted by a jury for
    malicious wounding and a related firearm charge.       On appeal,
    defendant, an African-American, complains that the trial court
    erroneously permitted the Commonwealth to exercise race-based
    peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 79
    (1986).    We disagree and affirm the convictions.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
    memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of the appeal.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    An accused enjoys the "right to be tried by a jury whose
    members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminating criteria."        
    Id. at 85-86.
      Thus, the exercise of a peremptory challenge to strike
    "potential jurors solely on account of their race" violates the
    Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.      
    Id. at 89.
      The protocols that govern determination of a Batson motion
    are well established.
    The opponent of a peremptory challenge must
    establish a prima facie case of
    discrimination (step 1); once a prima facie
    case is made, the burden of production
    shifts to the proponent of the strike to
    produce a race-neutral or, as in this case,
    a gender-neutral explanation (step 2); if a
    neutral explanation is proffered, the trial
    court must then decide whether the opponent
    of the strike has met its burden and proved
    purposeful discrimination (step 3).
    Riley v. Commonwealth, 
    21 Va. 330
    , 333, 
    464 S.E.2d 508
    , 509
    (1995) (citations omitted).
    In assessing the prosecutor's explanation at step 1,
    assuming a prima facie case of discrimination, "'the issue is
    the facial validity . . . [and] [u]nless a discriminatory intent
    is inherent in the . . . explanation, the reason offered will be
    deemed race neutral.'"    Purkett v. Elem, 
    514 U.S. 765
    , 768
    (1995) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 
    500 U.S. 352
    , 360 (1991)).
    The prosecution's reasoning need not be "persuasive, or even
    plausible[,]" only race neutral as a matter of law.       
    Id. If found
    race neutral, the inquiry proceeds to the third step,
    requiring defendant "'to show both that [the race neutral
    - 2 -
    explanations] were merely pretextual and that race . . . was the
    real reason'" for the strike.    Robertson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.
    App. 635, 638, 
    445 S.E.2d 713
    , 715 (1994) (citation omitted).
    Thus, generally, "the decisive question" before the trial
    court ultimately becomes "whether counsel's race neutral
    explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed" and,
    "once that has been settled, there seems nothing left to
    review."   
    Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365
    , 367.   Such determination
    constitutes a factual finding by the trial court, accorded
    "'great deference on appeal'" and disturbed only if unsupported
    by the evidence.   Barksdale v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 456
    ,
    460, 
    438 S.E.2d 761
    , 763 (1993) (en banc) (citations omitted).
    Here, following the court's finding of prima facie
    "racially discriminatory challenges" by the Commonwealth, the
    prosecutor offered racially neutral explanations for each
    disputed strike, including the proximity of addresses provided
    by two venirepersons and certain defense witnesses.   In
    response, defense counsel was admittedly uncertain whether the
    addresses were "near," recalling only the venirepersons in issue
    had not expressed recognition of any witness previously
    disclosed to the panel by the court.
    In overruling the motion, the trial court accepted the
    prosecutor's representations, "as an officer of the court,"
    concluding that the explanations were race neutral and not
    pretextual, findings properly supported by the record.
    - 3 -
    Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
    Affirmed.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2192991

Filed Date: 10/3/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021