Dickenson Co. Medical Centerv Barbara Rose ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
    DICKENSON COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER AND
    FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE
    COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 0731-00-3                         PER CURIAM
    AUGUST 1, 2000
    BARBARA G. ROSE
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Robert M. McAdam; Jones & Glenn, P.L.C., on
    brief), for appellants.
    (Paul L. Phipps; Lee & Phipps, P.C., on
    brief), for appellee.
    Dickenson County Medical Center and its insurer
    (hereinafter referred to as "employer") contend that the
    Workers’ Compensation Commission erred in finding that Barbara
    G. Rose proved that (1) her current psychiatric condition is, in
    part, causally related to her May 3, 1998 compensable injury by
    accident, and (2) she was totally disabled from work due to her
    psychiatric condition.     Upon reviewing the record and the briefs
    of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.        See
    Rule 5A:27.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    I.
    "General principles of workman's compensation law provide
    that '[i]n an application for review of any award on the ground of
    change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such
    change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the
    evidence.'"   Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 
    4 Va. App. 459
    ,
    464, 
    359 S.E.2d 98
    , 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight Carriers,
    Inc. v. Reeves, 
    1 Va. App. 435
    , 438-39, 
    339 S.E.2d 570
    , 572
    (1986)).   "[I]t is fundamental that a finding of fact made by the
    Commission is conclusive and binding upon this court on review.    A
    question raised by conflicting medical opinion is a question of
    fact."   Commonwealth v. Powell, 
    2 Va. App. 712
    , 714, 
    347 S.E.2d 532
    , 533 (1986).   "Questions raised by conflicting medical
    opinions must be decided by the commission."   Penley v. Island
    Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    , 318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236 (1989).
    In granting Rose's application alleging a
    change-in-condition, the commission found as follows:
    We . . . note that, after Dr.
    [Patricia] Vanover offered her opinion on
    the issue of disability, neither party
    thereafter approached Dr. [Russell D.]
    McKnight or Dr. [Ashvin A.] Patel for a
    clarification of their respective opinions
    on the issue of causation. Dr. McKnight
    found that [Rose's] psychiatric condition
    was causally related to the work injury and
    Dr. Patel had previously found that the
    industrial accident at least aggravated or
    exacerbated the pre-existing depressive
    disorder.
    - 2 -
    Given the record before us, we find a
    sufficient foundation for the opinions
    rendered by Dr. McKnight and Dr. Patel. We
    find that the greater weight of the evidence
    establishes that [Rose's] current
    psychiatric condition is, in part, causally
    related to the work injury and likewise any
    disability flowing therefrom.
    The commission's findings are supported by credible
    evidence, including the opinions and medical records of Drs.
    McKnight and Patel.    In its role as fact finder, the commission
    was entitled to accept the opinions of Drs. McKnight and Patel
    and to reject any contrary medical evidence.    In addition, based
    upon the opinions and medical records of Drs. McKnight and
    Patel, the commission, as fact finder, could reasonably infer
    that Rose's current psychiatric condition is, at least in part,
    causally related to her compensable injury by accident.     See
    Papco Oil Co. v. Farr, 
    26 Va. App. 66
    , 75, 
    492 S.E.2d 858
    , 862
    (1997) (holding that "a condition which has two causes, one
    related to a work injury, and one not, is compensable and the
    treatment of that condition will be the responsibility of the
    employer").
    II.
    On review, before the commission, employer did not argue
    that Rose failed to prove that she was entitled to temporary
    total disability benefits as a result of her psychiatric
    condition.    The sole issue raised by employer in its written
    statement submitted on review was whether Rose had proven a
    - 3 -
    causal connection between her psychiatric condition and her
    compensable injury by accident.    Accordingly, we will not
    address this issue on appeal.     See Green v. Warwick Plumbing &
    Heating Corp., 
    5 Va. App. 409
    , 413, 
    364 S.E.2d 4
    , 6 (1988); Rule
    5A:18.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0731003

Filed Date: 8/1/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021