Matthew Dean Wyatt v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Bumgardner
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    MATTHEW DEAN WYATT
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0554-97-3              JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    MARCH 24, 1998
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
    B.A. Davis, III, Judge
    (Mary E. Harkins, on brief), for appellant.
    Appellant submitting on brief.
    (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; Michael T.
    Judge, Assistant Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
    Matthew Dean Wyatt was convicted of making and communicating
    a threat to burn a building in violation of Code § 18.2-83.     He
    contends that the evidence failed to prove mens rea and failed to
    prove he made an actual threat.    We affirm the conviction.
    I.
    "Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after
    conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom."      Higginbotham v.
    Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).         So
    viewed, the evidence proved that on August 8, 1996, Wyatt placed
    several telephone calls to the residence of James Allen Mills,
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Jr.   Mills had known Wyatt for about six months and recognized
    Wyatt's voice from many conversations with Wyatt both in person
    and over the telephone.   Mills was acquainted with Wyatt because
    Wyatt had dated Mills' daughter.   Mills disapproved of Wyatt
    dating his daughter, and, on a prior occasion, when Wyatt and
    Mills' daughter were living together, Mills had tried to get them
    to separate.
    Mills answered four or five of Wyatt's telephone calls.
    During each of the calls, Wyatt asked to speak with Mills'
    daughter.   Each time, Mills refused to allow Wyatt to talk to his
    daughter.   During Wyatt's last telephone call to the Mills'
    residence, Wyatt told Mills that he would "just have to come down
    there and whip your fat ass and burn your house down."   After
    Wyatt hung up the telephone, Mills immediately dialed a telephone
    code to determine the location from which Wyatt was calling.
    However, because the call came from out of state, the telephone
    service could not provide the telephone number.   Four days later,
    Mills sought a warrant for Wyatt's arrest.
    The trial judge found that Wyatt made a threat to burn
    Mills' residence as proscribed by the statute and convicted
    Wyatt.
    II.
    In pertinent part, Code § 18.2-83 states that "[a]ny person
    . . . who makes and communicates to another by any means any
    threat to bomb, burn, destroy or in any manner damage any place
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    of assembly, building or other structure, or any means of
    transportation . . . shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony."
    Noting that the language of the statute "is not vague," this
    Court has ruled that "[a] threat, in the criminal context, is
    recognized to be a communication avowing an intent to injure
    another's person or property."     Perkins v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 7
    , 16, 
    402 S.E.2d 229
    , 234 (1991).
    Code § 18.2-83 does not require the Commonwealth to prove
    that Wyatt intended to carry out his threat to burn Mills' house.
    Proof that the threat was made and communicated satisfies the
    statutory requirements.   See Parnell v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 342
    , 346, 
    423 S.E.2d 834
    , 837 (1992).    However, this Court has
    construed the statute to require proof that the threat to burn
    was malicious and "reasonably cause[d] the receiver to believe
    that the speaker will act according to his expression of intent."
    Perkins, 12 Va. App. at 15-16, 
    402 S.E.2d at 234
    .
    The evidence proved that Wyatt and Mills had an antagonistic
    relationship stemming from Wyatt's contact with Mills' daughter.
    Mills' refusal to allow Wyatt to talk to Mills' daughter angered
    Wyatt.   When Wyatt threatened to burn Mills' home, Wyatt also
    expressed hostility toward Mills by threatening to assault Mills.
    This evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
    that Wyatt's threat to burn Mills' house was maliciously made.
    "Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or
    without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will . . .[,
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    and i]t may be directly evidenced by words."     Dawkins v.
    Commonwealth, 
    186 Va. 55
    , 61, 
    41 S.E.2d 500
    , 503 (1947).
    Wyatt argues that Mills' delay in seeking a warrant proves
    Mills was unconcerned about the threat.    We disagree.   Whether
    Mills reasonably believed that Wyatt intended to burn Mills' home
    was a question of fact for the trial judge.     See Bennett v.
    Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 228
    , 233, 
    380 S.E.2d 17
    , 20 (1989).        The
    evidence in the record supports the finding that Mills' belief
    was reasonable.
    The evidence proved that Mills did take the threat
    seriously.    Unlike several prior telephone conversations of that
    day, Mills attempted to locate Wyatt after the threat was made.
    Wyatt's threat to assault Mills, the animus between the men, and
    Mills' attempt to locate the place from which Wyatt called are
    sufficient to prove that Mills' belief was reasonable and that
    Mills was concerned about the threat.
    Furthermore, Mills' delay in obtaining the warrant was a
    matter going toward Mills' credibility, an issue for the trier of
    fact.     See Love v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 84
    , 90, 
    441 S.E.2d 709
    , 713 (1994).    Mills' delay of four days to obtain a warrant
    is not conduct that necessarily evidenced that Mills did not
    believe Wyatt would act on the statement.
    Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyatt's conduct was in
    violation of Code § 18.2-83.
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    Affirmed.
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