Samuel Victor Palmer v. Edna Lee Palmer ( 1996 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    SAMUEL VICTOR PALMER
    v.         Record No. 1214-95-2         MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    EDNA LEE PALMER                               MAY 14, 1996
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    George F. Tidey, Judge
    James Emmett Anderson for appellant.
    Harry P. Anderson, Jr., for appellee.
    Edna Lee Palmer (wife) and Samuel Victor Palmer (husband)
    were divorced by decree of the trial court which retained
    jurisdiction to thereafter "adjudicate the remedies provided by
    . . . Code [§§] 20-107.1, 107.2 and 107.3" and "to award counsel
    fees and costs . . . ."   These remaining issues were resolved by
    a further order which allocated certain marital property and
    debts between the parties, vested physical custody of their
    infant child in wife, fixed the related child support
    obligations, and awarded wife spousal support and counsel fees.
    Husband challenges each ruling on appeal.   For those reasons
    hereinafter set forth, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and a
    recitation of the facts is unnecessary to this memorandum
    opinion.   "Upon familiar principles, we review the evidence on
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    appeal in the light most favorable to . . . the party prevailing
    below."       Cook v. Cook, 
    18 Va. App. 726
    , 731, 
    446 S.E.2d 894
    , 896
    (1994).
    EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
    "[I]n reviewing an equitable distribution award, we rely
    heavily on the trial judge's discretion in weighing the
    particular circumstances of each case."       Aster v. Gross, 7 Va.
    App. 1, 8, 
    371 S.E.2d 833
    , 837 (1988).      Accordingly, we defer to
    the chancellor's resolution of the conflicting equities and will
    upset an award only if unsupported by the evidence or the result
    of an abuse of discretion or failure to follow statutory mandate.
    Banagan v. Banagan, 
    17 Va. App. 321
    , 326, 
    437 S.E.2d 229
    , 231-32
    (1993) (citations omitted).
    Here, the record discloses a $50,438 IRS lien on the marital
    home.       However, the trial court, without support in the record,
    concluded that "a realistic settlement of the lien would be
    approximately $20,000." 1     This determination infected the related
    equitable distribution with error, necessitating a
    reconsideration by the trial court of the parties' respective
    interests pursuant to Code § 20-107.3.
    On remand, although the trial court need not assign a weight
    to each factor prescribed by Code § 20-107.3, we caution that it
    must be guided by the statute in fashioning a proper award.
    1
    Because we reverse and remand on this issue, we decline to
    specifically address husband's additional challenges to the
    award.
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    CUSTODY
    When addressing matters concerning a child
    . . . the paramount consideration of a trial
    court is the child's best interests. On
    review, "[a] trial court is presumed to have
    thoroughly weighed all the evidence,
    considered the statutory requirements, and
    made its determination based on the child's
    best interests." Furthermore, the evidence
    is viewed in the light most favorable to the
    prevailing party below and its evidence is
    afforded all reasonable inferences fairly
    deducible therefrom. "In matters of a
    child's welfare, trial courts are vested with
    broad discretion in making the decisions
    necessary to guard and to foster a child's
    best interests." The trial court's judgment,
    "when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will
    not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
    wrong or without evidence to support it."
    Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 
    13 Va. App. 123
    ,
    128, 
    409 S.E.2d 460
    , 463 (1991) (citations omitted); see Code
    §§ 20-124.1 through 20-124.3.
    Here, the trial court vested legal custody of the child in
    both parents, "with [wife] having the primary physical and
    residential custody of the child and [husband] having liberal and
    reasonable visitations . . . ."   The court noted a "concern[]
    about the inability of the parties to communicate" but concluded
    that "joint custody should be attempted in fostering the best
    interest of [the child]."   The resulting custodial arrangement
    comports with Code §§ 20-124.1 through 20-124.3.
    Our review of the record discloses ample evidence to support
    the trial court's order, without suggestion of an abuse of
    2
    discretion.
    2
    Husband's contention that the trial court "recant[ed]" an
    earlier ruling is without merit.
    - 3 -
    CHILD SUPPORT
    In determining an appropriate award of child support, "the
    court shall consider all evidence presented relevant to any
    issues joined in that proceeding," and the "decision . . . shall
    be rendered upon the evidence relevant to each individual case."
    Code § 20-108.1(B).     "However, there shall be a rebuttable
    presumption . . . that the amount of the award which would result
    from the application of the guidelines set out in Code § 20-108.2
    is the correct amount of child support . . . ."        
    Id. Deviation is
    permissible upon consideration of specific statutory factors,
    if accompanied by "written findings in the order . . . that the
    . . . guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular
    case."     
    Id. Here, in
    computing the parties' support obligations pursuant
    to Code § 20-108.2, the trial court assigned monthly "gross
    income" to husband of $2,300, without evidence to support this
    finding.     See Code § 20-108.2(C).     The statutory formula
    correlates the gross income of the parents, the amount of the
    support award, and the respective obligation of each parent.
    Code § 20-108.2.    Thus, attribution of an incorrect gross income
    component to husband resulted in an erroneous computation of his
    support obligation, an error which requires remand.
    SPOUSAL SUPPORT
    Code § 20-107.1 requires the court to consider certain
    enumerated circumstances in ascertaining an award of spousal
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    support, if any.       "This does not mean that the trial court is
    required to quantify or elaborate exactly what weight . . . it
    has given to each . . .," provided "the court's findings . . .
    have some foundation based on the evidence presented."          Woolley
    v. Woolley, 
    3 Va. App. 337
    , 345, 
    349 S.E.2d 422
    , 426 (1986).
    Because our disposition of several issues subject of this
    appeal impact upon circumstances relevant to spousal support, we
    must also reverse and remand the instant award for
    reconsideration by the trial court, guided by the provisions of
    3
    Code § 20-107.1.
    ATTORNEY'S FEES
    The trial court will doubtless revisit attorney's fees in
    the context of other issues remanded by this decision, and we,
    therefore, reverse and remand the present award to permit such
    further consideration.       See Westbrook v Westbrook, 
    5 Va. App. 446
    , 458, 
    364 S.E.2d 523
    , 530 (1988) (citations omitted); Code
    § 20-79.
    Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed in
    part and affirmed in part, and the cause is remanded for further
    proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
    Affirmed in part,
    reversed in part,
    3
    Should the issue of "lump sum" spousal support arise on
    remand, the unique character of such relief must be considered by
    the trial court. Code § 20-107.1; Blank v. Blank, 
    10 Va. App. 1
    ,
    
    389 S.E.2d 723
    (1990); Mosley v. Mosley, 
    19 Va. App. 192
    , 
    450 S.E.2d 161
    (1994).
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    and remanded.
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