Robert Bruce Jackson v. Jean Jackson Harley ( 1996 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Overton
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    ROBERT BRUCE JACKSON
    v.        Record No. 2138-95-3         MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
    JEAN JACKSON HARLEY                         MAY 14, 1996
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
    Charles H. Smith, Jr., Judge
    Melissa Warner Scoggins (David G. Weaver;
    Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, on briefs), for
    appellant.
    Charlie R. Jessee (Jessee & Read, P.C., on
    brief), for appellee.
    Robert Bruce Jackson appeals the decision of the trial court
    finding that he has agreed to send all of his three children to
    college and requiring him to pay those expenses.   We affirm the
    trial court's ruling as to the first child, but reverse as to the
    two younger children.
    When Dr. Robert Jackson and Jean Harley Jackson divorced in
    1987, their children were ten, seven, and four years old.    The
    Stipulation Agreement incorporated into the divorce decree
    contained a provision concerning college expenses:
    16. The Parties hereto agree that should each of
    the Parties, decide to send any or all of their
    children, aforesaid, to college, said educational
    expense(s) will be provided for by the Parties on a
    pro-rated basis of his or her income to the other
    Party.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    As an example, the following is provided:
    Husband's annual earnings —   $200,000.00
    Wife's annual earnings —        20,000.00
    Wife would be obligated to pay ten (10%) of the
    child's college expenses.
    In Fall 1994 their eldest daughter decided to forego her
    senior year of high school and enrolled at the University of
    Virginia.   Dr. Jackson did not want her to go to school this
    early, but instead thought that she should take a year off.     He
    eventually paid ninety percent of her college expenses, but
    challenged the provision, arguing that each parent was required
    to agree to send the child to college and he did not agree.     The
    court ruled that the agreement contemplated a college education
    for all the children and that neither parent had a veto power.
    The judge further found that the parties in fact had agreed to
    send their children to college.
    A separation agreement is enforced as any other contract
    between the parties.   Parra v. Parra, 
    1 Va. App. 118
    , 128, 
    336 S.E.2d 157
    , 162 (1985).   "Property settlement and support
    agreements are subject to the same rules of construction and
    interpretation applicable to contracts generally."   Fry v.
    Schwarting, 
    4 Va. App. 173
    , 180, 
    355 S.E.2d 342
    , 346 (1987); see
    Tiffany v. Tiffany, 
    1 Va. App. 11
    , 15, 
    332 S.E.2d 796
    , 799
    (1985).   The intent of the parties as expressed in the contract
    controls the interpretation.   Bender-Miller Co. v. Thomwood
    Farms, Inc., 
    211 Va. 585
    , 588, 
    179 S.E.2d 636
    , 639 (1971).      "When
    the terms of a disputed provision are clear and definite, it is
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    axiomatic that they are to be applied according to their ordinary
    meaning."     Smith v. Smith, 
    3 Va. App. 510
    , 513, 
    351 S.E.2d 593
    ,
    595 (1986).
    The agreement in question provided that should each of the
    parties decide to send any or all of the children to college, the
    expenses would be split.    This language clearly contemplates that
    the parties must both agree that each child should attend
    college.
    The trial court found that the parties had already agreed to
    send all of their children to college.    The record does not
    support this conclusion in its entirety.    Robert Jackson did
    demonstrate, by his actions and words, that he agreed to send his
    eldest daughter to college.    He objected only to her leaving a
    year early, not to her attending college at all.    He ultimately
    did pay for the first year, rather than refusing to contribute to
    her decision.    The trial court was correct in holding Dr. Jackson
    responsible for his pro rata share of his first daughter's
    college expenses.
    The evidence before the court demonstrates that the parties
    have not agreed to send their two younger children to college.
    If they are so inclined, the parties may agree, at any time, as
    to whether either or both of the children shall be sent to
    college, but as neither child is yet of college age, these
    discussions need not be made now.
    We affirm the trial court's decision concerning the college
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    expenses of the eldest daughter.   The portion of the ruling
    concerning the other children is reversed and remanded for the
    trial court to enter an order not inconsistent with this holding.
    Affirmed in part,
    reversed in part,
    and remanded.
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