Roger Dale Snody v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Overton
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    ROGER DALE SNODY
    v.          Record No. 1104-95-3        MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA                    APRIL 23, 1996
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE
    David V. Williams, Judge
    Wayne T. Baucino (Office of the Public
    Defender, on brief), for appellant.
    Monica S. McElyea, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General;
    Thomas C. Daniel, Assistant Attorney General,
    on brief), for appellee.
    On appeal from a felony conviction for driving after having
    been declared an habitual offender in violation of Code
    § 46.2-357(B)(2), Roger Dale Snody contends that the evidence
    supports only a conviction for a misdemeanor under Code
    § 46.2-357(B)(1).   We agree and reverse the felony sentence and
    remand the case for a misdemeanor conviction and resentencing.
    On October 8, 1994, Officer Ross "heard a car with its
    engine racing and then heard tires break traction for several
    seconds."   At the time, Ross was outside his car.   He walked
    around his car for a better view and "saw a cloud of tire smoke"
    and a Monte Carlo with its brake lights on at the intersection of
    Moss and Market Streets.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Officer Ross pursued the car and pulled it over.    Snody was
    driving and a passenger occupied the front seat.   Ross discovered
    that Snody had been adjudicated an habitual offender.   Ross
    testified that Snody told him that he had spun his tires to get
    away from some trouble on Moss Street.    Ross testified that he
    saw no other vehicles on the street, that Snody did not deviate
    from his lane of traffic, and that he did not come close to
    hitting any other car, or property, or person.
    At trial, Snody moved to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor
    on the ground that his driving did not endanger the life, limb,
    or property of another.   The trial court denied this motion and
    found that Snody's driving endangered his passenger.    The trial
    court convicted Snody of violating Code § 46.2-357(B)(2) and
    imposed a felony sentence.
    "The distinction between negligent driving and reckless
    driving is the critical element in determining punishment under
    Code § 46.2-357."   Bishop v. Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 206
    ,
    210-11, 
    455 S.E.2d 765
    , 767 (1995).    Code § 46.2-357(B)(2) states
    in pertinent part:
    If such driving, of itself, does endanger the
    life, limb, or property of another, such
    person shall be guilty of a felony . . . .
    The evidence fails to prove that Snody's driving endangered
    the life, limb, or property of another.   Mere rapid acceleration,
    with a spinning of wheels, over a short course that involved no
    other vehicle or property and proposed no hazard of accident, did
    - 2 -
    not actually create such a danger.     Thus, the evidence does not
    support the imposition of a felony sentence.    The evidence does,
    however, prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of Code
    § 46.2-357(B)(1).   We remand this case to the trial court for
    conviction of a misdemeanor and appropriate sentencing.
    Reversed and remanded.
    - 3 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1104953

Filed Date: 4/23/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021