Mark Edwards, etc. v. Robert Ingalls ( 1996 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
    MARK EDWARDS T/A EDWARDS
    BUILDING & REMODELING
    v.   Record No. 2447-95-1                        MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    PER CURIAM
    ROBERT INGALLS                                     APRIL 23, 1996
    AND
    UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS'
    COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Larry D. King, on brief), for appellant.
    (Byron A. Adams, on brief), for appellee
    Robert Ingalls.
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General;
    Richard L. Walton, Jr., Senior Assistant
    Attorney General; John J. Beall, Jr.,
    Senior Assistant Attorney General;
    Christopher D. Eib, Assistant Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee
    Uninsured Employers' Fund.
    Mark Edwards t/a Edwards Building & Remodeling ("Edwards")
    contends that the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in
    finding that (1) Robert Ingalls ("claimant") was Edwards'
    employee rather than an independent contractor; and (2) that
    claimant did not commit willful misconduct pursuant to Code
    § 65.2-306.    Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the
    parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.       Rule
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    5A:27.
    I.   Employee Status
    "What constitutes an employee is a question of law; but
    whether the facts bring a person within the law's designation, is
    usually a question of fact."     Baker v. Nussman, 
    152 Va. 293
    , 298,
    
    147 S.E. 246
    , 247 (1929).     On appellate review, the findings of
    fact made by the commission will be upheld when supported by
    credible evidence.     James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va.
    App. 512, 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).
    Generally, an individual "'is an employee if he works for
    wages or a salary and the person who hires him reserves the power
    to fire him and the power to exercise control over the work to be
    performed.   The power of control is the most significant indicium
    of the employment relationship.'"     Behrensen v. Whitaker, 10 Va.
    App. 364, 367, 
    392 S.E.2d 508
    , 509-10 (1990) (quoting Richmond
    Newspapers, Inc. v. Gill, 
    224 Va. 92
    , 98, 
    294 S.E.2d 840
    , 843
    (1982)).   The employer-employee relationship exists if the power
    to control includes not only the result to be accomplished, but
    also the means and methods by which the result is to be
    accomplished.   Id. at 367, 392 S.E.2d at 510.
    Edwards operated a business which framed houses.      Edwards
    testified that he had nine people working for him as of November
    12, 1993, the date of claimant's accident.      Edwards did not
    classify these individuals as employees, rather, he believed they
    were subcontractors.    Edwards based this belief upon the
    individuals' work knowledge, the fact that they supplied their
    own tools, and their agreement not to have taxes taken out of
    their wages.
    Claimant testified that Edwards decided where and when
    claimant would work.    On various occasions, Edwards transported
    claimant from one job to another.      Claimant stated that Edwards
    instructed him on the work which needed to be done at each job.
    Although claimant had experience in framing houses, he called
    upon Edwards for assistance if he had problems.
    On the day of claimant's November 12, 1993 accident, Edwards
    came to a job where claimant was working on a basement and told
    claimant to go to another job to work on a porch.     While working
    on the porch, claimant fell from homemade scaffolding built by
    two co-workers.    As a result of the fall, claimant injured his
    knee.
    Edwards paid claimant by the hour on a weekly basis,
    sometimes in cash and sometimes by check.     Claimant quit working
    for Edwards in June 1993.    Through June 1993, Edwards reported
    claimant's earnings for tax purposes on a W-2 form.     Claimant
    returned to work for Edwards in October 1993.     After claimant's
    November 12, 1993 accident, Edwards reported claimant's earnings
    on a 1099 form.
    The testimony of claimant and Edwards provides credible
    evidence to support the commission's finding that Edwards' so-
    called subcontractors, including claimant, were actually Edwards'
    employees for purposes of workers' compensation.     Edwards
    controlled not only the result to be accomplished by claimant, an
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    hourly employee, but he also controlled the means and methods by
    which claimant accomplished his job.
    Based upon this record, we find that the commission did not
    err in holding that Edwards employed more than three employees,
    and that claimant was Edwards' employee.
    II.   Willful Misconduct
    "To prevail on the defense of willful violation of a safety
    rule, employer must prove that: (1) the safety rule was
    reasonable; (2) the rule was known to the employee; (3) the rule
    was promulgated for the benefit of the employee; and (4) the
    employee intentionally undertook the forbidden act."     Brockway v.
    Easter, 
    20 Va. App. 268
    , 271, 
    456 S.E.2d 159
    , 161 (1995).
    Whether the rule is reasonable and
    applies to the situation from which the
    injury results, and whether the claimant
    knowingly violated it, is a mixed question
    of law and fact to be decided by the
    commission and reviewable by this Court.
    But the question of whether an employee is
    guilty of willful misconduct and whether
    such misconduct is a proximate cause of the
    employee's accident are issues of fact.
    Id. at 271-72, 456 S.E.2d at 161.
    In finding that employer did not establish that "claimant
    intentionally undertook the purportedly forbidden act," the
    commission found as follows:
    Croft, who alleges that he told the
    claimant to get off the scaffolding because
    someone would get hurt, made the singular
    exhortation, and then left. There was no
    enforcement of his alleged dictate. The
    claimant refutes that any such comment was
    made to him. He further states that what
    was built was the type of scaffolding that
    4
    had been used by him a number of times in
    the past; and that to his observation it
    had been built the same way he had used it
    previously. Even his employer, though
    suggesting that another scaffolding was
    available, acknowledged that his employees
    sometimes choose to build their own, "which
    was commonplace." Though it would not have
    taken long to assemble the mason's
    scaffolding, what necessarily may have
    taken less time does not imply misconduct
    not to do it. The evidence predominates
    that the employee's conduct was not
    prohibited, but rather was condoned by the
    employer.
    The commission's factual findings are supported by credible
    evidence, including the testimony of claimant, Croft, and
    Edwards.   Based upon their testimony, the fact finder could infer
    that employer condoned the employees' practice of building their
    own scaffolding.    Accordingly, we cannot say as a matter of law
    that the commission erred in finding that employer's evidence
    failed to prove any wrongful intent on claimant's part.     Because
    of this finding, employer's defense of willful violation of a
    safety rule cannot prevail.    Virginia law requires an employer to
    prove more than negligence or the exercise of the will in doing
    an act; employer must prove a wrongful intention.      Uninsured
    Employer's Fund v. Keppel, 
    1 Va. App. 162
    , 164, 
    335 S.E.2d 851
    ,
    852 (1985).
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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