Robert Hyer Allison v. Marleen McBride Allison ( 1996 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Overton
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    ROBERT HYER ALLISON
    v.             Record No. 1516-95-4       MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
    MARLEEN McBRIDE ALLISON                       APRIL 16, 1996
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    Jack B. Stevens, Judge
    Gary V. Davis for appellant.
    James A. Watson, II (Surovell, Jackson, Colten, &
    Dugan, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
    Robert Hyer Allison, husband, appeals the denial of his
    motion to reduce spousal support to Marleen McBride Allison,
    wife.       Finding no error in the lower court's decision, we affirm
    the decision of the circuit court.
    Husband and wife were divorced in 1993 and husband was
    ordered to pay spousal support to wife.       Husband stopped working
    in November 1994 and then petitioned the court for a reduction in
    support based on this change in circumstances.        His monthly
    income had fallen from $5,777.34 to $5,373.00.        After a hearing
    at which both husband and wife gave testimony and other evidence,
    the trial judge denied the motion to reduce husband's spousal
    support.      In his order, he ruled that "the Defendant has failed
    to prove that his involuntary cessation of employment is a change
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    warranting a modification of the initial support award."
    Husband asserts that the court erred by not considering all
    of the factors set forth in Code § 20-107.1 governing spousal
    support awards.   We disagree.   Section 20-107.1 applies to the
    initial setting of spousal support.      "If the court determines
    that an award should be made, it shall, in determining the
    amount, consider the [listed factors]."     Code § 20-107.1.    The
    consideration of all of the factors in Code § 20-107.1 is not
    required when a judge rules upon a motion to reduce the award
    under Code § 20-109.   Cf. Yohay v. Ryan, 
    4 Va. App. 559
    , 567, 
    359 S.E.2d 320
    , 324-25 (1987) (holding that when determining
    reduction of child support award under Code § 20-108, the court
    is not required to consider all of Code § 20-107.2 factors used
    to initially set the award).     The standard for a warranted
    modification of spousal support is rather whether the moving
    party proves "both a material change in circumstances and that
    this change warrants a modification of support."      Schoenwetter v.
    Schoenwetter, 
    8 Va. App. 601
    , 605, 
    383 S.E.2d 28
    , 30 (1989); see
    Furr v. Furr, 
    13 Va. App. 479
    , 481, 
    413 S.E.2d 72
    , 73 (1992).
    The court in this case expressly found that no such change
    had occurred after considering all evidence of income to each of
    the parties.   Husband argues that the judge improperly refused to
    hear evidence pertaining to wife's net worth and assets.       His
    argument is unpersuasive.   The judge was not required to consider
    wife's separate estate assets in determining a modification of
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    spousal support.   See Klotz v. Klotz, 
    203 Va. 677
    , 680, 
    127 S.E.2d 104
    , 106 (1962).   The wife's income is instead the crucial
    issue, and the record demonstrates that wife fully disclosed her
    income through testimony and interrogatories.   The judge likewise
    considered all of husband's income.    To the extent that husband
    had the ability to withdraw from his retirement accounts without
    penalty, the judge properly considered this source of income.
    The record supports the finding that no material change of
    circumstances warranted a reduction in spousal support.       As such,
    the decision of the trial court will be upheld.
    Husband also appeals the decision of the court concerning
    attorneys' fees.   Husband failed, however, to include any
    transcript or statement of facts of the proceedings in question,
    leaving this Court without a means to determine the issue.      We
    therefore dismiss that portion of the appeal.     Turner v.
    Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 96
    , 100, 
    341 S.E.2d 400
    , 402 (1986).
    Affirmed in part and
    dismissed in part.
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