Franklin Equipment Co v. Claudette M. Woodley ( 1996 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
FRANKLIN EQUIPMENT COMPANY
AND
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 2059-95-1 PER CURIAM
FEBRUARY 20, 1996
CLAUDETTE M. WOODLEY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Ruth N. Carter; Midkiff & Hiner, on briefs),
for appellants.
(Gregory E. Camden; Rutter & Montagna, on
brief), for appellee.
Franklin Equipment Company and its insurer (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) Claudette M.
Woodley (claimant) proved a causal relationship existed between
her right carpal tunnel syndrome and her compensable February 22,
1994 injury by accident; and (2) claimant, who had not been
released to return to work, did not have a duty to market her
residual work capacity. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs
of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Rule 5A:27.
I. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome/Causation
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "The
actual determination of causation is a factual finding that will
not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible evidence to
support the finding." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App.
684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). "Questions raised by
conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission."
Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d
231, 236 (1989).
In ruling that claimant met her burden of proving that her
right carpal tunnel syndrome resulted from her compensable
February 22, 1994 injury by accident, the commission found as
follows:
The claimant testified that she had
continuing arm pain following her injury on
February 22, 1994. She did not seek medical
treatment until April 1, 1994, approximately
five weeks after her accident. At that time,
Dr. [Glenn] Bidwell diagnosed a right
shoulder sprain. However, on April 19, 1994,
as reflected in his Attending Physician's
Report, he noted complaints of right wrist
discomfort which he attributed to the
industrial accident. Dr. [J.M.] Britt,
[Jr.], in his letter of August 25, 1994,
opined that the claimant's right carpal
tunnel syndrome was "related to an injury
which occurred on the job while she was
welding. . . ." in February 1994. He
rendered this opinion after taking cognizance
of a previously-neglected notation in his
office notes concerning the February 1994
incident. While we note the opinions of Drs.
[James R.] Malcolm and [Herbert W.] Park, we
find Dr. Britt's opinion more persuasive.
In its role as fact finder, the commission was entitled to
weigh the medical evidence and to accept the opinions of Drs.
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Bidwell and Britt, the treating physicians. The commission was
also entitled to reject the opinions of Drs. Malcolm and Park,
who reviewed medical records at employer's request, but who never
examined claimant. In cases of conflicting medical evidence,
"[t]he general rule is that when an attending physician is
positive in his diagnosis . . . , great weight will be given by
the courts to his opinion." Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v.
Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 439, 339 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1986). The
opinions of Drs. Bidwell and Britt, along with claimant's
description of her industrial accident and her history of ongoing
right arm symptoms since the February 22, 1994 injury by
accident, constitute credible evidence to support the
commission's decision. "The existence of contrary evidence in
the record is of no consequence if there is credible evidence to
support the commission's finding." Wagner Enters., Inc. v.
Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991).
II. Marketing
The commission found that "claimant [had] not been released
in any capacity by either Dr. Bidwell or Dr. Britt." The medical
records of Drs. Bidwell and Britt provide credible evidence to
support this finding. Accordingly, we cannot find that the
commission erred in ruling that claimant was totally disabled
and, therefore, had no duty to market her residual capacity.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Claimant's request for an order awarding attorneys' fees and
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costs is denied.
Affirmed.
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