Center Ford v. Bryant S. Byrd ( 1996 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
CENTER FORD
AND
TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
v. Record No. 2158-95-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
PER CURIAM
BRYANT S. BYRD FEBRUARY 20, 1996
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Susan B. Potter; Vandeventer, Black,
Meredith & Martin, on brief), for
appellants.
(Johnny C. Cope; Saunders, Stephenson,
Cope, Olson & Yoffy, on brief), for
appellee.
Center Ford contends that the Workers' Compensation
Commission erred in finding that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel prevented it from relying upon the statute of
limitations contained in Code § 65.2-601 as a defense to
Bryant S. Byrd's claim for benefits. Upon reviewing the record
and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
decision. Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp.
v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). We
must uphold factual findings made by the commission if supported
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va.
App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989).
On April 13, 1992, Byrd sustained a compensable left leg
injury while working for employer as a mechanic. He reported the
injury to employer, who filed a First Report of Accident with the
commission on May 29, 1992. On June 2, 1992, the commission
issued a notification letter to Byrd, enclosing a workers'
compensation guide. Byrd denied receiving the letter or the
guide.
Byrd testified that he received a Memorandum of Agreement
("MOA") from employer's insurance carrier, which he signed and
returned to the carrier. Byrd stated that when he telephoned
Alice Pleasant, the carrier's representative, she assured him
that she would send the MOA to the commission as soon as she
received it from Byrd. Shortly thereafter, Byrd began to receive
compensation checks. Based upon these events, Byrd assumed that
he did not need to do anything else to file a timely claim.
Employer voluntarily paid compensation to Byrd from May 3, 1992
through July 5, 1994.
Pleasant admitted that she sent the MOA to Byrd on June 30,
1992. However, she denied that Byrd ever called her about the
MOA or that she ever received a signed MOA back from him.
Pleasant admitted that it was possible she sent the MOA to the
commission and that the commission did not receive it.
On July 6, 1994, Pleasant filed an application to suspend
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Byrd's benefits alleging that he failed to cooperate with
vocational rehabilitation. On July 11, 1994, the commission
notified Pleasant, with a copy to Byrd, that no award had ever
been entered.
On October 13, 1994, Byrd's attorney filed an application
for benefits seeking entry of an award and resumption of
compensation. Byrd admitted that he received a copy of the
commission's July 11, 1994 letter stating that no award had been
entered. He did not understand the significance of this letter
until he consulted an attorney.
"Code § 65.1-87 [now Code § 65.2-601] provides that the
right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act is
forever barred 'unless a claim be filed' with the . . .
Commission within two years after the injury by accident."
Keenan v. Westinghouse Elevator Co., 10 Va. App. 232, 233, 391
S.E.2d 342, 343 (1990). It was undisputed that the claim filed
by Byrd's attorney on October 13, 1994 was not timely.
To prove estoppel, a claimant must show by clear, precise
and unequivocal evidence that he relied to his detriment upon an
act or statement of employer or its agent to refrain from filing
a claim within the statutory period. Rose v. Red's Hitch &
Trailer Servs., Inc., 11 Va. App. 55, 59-60, 396 S.E.2d 392,
394-95 (1990). However, a claimant need not prove a false
representation, concealment of a material fact, or fraudulent
intent, in order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
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Cibula v. Allied Fibers & Plastics, 14 Va. App. 319, 324-25, 416
S.E.2d 708, 711 (1992), aff'd, 245 Va. 337, 428 S.E.2d 905
(1993). In addition, it is well settled that employer is not
estopped as a matter of law from relying on the limitation period
provided by Code § 65.2-601 merely because it made voluntary
payments to a claimant. See Bowden v. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Drydock Co., 11 Va. App. 683, 686-87, 401 S.E.2d 884, 886
(1991).
In holding that employer was equitably estopped from relying
on the statute of limitations, the commission found as follows:
Not only did the employer pay compensation
benefits for more than two years, it paid
cost-of-living benefits, hired a vocational
rehabilitation consultant to work with the
claimant, sent the claimant a Memorandum of
Agreement and filed an Application for
Hearing seeking to suspend benefits. These
actions are all actions that evidence the
employer accepted the claimant [sic] and
support the claimant's testimony that he
relied upon employer's actions to his
detriment.
It was undisputed that employer accepted Byrd's claim as
compensable and sent him the MOA. The commission was entitled to
accept Byrd's testimony that he signed and returned the MOA to
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Pleasant, and that she assured him she would send the MOA to the
commission. Byrd began receiving compensation checks shortly
after his conversation with Pleasant. The commission could
reasonably infer from Byrd's testimony that he relied upon
Pleasant's actions and statements, which did in fact induce him
to refrain from filing a claim within the statutory period.
Because Byrd's testimony provides credible evidence to support
the commission's decision, we cannot find as a matter of law that
the commission erred in ruling that employer was equitably
estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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