Boar's Head, etc. v. Judy Inez Woodley ( 1995 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Chief Judge Moon, Judge Willis and Senior Judge Hodges
    BOAR'S HEAD PROVISIONS COMPANY
    and
    SENTRY INSURANCE A MUTUAL COMPANY
    v.         Record No. 0207-95-4        MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    JUDY INEZ WOODLEY                        SEPTEMBER 19, 1995
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Warren H. Britt; Curtis G. Manchester;
    Vernon C. Howerton, Jr.; Parvin, Wilson,
    Barnett & Guynn, P.C., on briefs), for
    appellants.
    (Wesley G. Marshall; Peter M. Sweeny &
    Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
    On appeal from an award of compensation to Judy Inez
    Woodley, Boar's Head Provisions Company and Sentry Insurance A
    Mutual Company (Boar's Head) contend the Workers' Compensation
    Commission erred (1) in holding that Ms. Woodley's carpal tunnel
    syndrome (CTS) is a disease and (2) in holding that Ms. Woodley
    suffered a compensable occupational disease as defined by Code
    § 65.2-400.   We find this appeal to be without merit and
    summarily affirm the decision of the commission.   Rule 5A:27.
    Upon appellate review, the commission's findings of fact
    will be upheld if they are supported by credible evidence.    James
    v. Capitol Steel Construction Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).   "A question raised by conflicting
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    medical opinion is a question of fact."     City of Norfolk v.
    Lillard, 
    15 Va. App. 424
    , 429, 
    424 S.E.2d 243
    , 246 (1992).       We
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
    prevailing below, and "the fact that contrary evidence may be
    found in the record is of no consequence if credible evidence
    supports the commission's finding."     Bean v. Hungerford
    Mechanical Corp., 
    16 Va. App. 183
    , 186, 
    428 S.E.2d 762
    , 764
    (1993).
    While employed by Boar's Head, Ms. Woodley contracted carpal
    tunnel syndrome, which was diagnosed by her doctors as a disease
    more likely than not caused by the conditions of her employment.
    The doctors denied awareness of any non-employment related
    activity which substantially exposed Ms. Woodley to the risk of
    carpal tunnel syndrome.
    The Supreme Court in Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks, 
    246 Va. 429
    , 
    436 S.E.2d 600
    (1993), held that the Workers'
    Compensation Act "requires that the condition for which
    compensation is sought as an occupational disease must first
    qualify as a disease."    
    Id. at 432,
    436 S.E.2d at 601.     A disease
    is defined as:
    any deviation from or interruption of the normal
    structure or function of any part, organ, or
    system (or combination thereof) of the body that
    is manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms
    and signs whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis
    may be known or unknown.
    Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 
    17 Va. App. 499
    , 503, 
    438 S.E.2d 769
    ,
    772 (1993) (quoting Sloane-Dorland Ann. Medical-Legal Dictionary
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    209 (1987)).
    Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is defined as:
    a complex of symptoms resulting from compression
    of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel, with
    pain and burning or tingling paresthesias in the
    fingers and hand, sometimes extending to the
    elbow.
    Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1289 (26th ed. 1985).
    Boar's Head argues that although CTS may be classified as a
    disease under the definition of Piedmont, Merillat expressly
    rejects compensability for an injury or disease that results from
    repetitive motion or cumulative trauma.    We disagree.    Merillat
    distinguishes trauma from disease and denies compensation for an
    injury resulting from cumulative trauma.   An injury is "an
    obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in the body."
    Chesterfield Co. v. Dunn, 
    9 Va. App. 475
    , 476, 
    389 S.E.2d 180
    ,
    181 (1990).    See Perdue Farms v. McCutchan, ___ Va. App. ___, ___
    S.E.2d ___ (1995).
    Ms. Woodley's doctors termed her CTS a disease and the
    record supports that diagnosis.   No evidence described her
    condition as an "obvious sudden mechanical or structural change"
    in her body.   Therefore, credible evidence supports the
    commission's finding "that the claimant suffered a compensable
    occupational disease [right carpal tunnel syndrome] arising out
    of and in the course of her employment . . . ."
    We affirm the decision of the commission.
    Affirmed.
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