Scott William Clearwater v. Mobil Oil Corp. ( 1995 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Koontz, * Bray and Annunziata
    SCOTT WILLIAM CLEARWATER
    v.   Record No. 0233-95-4                     MEMORANDUM OPINION**
    PER CURIAM
    MOBIL OIL CORPORATION                            AUGUST 29, 1995
    AND
    NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Scott W. Clearwater, pro se, on briefs).
    (Susan A. Evans; Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & Boccarosse,
    on brief), for appellees.
    Scott W. Clearwater contends that the Workers' Compensation
    Commission erred in finding that he failed to prove that the
    injuries he sustained on June 20, 1993 arose out of and in the
    course of his employment with Mobil Oil Corporation ("employer").
    Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we
    conclude that this appeal is without merit.        Accordingly, we
    summarily affirm the commission's decision.        Rule 5A:27.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.    R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).           A
    finding by the commission that an injury did or did not arise out
    *
    Justice Koontz participated in the decision of this case
    prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme Court of
    Virginia.
    **
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    of and in the course of employment is a mixed finding of law and
    fact and is properly reviewable on appeal.        City of Richmond v.
    Braxton, 
    230 Va. 161
    , 163-64, 
    335 S.E.2d 259
    , 261 (1985).
    "The concepts of 'arising out of' and 'in the course of'
    employment are not synonymous and both conditions must be proved
    before compensation will be awarded."        Marketing Profiles, Inc.
    v. Hill, 
    17 Va. App. 431
    , 433, 
    437 S.E.2d 727
    , 729 (1993) (en
    banc).   "The burden rests upon the claimant 'to prove them by a
    preponderance of the evidence.'"        
    Id. (quoting Baggett
    Transp.
    Co. v. Dillon, 
    219 Va. 633
    , 637, 
    248 S.E.2d 819
    , 822 (1978)).
    Unless we can say as a matter of law that the claimant's evidence
    sustained his burden of proof, the commission's findings are
    binding and conclusive upon us.        Tomko v. Michael's Plastering
    Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835 (1970).
    The claimant worked for the employer as an attorney.       His
    home office was in Washington, D.C.       His job frequently required
    that he travel to out-of-town locations.       On June 20, 1993, he
    travelled to New York City to attend a business meeting on the
    following morning.   The claimant arrived in New York City by
    plane and took a taxicab to the Helmsly Hotel, where he
    registered for the night and checked in to his room.       Thereafter,
    he walked to Times Square for dinner.       On his way, he purchased a
    theater ticket for a performance later that evening.       He ate
    dinner and went to the theater on West 38th Street.       After the
    show, at approximately 11:30 to 11:45 p.m., he walked towards his
    2
    hotel located at 212 East 42nd Street.   While he was crossing 3rd
    Avenue, a taxicab turning at the intersection at 42nd Street
    struck the claimant, causing him to sustain multiple injuries.
    The expenses of the claimant's trip to New York City,
    including parking, taxicabs, tips, the hotel room, and meals were
    reimbursed by the employer on the basis of a voucher submitted by
    the claimant.   The claimant did not submit for reimbursement the
    cost of the theater ticket.
    The commission denied the claimant's application, finding
    that "[his] reasonable and understandable decision to attend a
    local theater show was purely personal and unrelated to the work
    activities for which he travelled to New York.    The accident that
    occurred while returning from this personal frolic therefore
    cannot be said to arise out of his employment."
    The claimant contends that his claim is compensable because
    his duties required his presence on the public streets, and
    therefore, his injuries arose out of his employment.    See, e.g.,
    Taylor v. Robertson Chevrolet Co., 
    177 Va. 289
    , 
    13 S.E.2d 326
    (1941); Marketing 
    Profiles, 17 Va. App. at 435
    , 437 S.E.2d at
    730.
    However, this case is distinguishable from the so-called
    "street cases."   Here, the claimant voluntarily chose to attend
    the theater and to walk across 3rd Avenue, where he incurred the
    obvious risk of being struck by an automobile.    His work with the
    employer did not require his presence on 3rd Avenue at the time
    3
    he was injured.   The claimant, unlike the employees in the cited
    cases, was on a personal mission and was not performing any duty
    or requirement of his employment.     Under these facts, the risk of
    being struck by an automobile was not incident to and did not
    arise out of his employment.    This particular risk was not an
    actual risk of the claimant's employment.
    The claimant also argues that his injuries arose out of his
    employment because they were sustained during a business trip for
    which the employer reimbursed his travel expenses.     See, e.g.,
    Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 
    236 Va. 41
    , 
    372 S.E.2d 369
    (1988).   In Provident, the claimant, a travelling salesman,
    was injured in an automobile accident while driving in his own
    vehicle on the way home from visiting his employer's stores.      
    Id. at 43-44,
    372 S.E.2d at 370-71.   Here, however, the claimant was
    not injured while coming from or going to work in employer-
    provided or employer-reimbursed transportation.    Moreover, unlike
    the employee in Provident, the claimant deviated from his
    employment and embarked on a personal mission.
    Finally, the claimant argues that the personal comfort
    doctrine should be expanded to include compensation for an injury
    sustained by an employee while seeking personal entertainment on
    an out-of-town business trip.   The personal comfort doctrine
    recognizes that "occasional breaks and excursions for food,
    drink, rest, and restroom visitation are deemed to be within the
    course of employment."   Ablola v. Holland Road Auto Ctr., 
    11 Va. 4
    App. 181, 183, 
    397 S.E.2d 541
    , 543 (1990).      See also Jones v.
    Colonial Williamsburg Found., 
    10 Va. App. 521
    , 
    392 S.E.2d 848
    (1990) (en banc) (employee injured while throwing personal trash
    into trash bin on employer's premises entitled to compensation).
    However, the claimant cites no authority that indicates that
    Virginia law recognizes personal entertainment as falling within
    the scope of the personal comfort doctrine. 1
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    1
    We also note that Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Lewis,
    
    156 Va. 800
    , 
    159 S.E. 188
    (1931), cited by the claimant, did not
    address the issue presented in this case, because Lewis had
    returned to his employment duties at the time of his injury.
    5