Richard Ragsdale v. Lunenburg Department of Social Services ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Alston, Decker and Senior Judge Coleman
RICHARD RAGSDALE
v. Record No. 0089-14-2
LUNENBURG DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
TOMEKA BEASLEY PER CURIAM
OCTOBER 7, 2014
v. Record No. 0658-14-2
LUNENBURG DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LUNENBURG COUNTY
Leslie M. Osborn, Judge
(Joseph E. Taylor; Taylor Law Firm, PLLC, on brief), for appellant
Richard Ragsdale.
(Robert E. Hawthorne, Jr.; Hawthorne & Hawthorne, P.C., on
brief), for appellant Tomeka Beasley.
(Carol B. Gravitt; Matthew W. Evans; Elizabeth Taylor Carter,
Guardian ad litem for the minor child L.A.R.; Jennifer L. Jones,
Guardian ad litem for the minor child C.A.R.; Gravitt & Gravitt,
P.C.; The Jones Law Firm, P.C., on briefs), for appellee.
Richard Ragsdale (father) and Tomeka Beasley (mother) are appealing the circuit court’s
orders that terminated their parental rights to their children, L.A.R. and C.A.R. Both father and
mother argue that the circuit court erred by (1) improperly considering a “contemporaneously
decided termination of parental rights as to a sibling as a previous involuntary termination of
parental rights sufficient to implicate Va. Code § 16.1-283(E)(i) and improperly lower[ing] the
burden of proof as to the termination of parental rights concerning the second child;” (2) finding that
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
the Lunenburg Department of Social Services (the Department) proved by clear and convincing
evidence that mother and father abused or neglected L.A.R. and C.A.R. “such that there was a
serious or substantial threat to their life, health or development, that it is not reasonably likely that
the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated”
so that the children could be safely returned home “within a reasonable period of time,” or that the
termination of mother’s and father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests; (3) finding
that the Department had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of parental
rights as to the second child was in that child’s best interests, “assuming for argument’s sake that
Va. Code § 16.1-283(E)(i) could properly be applied to this case;” and (4) admitting evidence as to
the voluntary termination of parental rights of five of mother’s children, two of whom are also
father’s children, “because the evidence was irrelevant and because, even if relevant, the evidence
was unduly prejudicial.” Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that
these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decisions of the circuit
court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant
to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of
Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991).
Father and mother have two children, who are the subject of these appeals. L.A.R. was
born in October 2010, and C.A.R. was born in September 2012.
The Department initially became involved with the family in 2006. The Department
removed five of mother’s six other children1 in August 2007 because of physical neglect and
inadequate shelter. Two of these five children were also father’s children. The Department
1
One of mother’s children was placed with a relative and was not in foster care.
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provided services to the family, and in August 2008, the children were returned home. In August
2009, the Department removed the five children again for inadequate shelter and lack of
supervision. The children were adjudicated as abused or neglected. On January 4, 2011, mother
and father’s parental rights were voluntarily terminated.
In October 2010, the Department removed L.A.R. from mother’s care when she was born
because mother and L.A.R. tested positive for cocaine. Mother admitted using drugs while she
was pregnant with L.A.R. and using cocaine during labor or immediately before L.A.R.’s birth.
Father signed an entrustment agreement, which the Department states has never been withdrawn.
L.A.R. has been in foster care since birth.
The Department instructed mother and father to obtain substance abuse counseling,
individual counseling, and domestic violence counseling, and to attend parenting classes.
Mother and father also had to obtain and maintain stable housing and finances. The parents
made progress and improved their housing situation. Father was employed. The Department
eventually agreed to unsupervised and overnight visits with L.A.R., until January 2013 when all
visitations stopped after father’s arrest and incarceration for domestic violence.
During her pregnancy with C.A.R., mother tested positive for cocaine four times.
However, when C.A.R. was born, mother did not test positive for any drugs, and neither did the
child. As a result of the negative drug tests, the Department did not remove C.A.R. at birth.
While L.A.R. was in foster care, father tested positive for illegal drugs and admitted
consuming alcohol. He and mother argued and fought, especially when they were intoxicated.
The police had responded to their home due to domestic violence incidents. In January 2013,
father was arrested for domestic violence. The Department implemented a safety plan and
expressed concern because mother and father had been drinking alcohol, C.A.R. was present, and
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father had been arrested for assaulting mother. Father pled guilty to the felony assault charge.2
The Department was concerned with the parents’ continued substance abuse and domestic
violence. Despite assuring the Department that there would be no contact between them, mother
allowed father to return home when he was released from jail. Consequently, in March 2013, the
Department removed C.A.R. from the home.
The Department repeatedly offered services to the parents, including substance abuse
counseling. Mother and father attended some substance abuse counseling sessions at Crossroads,
an agency suggested by the Department, but then sought counseling through another counselor.
They did not provide documentation to the Department or court regarding the counseling
sessions with the other provider.
The Lunenburg County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court)
approved the goal of adoption and in September 2013 terminated the parental rights of the
mother and father. They appealed to the circuit court.
On December 18, 2013, father testified in circuit court that he was working full-time and
had been employed with the same employer “off-and-on” for approximately five years. He
currently was not using any illegal drugs. He admitted that if he and mother drank alcohol, their
arguments escalated. Father testified that he reduced the amount of alcohol that he consumes.
Mother admitted her prior drug use, but testified that she no longer uses any illegal drugs. She
testified that she too reduced the alcohol that she consumes and no longer drinks liquor. Both
mother and father discussed their attendance at counseling sessions with a counselor at Southern
Dominion Health.
2
This conviction was father’s third or subsequent offense for assault and battery of a
family member.
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After hearing all of the evidence and argument, the circuit court terminated mother’s and
father’s parental rights to L.A.R. based on Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2) and their parental
rights to C.A.R. based on Code § 16.1-283(B) and (E)(i). These appeals followed.
ANALYSIS
“Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16
(1986) (citations omitted). When considering termination of parental rights, “the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d
at 463.
Code § 16.1-283(B)
Both parents argue that the circuit court erred in terminating their parental rights to
L.A.R. and C.A.R. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), which states parental rights may be
terminated if:
1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious
and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and
2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in
such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated
so as to allow the child’s safe return to his parent or parents within
a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the
court shall take into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitate
the parent or parents by any public or private social, medical,
mental health or other rehabilitative agencies prior to the child’s
initial placement in foster care.
“[S]ubsection B [of Code § 16.1-283] ‘speaks prospectively’ and requires the circuit
court to make a judgment call on the parent’s ability, following a finding of neglect or abuse, to
substantially remedy the underlying problems.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46
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Va. App. 257, 270-71, 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (2005) (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562-63, 580 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2003)).
Contrary to the parents’ arguments, the Department proved that L.A.R. and C.A.R. were
abused or neglected. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good
indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45,
56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315,
319 (1987)). Mother used cocaine during her pregnancy with L.A.R. In fact, mother and child
tested positive for cocaine when L.A.R. was born. After the Department removed L.A.R., both
parents tested positive for illegal drugs. Mother admitted using cocaine while she was pregnant
with C.A.R.
The Department instructed the parents to submit to a substance abuse evaluation, which
they did, and to participate in substance abuse counseling. At first, they went to Crossroads, as
recommended by the Department. After missing several sessions, they were dismissed from that
program. The parents testified that they went to another counselor, but failed to provide any
documentation regarding their sessions. The circuit court noted that the lack of documentation
had been discussed with them previously; however, the parents still did not get a letter or
certificate to show their progress in counseling.
In addition to their drug use, both parents abused alcohol. They admitted arguing when
they were intoxicated. On one occasion in January 2013, father was arrested for felony assault
and battery of a family member, third or subsequent offense, demonstrating a pattern of violence.
C.A.R. was present at the time. The parents admitted drinking “occasionally” after the incident.
The Department had been providing services and working with this family since 2006.
Although the parents improved their housing situation, the circuit court concluded that the
parents “just don’t get it” and “it’s not likely they can correct this situation.” The Department
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expressed concern about mother and father living together, especially after the domestic violence
incident in January 2013 when father was arrested; however, they continued to live together after
father was released from jail.
At the time of the hearing, L.A.R. had been in foster care for over three years, and C.A.R.
had been in foster care for approximately nine months. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a
child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be
capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
Based on the record, the circuit court did not err in terminating their parental rights to
L.A.R. and C.A.R. based on Code § 16.1-283(B).
Admission of evidence
Mother and father argue that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence regarding “the
voluntary termination of parental rights as to five prior children of Mother (two of which were
also Father’s children) because the evidence was irrelevant and . . . unduly prejudicial.”
“Generally, the admissibility of evidence ‘is within the broad discretion of the trial court,
and an [evidentiary] ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of
discretion.’” Surles v. Mayer, 48 Va. App. 146, 177, 628 S.E.2d 563, 578 (2006) (quoting Blain
v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988)) (brackets in original).
Mother and father argue that the evidence regarding the voluntary terminations of their
other children was irrelevant to the circumstances regarding L.A.R. and C.A.R. They contend
the circumstances were different. They also highlight that the prior terminations were voluntary,
whereas now the Department sought involuntary terminations. They assert that the evidence was
unduly prejudicial because it minimized the improvements that were made by them.
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“Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in
issue in the case.” Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1186, 409
S.E.2d 16, 21 (1991) (citing Harrell v. Woodson, 233 Va. 117, 122, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1987)).
Virginia law recognizes the “maxim that, sometimes, the most
reliable way to gauge a person’s future actions is to examine those
of his past.” Petry v. Petry, 41 Va. App. 782, 793, 589 S.E.2d 458,
463 (2003). “As many courts have observed, one permissible
‘measure of a parent’s future potential is undoubtedly revealed in
the parent’s past behavior with the child.” Id. (citation omitted).
“No one can divine with any assurance the future course of human
events. Nevertheless, past actions and relationships over a
meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may
be expected to hold.” Winfield v. Urquhart, 25 Va. App. 688,
696-97, 492 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1997) (citations omitted).
Toms, 46 Va. App. at 267-68, 616 S.E.2d at 770.
The circuit court did not err in admitting the evidence regarding the parents’ previous
terminations. The parents had the opportunity to testify and discuss their improvements over the
years. In fact, the circuit court recognized that they improved their housing situation, which was
an issue with their previous children. Therefore, the evidence was not unduly prejudicial and the
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.
Alternative grounds
The circuit court terminated mother and father’s parental rights to L.A.R. based on Code
§ 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). It terminated their parental rights to C.A.R. based on Code
§ 16.1-283(B) and (E)(i).
When a circuit court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, we need only consider
whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the circuit court, and if
so, we need not address the other grounds. See Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (the Court affirmed termination of parental rights
under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination of parental
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rights pursuant to another subsection). Therefore, we will not consider whether the circuit court
erred in terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights to L.A.R. pursuant to Code
§ 16.1-283(C)(2) and to C.A.R. pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(E)(i).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s rulings are summarily affirmed. Rule
5A:27.
Affirmed.
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