Allen Jamal Ralph v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2022 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Beales, AtLee and Chaney
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
ALLEN JAMAL RALPH
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0826-21-1 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
MAY 10, 2022
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Michael A. Gaten, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Justin B. Hill, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
On October 26, 2020, Allen Jamal Ralph pled guilty to three counts of use of a firearm in
the commission of a felony, one count of robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit
robbery. Consistent with the written plea agreement, the Circuit Court of the City of Hampton
sentenced Ralph to a total of fifty-three years of incarceration with thirty-eight years suspended.
In this appeal, Ralph argues that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty pleas and abused its
discretion in sentencing him according to the terms of the plea agreement.
I. BACKGROUND
At a hearing on the entry of Ralph’s guilty pleas, the Commonwealth proffered that if the
case had proceeded to trial, the evidence would have shown that Ralph and two other men
devised a plan to rob a GameStop store in Hampton. The evidence showed that Ralph agreed to
serve as the getaway driver and drove the three of them to the Hampton GameStop location.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
When they arrived, Ralph drove the car around the parking lot of the shopping center and parked
in different spaces to survey the store. The two other men entered the store with a gun while Ralph
stayed in the car. The armed perpetrators locked the manager of the GameStop and two customers
inside the store and pointed the firearm at all three of the victims. They took personal property from
all three victims, took money from the cash register, and forced the manager to open the safe.
Hampton police officers arrived and actually saw the robbery in progress. The officers
pursued the robbers as they fled through the back door of the store. As the robbers ran, they
dropped the gun and some items taken during the robbery. Eventually, they ran back out into the
parking lot, where Ralph was still waiting to pick them up. All three were apprehended by police in
the parking lot.
The Commonwealth and Ralph reached an agreement whereby Ralph agreed to plead guilty
to three counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, one count of robbery, and one
count of conspiracy to commit robbery. In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosequi
several other charges, including indictments for abduction and additional counts of use of a firearm
in the commission of a felony. The written plea agreement memorialized the parties’ joint
recommendation that Ralph receive a sentence of fifty-three years with thirty-eight years of that
sentence suspended.
Before accepting the plea agreement, the trial court conducted a plea colloquy with
Ralph. During the colloquy, Ralph stated that he fully understood the charges against him and
that he fully understood what the Commonwealth would need to prove. Ralph also confirmed
that he had consulted with his attorney and that they had discussed possible defenses to the
charges. The trial judge asked, “Are you entering these pleas of guilty freely and voluntarily?”
Ralph answered, “Yes, sir.” The trial judge continued, “Are you entering these pleas of guilty
because you are, in fact, guilty of the crimes charged?” Ralph responded, “Yes, sir.”
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Ralph assured the court that he had not taken any medications or substances and did not
have any mental condition that prevented him from understanding the proceedings. He
acknowledged that he was waiving his rights to plead not guilty and to have a trial. He
confirmed that no one had forced or threatened him to enter his pleas and that no one had made
any promises outside the written plea agreement. He stated that he understood everything in the
plea agreement. He indicated that he understood all of the trial judge’s questions, and he did not
ask any questions of the trial court.
The trial court proceeded to sentence Ralph according to the parties’ sentencing
recommendation as set out in the plea agreement. Therefore, the trial court sentenced Ralph to
fifty-three years of incarceration with thirty-eight years suspended—for an active sentence of
fifteen years. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Ralph assigns two errors on appeal. He first contends that “[t]he trial court erred in
accepting Ralph’s pleas of guilty to five felony counts” because “Ralph did not enter voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent pleas to the charges against him.” Second, he argues, “The sentencing
court abused its discretion in sentencing Ralph pursuant to a plea agreement to a total of 53 years
in prison, with 38 years suspended, where there were significant mitigating circumstances to
which the sentencing court failed to give proper weight.”
A. Ralph’s Guilty Pleas
Rule 5A:18 provides, “No ruling of the trial court or the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Commission will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was
stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to
enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” “The rule strives to ensure ‘the trial court has an
opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and
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reversals.’” Commonwealth v. Bass, 292 Va. 19, 26 (2016) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth,
279 Va. 210, 217 (2010)).
In this case, before the trial court accepted the plea agreement, the trial court conducted a
thorough plea colloquy in accordance with Rule 3A:8 to determine the voluntariness of Ralph’s
pleas. See Rule 3A:8(b)(1) (“A circuit court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
to a felony charge without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with an
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.”). Ralph asserts that
the good cause exception to Rule 5A:18 applies here because he “had little opportunity to move
for a withdrawal of his guilty pleas and didn’t fully understand the consequences of his guilty
pleas until it was too late to move for withdrawal of the pleas.”
“The Court may only invoke the ‘good cause’ exception where an appellant did not have
the opportunity to object to a ruling in the trial court; however, when an appellant ‘had the
opportunity to object but elected not to do so,’ the exception does not apply.” Perry v.
Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 655, 667 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Luck v.
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 827, 834 (2000)). The extensive plea colloquy discussed supra
demonstrates that the trial court afforded Ralph ample opportunity to object before his guilty
pleas became final. Ralph could have objected during the October 26, 2020 hearing when the
trial court accepted his guilty pleas, or he could have moved to withdraw his pleas for up to
twenty-one days after the trial court entered its sentencing order. Code § 19.2-296. However,
Ralph never indicated that there was any issue during the plea colloquy—and never moved to
withdraw his guilty pleas at any point during the numerous days after the hearing while the trial
court still retained jurisdiction over the matter. We therefore reject Ralph’s contention that the
good cause exception to Rule 5A:18 applies here.
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Ralph also urges this Court to apply the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18. This
Court “considers two questions when deciding whether to apply the ends of justice exception:
(1) whether there is error as contended by the appellant; and (2) whether the failure to apply the
ends of justice provision would result in a grave injustice.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 294 Va.
25, 27-28 (2017) (quoting Bass, 292 Va. at 27). “The ‘ends of justice’ exception to Rule 5A:18
is ‘narrow and is to be used sparingly.’” Melick v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 122, 146 (2018)
(quoting Pearce v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 113, 123 (2008)).
In this case, Ralph acknowledged during the plea colloquy that he understood the charges
against him and that he understood what the Commonwealth needed to prove. The trial judge
specifically asked Ralph, “Are you entering these pleas of guilty freely and voluntarily?” Ralph
answered, “Yes, sir.” The trial judge then also asked, “Are you entering these pleas of guilty
because you are, in fact, guilty of the crimes charged?” Again, Ralph answered, “Yes, sir.” The
record of the plea colloquy thus shows that Ralph entered valid guilty pleas. We certainly cannot
say that this case falls within the narrow category of cases in which the record affirmatively
shows a miscarriage of justice so grave that this Court would attain the ends of justice by
considering an argument that was never made to the trial court. Consequently, we do not reach
Ralph’s argument—made for the first time on appeal—that the trial court erred in accepting his
guilty pleas.
B. Ralph’s Sentence
Finally, Ralph argues that the trial court “abused its discretion in sentencing Ralph
pursuant to a plea agreement to a total of 53 years in prison, with 38 years suspended[.]” “The
determination of sentencing lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Martin v.
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 733, 735 (2007). “A sentencing decision will not be reversed unless
the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. “[W]hen a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment
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penalty and the sentence does not exceed that maximum, the sentence will not be overturned as
being an abuse of discretion.” Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Alston v.
Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 771-72 (2007)). Ralph does not argue that his sentences exceeded
the applicable statutory maximum for any of his convictions. Instead, he asserts that “there were
significant mitigating circumstances to which the sentencing court failed to give proper weight.”
However, Ralph expressly agreed to the sentence he received as part of the plea agreement. The
plea agreement specifically recommended a sentence of fifty-three years of incarceration with
thirty-eight years suspended, for an active sentence of fifteen years. The trial court certainly did
not err in sentencing Ralph according to the agreement that Ralph himself made with the
Commonwealth. Furthermore, the General Assembly has restricted appellate review of
sentencing decisions. See Code § 19.2-298.01(F). Likewise, the Supreme Court has previously
stated, “[O]ur view adheres to the ‘general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence
is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at
an end.’” Du, 292 Va. at 565 (quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974)).
In this case, Ralph’s sentences were “within the statutory range[s], and our task is complete.”
Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 89, 99 (2018); see also Du, 292 Va. at 564-65.
III. CONCLUSION
In short, Ralph never indicated that there was any issue when the trial court accepted his
guilty pleas—and never at any point moved to withdraw his guilty pleas while the trial court
retained jurisdiction over the matter. Furthermore, the record of the plea colloquy shows that
Ralph entered valid guilty pleas to each of the charges against him. Therefore, Rule 5A:18
precludes Ralph from arguing for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in accepting
his guilty pleas.
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Finally, Ralph assigns error on appeal to the sentence he received, but he expressly agreed
to the sentence that was set out in the plea agreement. The trial court imposed the exact sentence
outlined in the written plea agreement that Ralph and the Commonwealth had requested. In
addition, Ralph’s sentence fell within the applicable statutory range for each of his convictions
so we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in any way. Consequently, we uphold
the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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