Derik William Pruett v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2022 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Malveaux, Ortiz and Causey
Argued at Lexington, Virginia
DERIK WILLIAM PRUETT
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0092-22-3 JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ
DECEMBER 6, 2022
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
Timothy W. Allen, Judge
William Edward Cooley for appellant.
Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Franklin County convicted Derik William
Pruett of the possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance, in violation of Code § 18.2-250.
Pruett argues that the trial court erred in finding that he possessed the methamphetamine because the
“smoking device tied to [him] was not found on the same day that [he] possessed the device and [it]
was available for use by other people in the interim.” Because the Commonwealth’s evidence was
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pruett was guilty of possession of a Schedule I or
II controlled substance, specifically because Pruett admitted to using the discovered pipe that tested
positively for methamphetamine, we affirm the conviction.
BACKGROUND
We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing
party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard the
evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the
credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323-24 (2018)).
On September 15, 2019, Franklin County Sheriff’s Investigator Zachary Shaffer assisted in
the execution of a search warrant on a house in Franklin County.1 Shaffer, joined by other police,
knocked on the house door and announced their presence multiple times without response. The
police forced entry into the residence and found the only occupant, Pruett, standing near a hallway
closet. In the hallway closet, the police found a black pouch containing a glass smoking device,
syringes, and a small plastic baggie. Police advised Pruett of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Pruett told the police that “he had taken a hit from [the glass smoking
device] last night.” The police sent the device to a forensic laboratory, which determined that it
contained methamphetamine. The laboratory did not find traces of marijuana.
On cross-examination, Shaffer admitted that Pruett did not own the residence and that it
appeared that “a lot of people [came] to that house in recent days.” Shaffer also stated that at the
time of the search, Pruett had packed his belongings in anticipation of leaving the residence.
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Pruett moved to strike, asserting the
Commonwealth did not meet its burden. Pruett argued that the Commonwealth only presented
evidence of a smoking device that he admitted using some time before the search and that
subsequent to his use another person could have used the smoking device to smoke
methamphetamine. Pruett concluded that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he possessed the
methamphetamine or even knew that it was in the smoking device. The trial court denied Pruett’s
motion to strike.
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The police executed the search warrant for the purpose of finding drugs in the residence.
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Pruett then testified in his own defense. Pruett said he did not answer the door when the
police knocked because he was using the restroom. He said he “vaguely” remembered telling the
police that he used the smoking device but later stated that he had never seen the smoking device in
his life. Pruett testified that two other people lived at the residence and used drugs. On
cross-examination, Pruett admitted to having five past felony convictions. Pruett stated that he may
have told the police that he took a “hit” from the pipe, but that he could not recall and clarified that
he used the pipe to smoke “probably marijuana.”
After hearing all the evidence and argument, the trial court convicted Pruett of possession of
a Schedule I or II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Pruett to three years of
incarceration, with one year and ten months suspended. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Pruett argues that “the Commonwealth did not establish the essential elements for a
conviction for possession of methamphetamine.” Pruett argues that although the evidence showed
that he “took a ‘hit’ off a glass smoking device the night before the search warrant was executed . . .
[t]here was no evidence that [he] knew what was in the smoking device the night before . . . or on
the day that the officers arrived at the house.” Additionally, Pruett asserts that “others in the house
may have used the smoking device between the time [he] used it and when the officers arrived.”
Pruett argues that this “precludes the assumption” that he was using methamphetamine when he
used the smoking device.
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting
Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.-3-
(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the
relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting
Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the
conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion
might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72
Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).
“In order to convict a person of illegal drug possession, the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was aware of the presence and character of the drug
and that the accused consciously possessed it.” Yerling v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 527, 532
(2020). “[P]roof of actual possession is not required; proof of constructive possession will
suffice.” Id. (quoting Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 426 (1998)). The Commonwealth
proves constructive possession by showing that there are “acts, statements, or conduct of the
accused or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the [accused] was aware of both
the presence and character of the substance and that it was subject to his dominion and control.”
Id. (quoting Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473 (1986)). Although “ownership or
occupancy of the premises where the drug is found does not create a presumption of possession,
. . . these factors may be considered in deciding whether an accused possessed the drug.” Id.“Circumstantial evidence is as acceptable . . . as direct evidence” to prove guilt, especially as “it is
practically the only method of proof” for elements like intent and knowledge. Abdo v.
Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 468, 475-76 (2015) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492,
498 (1980)).
The Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the conclusion beyond a
reasonable doubt that Pruett possessed the methamphetamine. When the police entered the house,
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Pruett was the only occupant and was standing near the closet where the police found the smoking
device. Pruett admitted to the police that on the previous night, he “had taken a hit” from the
smoking device, which the forensic laboratory determined contained methamphetamine.
At trial, however, Pruett stated that he had never seen the smoking device in his life. Pruett
also testified that he “vaguely” remembered that he may have told the police that he used the
smoking device, but that he could not recall. Later, Pruett stated that he used the pipe to smoke
“probably marijuana,” despite the forensic laboratory finding no traces of marijuana in the pipe.
It is well-settled that “issues of witness credibility and the weight afforded a witness’
testimony ‘are matters solely for the fact finder[,] who has the opportunity to see and hear that
evidence as it is presented.’” Hammer, 74 Va. App. at 239 (alteration in original) (quoting Gerald
v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 486 (2018)). A reviewing court “must accept ‘the [fact finder’s]
determination of the credibility of witness testimony unless, “as a matter of law, the testimony is
inherently incredible.”’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70
Va. App. 740, 759 (2019)).
The trial court was entitled to reject Pruett’s contradictory and self-serving evidence. See
Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011). Here, the trial court rejected Pruett’s
testimony and found the Commonwealth’s witness to be more credible. See Rams v.
Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 28 (2019) (holding that in convicting the appellant, the fact
finder “has found by a process of elimination that the evidence does not contain a reasonable
theory of innocence” (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004))).
Considering the totality of the evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Pruett
knowingly possessed methamphetamine.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. The
Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, was not inherently incredible, and was sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pruett was guilty of possession of a Schedule I or II controlled
substance. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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