Frank Howard v. Suzanne Howard ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges AtLee and Friedman
Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
FRANK HOWARD
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0819-22-4 CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER
MARCH 14, 2023
SUZANNE HOWARD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Jeanette A. Irby, Judge
Carla F. Ward (Law Office of Carla F. Ward PLLC, on brief), for
appellant.
Craig E. White (Sevila, Saunders, Huddleston & White, PC, on
brief), for appellee.
Frank Howard appeals the circuit court’s order denying his motion to modify spousal
support. He argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to continue the hearing and by
excluding testimony about the circumstances surrounding the formation of the parties’ separation
agreement. He further contends that the court erred by finding there had not been a material change
in circumstances warranting modification of the spousal support award. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. We also deny the wife’s request for attorney
fees and costs incurred on appeal.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1 413.
BACKGROUND1
On February 27, 2019, the circuit court entered a final decree of divorce awarding Suzanne
Howard a divorce from her husband. The parties signed a separation and property settlement
agreement in November 2018, under which the husband agreed to pay her $2,000 per month for
spousal support. They agreed that the spousal support award was modifiable by a court of
competent jurisdiction in the event of “a material change in either party’s financial circumstances
that justifies a modification to the amount due for spousal support.” The final divorce decree
affirmed, ratified, and incorporated the agreement.
In October 2019, a vehicle hit the husband as he walked in the crosswalk across a ten-lane
highway. As a result of the accident, he sustained significant injuries to his right leg, left arm, and
spine. Two weeks later, he filed a motion to modify the spousal support award. The husband
alleged he was “unable to work or produce an income” and “unable to fulfill his spousal support
obligation as currently ordered.”
The circuit court entered a pretrial scheduling order setting the hearing on the motion for
August 31, 2021. The order also directed the parties to file their witness and exhibit lists 15 days
beforehand, by August 16, 2021, and stated that “[a]ny exhibit or witness not so identified and filed
will not be received in evidence.” The husband, who was represented by counsel, belatedly filed his
witness and exhibit list on August 19, 2021, and the wife objected to the untimely filing.
On August 25, 2021, the husband was hospitalized due to a health event. Two days later, he
filed an emergency motion to continue the hearing on the basis that he could not proceed on August
31, 2021. By order of August 30, 2021, the court granted the husband’s motion and rescheduled the
hearing for May 3, 2022. Noting that the filing deadlines for exhibit notebooks, exhibit lists, and
1
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the wife, as the prevailing party
below. See Rainey v. Rainey, 74 Va. App. 359, 368 n.1 (2022).
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witness lists had passed before the husband’s hospitalization, the court refused to modify or extend
those deadlines.
On the morning of the rescheduled hearing, the husband filed a motion to vacate the circuit
court’s August 30, 2021 order and continue the hearing again, arguing that the order precluded him
from presenting new evidence of the parties’ current circumstances. After considering the
husband’s motion and the arguments of the parties, the court “vacat[ed] the portion of the order
which would not allow [it] to hear present day evidence” but did not continue the hearing. In
denying the husband’s continuance request, the court noted that the parties could present evidence
of their current income and expenses. The husband noted his ongoing objection to proceeding with
the hearing.
The husband testified about the injuries he sustained as a result of his 2019 accident. He
explained that he could no longer write with his dominant hand and needed to use a wheelchair. He
elaborated that he had undergone 17 operations and was hospitalized as recently as the week before
the hearing.
The husband stated that he was in his mid-sixties and unable to work after being struck by a
car. He explained that before the accident, he was a self-employed mortgage broker. According to
the husband, through his business, he “wasn’t making a lot of money, but [he] was making
money.” He represented to the court that his annual income in 2018 was approximately $5,300.2
He further testified that his income went “downhill” following his 2019 accident. He also said that
he paid his spousal support obligation from his half of the proceeds from the sale of the marital
home. He added that his portion of the proceeds had been exhausted at the time of the hearing.
2
The husband’s gross revenue from his two companies was $163,203 in 2018. His 2018
tax returns show that he deducted $157,672 from his gross revenue and reported his 2018
business income as $5,531. The husband did not testify about the gross revenue from his
companies in 2018 or any other year.
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According to the husband, he tried to continue working as a self-employed mortgage broker
following his accident but did not earn any income. He represented that he had decided to retire,
had “been deemed a hundred percent disabled” by the Social Security Administration, and received
$2,513 per month in Social Security benefits. In addition, he explained that he sought to terminate
the spousal support award “based on [his] physical condition, age, and . . . inability to work . . . as of
October 2019.”
The husband attempted to testify about why he had agreed to pay the wife $2,000 per month
in spousal support, and the wife raised several objections. The husband did not challenge the wife’s
objections or proffer what his testimony would have been.
During his case-in-chief, the husband called the wife as a witness. When he tried to elicit
testimony regarding her current income, she objected because he had not alleged that her income
constituted a material change in circumstances in his motion to modify spousal support. After
seeking clarification about the wife’s objection, the husband’s counsel stated that she would
“direct[ her] questions in terms of what [the wife] might know about the material change in
circumstances.” Counsel also noted that she “assume[d] that if the [c]ourt d[id] make a finding [of
a] material change in circumstances,” they would then address the issue of the wife’s income. The
husband did not proffer what the wife’s testimony about her income would have been.
At the end of the husband’s case-in-chief, the wife moved to strike on the basis that he failed
to prove a material change in circumstances because his income actually increased after the parties
entered into the separation agreement. The wife argued that the husband’s annual income in 2018
was approximately $5,600 and that his present annual income from his Social Security benefits was
approximately $30,156. The husband responded that his 2018 income was not the basis of the
agreed amount of spousal support because “[i]t was clearly his intention that he was going to be able
to pay [the award] out of the proceeds of his business.” He reasoned that therefore his 2018 income
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was irrelevant because “he had an asset,” presumably his proceeds from the sale of the marital
home, that he could use to pay spousal support. The husband further argued that he “had a down
year in 2018” and that his 2018 income should not be used “as a standard [that] he is actually doing
way better now.”
The circuit court granted the wife’s motion to strike. The court noted that it was undisputed
that the husband was “unable to work.” Nonetheless, the circuit court found the record proved that
his income had increased from the time of the parties’ separation agreement. It found that, even if
the husband’s income was unusually low in 2018, the only income evidence was that he “ma[d]e
more money than what he had at the time” the separation agreement was signed. The court noted it
was the husband’s burden to establish what his income was. In addition, the court awarded the wife
$9,915.95 in attorney fees.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the husband argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to continue
the hearing and excluding testimony about the parties’ separation agreement. He further contends
that the court erred by finding that no material change in circumstances warranting a modification of
the spousal support award had occurred. The wife disagrees and requests attorney fees and costs
incurred on appeal.
I. Continuance Motion
The husband argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing his request for a
continuance. He asked for the continuance on the morning of the May 2022 hearing in conjunction
with his motion to vacate the court’s August 30, 2021 order. The court did not continue the hearing
but vacated “the portion” of the August 30, 2021 order that “would not allow [it] to hear present day
evidence.” The husband suggests that the August 30, 2021 order precluded him from introducing
“full documentary and testamentary evidence of his deteriorating medical condition and current
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financial state.” He argues that, after the court vacated the order, it should have “continu[ed] the
matter to another date and enter[ed] a new scheduling order so both sides could supplement their
discovery and present their evidence.”
“The decision of whether to grant a continuance is committed to the discretion of the
circuit court.” Shah v. Shah, 70 Va. App. 588, 593 (2019). That court’s ruling on the motion
“will be rejected on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.”
Va. Fuel Corp. v. Lambert Coal Co., 291 Va. 89, 104-05 (2016) (quoting Haugen v. Shenandoah
Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34 (2007)). “The absence of one renders
inconsequential the presence of the other.” Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 558, 565
(2009) (quoting Bolden v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 285, 290 (2007), aff’d, 275 Va. 144(2008)). Additionally, prejudice “may not be presumed; it must appear from the record.” Id.(quoting Bolden, 49 Va. App. at 290).
A fundamental precursor to appellate review is an adequate proffer. See Graham v.
Cook, 278 Va. 233, 249 (2009). A proffer is necessary to permit the appellate court to determine
whether the denial of a continuance requested in order to obtain evidence was an abuse of
discretion and prejudiced the complaining party. An adequate proffer creates a record of “what
the [evidence] would have been.” Commonwealth Transp. Comm’r v. Target Corp., 274 Va.
341, 348 (2007) (quoting Holles v. Sunrise Terrace, Inc., 257 Va. 131, 135 (1999)). It is not
sufficient for a party to proffer “merely his theory of the case” rather than the substance of the
suggested excluded evidence. Ray v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 647, 650 (2010) (quoting
Tynes v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 21 (2006)). In short, “[a]bsent a proffer showing
‘harm was done,’” the appellate court is “‘forbidden [from] consider[ing] the question.’” Id. at
650 (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 73, 78-79 (1950)).
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Here, when the husband sought a continuance, he did not proffer to the circuit court the
specific evidence that he claims he was unable to present. His counsel merely stated the desire to
“create new exhibits” addressing “his deteriorating medical condition and current financial
state,” supplementing the discovery between the parties. The circuit court vacated part of the
August 2021 order so that the parties could introduce “present day evidence.” The court allowed
the husband to testify about his income as of the date of the hearing. Without a proffer of the
allegedly excluded evidence, the record does not show that the husband was prejudiced by the
absence of the unspecified evidence.3 Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
II. Exclusion of Testimony
The husband contends that the circuit court erred by excluding testimony about the “factors
and circumstances leading to [the] [a]greement” regarding spousal support. He believes the court
erred by not admitting his testimony about how the parties reached the original agreement and not
allowing him to question the wife about her income in 2019. After the circuit court sustained the
wife’s relevance objections, however, the husband did not proffer the excluded testimony for the
record.
Similar to the situation with a continuance, “[w]hen evidence is excluded by the court, the
aggrieved party must make a proper proffer of the excluded testimony to preserve the ruling for
appellate review.” Klein v. Klein, 11 Va. App. 155, 160 (1990); accord Galumbeck v. Lopez, 283
Va. 500, 507 (2012). “When an appellant claims a . . . court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence, we cannot competently determine error—much less reversible error—without ‘a
Although the husband argues that he was prejudiced by the circuit court’s August 30,
3
2021 order, he does not identify any specific prejudice he suffered by proceeding with the
hearing on May 3, 2022. Instead, he simply concludes that he had suffered “extreme prejudice”
and that the denial of his continuance request was “deeply prejudicial.” See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry.
Co. v. Bowles, 261 Va. 21, 29 (2001) (noting that the party did not posit any “specific prejudice”
resulting from the denial of the motion to continue).
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proper showing of what that testimony would have been.’” Ray, 55 Va. App. at 649 (quoting
Tynes, 49 Va. App. at 21).
The husband did not proffer what the presumable testimony of his witnesses would have
been and consequently does not provide this Court with a basis to determine whether the circuit
court properly excluded the testimony. The failure to proffer precludes consideration of this
particular claim. Without a proffer of the expected testimony, this Court simply cannot
determine whether any such evidence was relevant and admissible. Therefore, we do not
consider this assignment of error. See Klein, 11 Va. App. at 160.
III. Material Change in Circumstances
The husband contends that the circuit court erred by finding that no material change in
circumstances warranting modification of its spousal support award had occurred. Specifically,
he believes that the court erroneously considered only his income and no other factors, such as
the depletion of his assets and his inability to continue working. The husband argues that his
injuries from the debilitating accident constituted “a totally unexpected and substantial material
change in circumstances affecting his ability to pay spousal support.” In support, he suggests
that his injuries “were so severe they affected every aspect of his life.”
In the separation and property settlement agreement, the parties provided that the spousal
support award was modifiable in the event of “a material change in either party’s financial
circumstances that justifies a modification to the amount due for spousal support.” Generally,
following an award of spousal support, a circuit court may modify the award if the circumstances
merit such a change. Code § 20-109. As expressly provided in the agreement here, “[t]he
moving party in a petition for modification of support is required to prove both a material change
in circumstances and that this change warrants a modification of support.” Nielsen v. Nielsen, 73
Va. App. 370, 379 (2021) (quoting Dailey v. Dailey, 59 Va. App. 734, 742-43 (2012)). It is well
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established that “[w]hether there has been a material change of circumstances is a factual
finding.” Id. at 381 (quoting Barrs v. Barrs, 45 Va. App. 500, 507 (2005)). An appellate court
will not set aside a circuit court’s factual findings unless “plainly wrong or without evidence to
support [them].” Hughes v. Hughes, 33 Va. App. 141, 146 (2000) (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9
Va. App. 326, 328 (1990)).
To constitute a material change in circumstances, a “change ‘must bear upon the financial
needs of the dependent spouse or the ability of the supporting spouse to pay.’” Barnes v. Barnes,
64 Va. App. 22, 29 (2014) (quoting Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 195 (1997)). In other
words, it “must relate to either the need for support or the ability to pay.” Barton v. Barton, 31
Va. App. 175, 178 (1999). In addition, to merit a modification or termination of the spousal
support award, “[t]he material change in circumstances must have occurred after the most recent
judicial review of the award.” Nielsen, 73 Va. App. at 380 (quoting Barrs, 45 Va. App. at 506).
Here, the circuit court correctly observed that the husband bore the burden to prove a
material change in circumstances that warranted a change of the spousal support award. See
Nielsen, 73 Va. App. at 379. Consistent with the husband’s pleading, the court limited
consideration of the case to the husband’s ability to pay based on his income. Although the court
acknowledged the severity of the husband’s injuries and his inability to work, it found, based on
the evidence presented, that those factors did not actually reduce his income. Consistent with
this conclusion, the court was unpersuaded that the accident negatively impacted the husband’s
ability to pay.
We recognize that the husband argues, as he did below, that the parties’ separation
agreement was not based on his income and the circuit court should have considered other factors
such as his depletion of assets. However, the husband’s written motion to modify support specified
only his injuries and resulting inability “to work or produce an income” as bases for the motion. A
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circuit court can “base its judgment or decree” only on “facts . . . alleged” or rights that have “been
pleaded and claimed.”4 Stark v. Dinarany, 73 Va. App. 733, 746 (2021) (quoting Ted Lansing
Supply Co. v. Royal Aluminum & Constr. Corp., 221 Va. 1139, 1141 (1981)). In other words, the
husband, in his motion, specifically pled a material change in circumstances based only on his
physical condition and inability to work. It was therefore appropriate for the circuit court to limit its
consideration of the case to the factors the husband relied on in his pleading. We too must review
this case under the framework set out in the husband’s motion to modify spousal support.
Consequently, the sole question for this Court to resolve is whether the circuit court erred in finding
that the husband failed to prove that his injuries constituted a material change in circumstances since
the original award that reduced his ability to pay.
The circuit court found that, even if it assumed that the husband’s 2018 income was
anomalously low, he had introduced no income evidence except that he “ma[d]e more money”
following the accident “than what he had [made] at the time the agreement was signed.” The
court’s finding is supported by the husband’s testimony that his income was approximately $5,300
for the year in which the parties entered into their separation agreement. Although his gross
revenue that year was $163,203, he deducted $157,672 from that amount to net an income of around
$5,300. In contrast, the husband testified that he received $30,156 a year from Social Security at the
time of the instant hearing.
Based on this evidence, the court found that the husband’s income was higher at the time of
the hearing than when the parties entered into the separation agreement. This finding is supported
4
“The basis of every right of recovery under our system of jurisprudence is a pleading
setting forth facts warranting the granting of the relief sought.” Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal
Aluminum & Constr. Corp., 221 Va. 1139, 1141 (1981) (quoting Potts v. Mathieson Alkali
Works, 165 Va. 196, 207 (1935)). This rule protects “[e]very litigant[’s] . . . entitle[ment] to be
told by his adversary in plain and explicit language . . . his ground of complaint or defense.” Id.(quoting Potts, 165 Va. at 207).
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by the record. See Hughes, 33 Va. App. at 146. Because the evidence established that the
husband’s income had actually increased after the accident, he failed to prove to the satisfaction of
the fact finder that his inability to work constituted a material change in circumstances affecting his
ability to pay his spousal support obligation as compared to his ability at the time he agreed to
the award. See Barton, 31 Va. App. at 177-78. Despite any sympathy engendered by the
husband’s personal situation, the circuit court was not plainly wrong in concluding that he failed to
prove a material change in circumstances warranting a change in the spousal support award.
IV. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal
The wife seeks an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.5 Under Rule 5A:30, in
specified cases in which attorney fees and costs are recoverable under Title 20 of the Code of
Virginia, the Court of Appeals may award some or all of the fees and costs requested. Whether to
award fees is discretionary. See Rule 5A:30; Alwan v. Alwan, 70 Va. App. 599, 613 (2019). In
deciding whether to make such an award, the Court may consider factors including whether the
requesting party has prevailed, whether the appeal “lacked substantial merit” or was frivolous, or
whether other reasons support an award of attorney fees and costs. See Rule 5A:30; accord
Brandau v. Brandau, 52 Va. App. 632, 642 (2008); O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690,
695 (1996). Rule 5A:30(b) allows this Court to “consider all the equities of the case.”
The husband’s claims ultimately lack merit, but at least one is not frivolous. Considering all
the equities of the case, the other factors in Rule 5A:30, and the relevant case law, we deny the
wife’s request for appellate attorney fees and costs. Accordingly, “[e]ach party shall bear its own
fees and costs.” See Rainey v. Rainey, 74 Va. App. 359, 391 (2022).
The separation agreement “expressly reserve[s]” the issue of attorney fees for the Court.
5
See generally Allen v. Allen, 66 Va. App. 586, 603 (2016) (considering the parties’ post-nuptial
agreement to determine whether to award appellate attorney fees).
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CONCLUSION
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the eleventh-hour motion to
continue the hearing. We do not consider the husband’s challenge to the exclusion of certain
testimony because the expected testimony was not proffered for the record. In addition, the
record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that the husband failed to establish a material
change in circumstances warranting a change in the spousal support award. For these reasons, the
circuit court’s ruling is affirmed. We also deny the wife’s request for attorney fees and costs.
Affirmed.
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