Randor Lee Uzzel, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2020 )


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  •                                              COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Beales, O’Brien and Malveaux
    Argued by videoconference
    UNPUBLISHED
    RANDOR LEE UZZLE, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.     Record No. 0386-19-1                                   JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
    DECEMBER 29, 2020
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
    David W. Lannetti, Judge
    Andrew Sebok for appellant.
    Leanna C. Minix, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    Following a bench trial, appellant Randor Lee Uzzle, Jr. was convicted of rape under
    Code § 18.2-61. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to
    replace his court-appointed defense attorney. He also argues that the “trial court erred in failing
    to inquire into the apparent conflict of interest” when it learned at the sentencing hearing that
    Uzzle’s attorney had prosecuted him approximately twelve years earlier in what he
    acknowledges was an unrelated criminal proceeding.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Uzzle was charged with raping T.M., his friend’s fourteen-year-old daughter.1 Before his
    trial began on September 18, 2018, Uzzle’s court-appointed trial counsel, Asha Pandya, informed
    the court that Uzzle wished to address the court directly. After the trial judge granted him
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    1
    Uzzle was also charged with aggravated sexual battery under Code § 18.2-67.3 but that
    charge was nolle prosequied.
    permission to speak, Uzzle stated, “Yes, sir. I just feel like [Pandya] is not trying to act for me at
    all.” Uzzle explained, “[L]ike she was supposed to come see me, and I am not prepped. She is
    angry because I didn’t take the deal. She slammed the door in my face in the back. She has an
    attitude, and I haven’t talked to her.” The trial judge asked Uzzle when he had last spoken with
    Pandya, and Uzzle replied, “Like a week or two ago, and she was supposed to come and see me.
    This is a very serious case, and I was just now seeing her today, and she was rushing to talk to
    me in the back.”
    After hearing Uzzle’s concerns, the trial judge turned to Pandya. He inquired about
    Uzzle’s allegations and asked if she had agreed to meet with him a week ago. Pandya stated:
    It was the end of the week before the hurricane. It was
    approximately—less than ten days ago. Mr. Uzzle was completely
    prepped for this trial. We’ve talked about all the issues as far as
    this being a credibility case. We have even gone through what the
    witness testimony would be. We’ve spoken about the guidelines,
    both adjusted and unadjusted.
    There was an offer made by the Commonwealth Attorney’s
    Office. We talked about that on several occasions, and he initially
    rejected it. This morning when we came for trial we were
    transferred so I advised Mr. Uzzle of some issues dealing with
    being in a new courtroom and so on, went over the guidelines
    again. It was Mr. Uzzle who upon having a conversation with me
    wanted me to reapproach the Commonwealth with a determinative
    sentence, and he indicated that was something he was interested in
    doing, which I did. I relayed it to them, came back. I told him
    throughout I have no agenda, not telling him what he should do. I
    never do with my clients. Unfortunately, he doesn’t like the facts,
    he doesn’t like the guidelines and he doesn’t really like my legal
    advice, as to what I said to him I think is in his best interest as it
    relates to his freedom. Other than that I don’t know what else—
    The trial judge interjected, asking, “Are you prepared for trial?” and Pandya responded,
    “I’m absolutely prepared. I’ve been prepared for weeks.” When the trial judge asked if Uzzle
    had any additional comments, Uzzle stated:
    Yeah. She said we prepped for witnesses, but when she
    came to see me ten or whatever days ago, she said I would be back,
    -2-
    to come see me so we can prep and so I know what to say and what
    not to say, and she never came, so I’m not prepped for trial.
    In response, Pandya explained that she had intended to visit Uzzle again but was unable
    to do so because of a hurricane. She stated that, for “any major case like this,” she tries to see
    her clients multiple times but the fact that she was unable to visit him that last time did not
    “mean he wasn’t already prepped as far as that is concerned.”
    After listening to Uzzle and his counsel, the trial judge stated, “The Court is going to
    deny the motion to withdraw counsel. The Court is going to treat it as a motion to withdraw.”
    The trial court then proceeded with the arraignment. During the plea colloquy, the trial
    judge asked Uzzle if he was satisfied with the services of his attorney. Uzzle responded, “No.”
    He continued, “I shouldn’t have to argue with my lawyer and the prosecutor. That’s it.” Uzzle
    entered a plea of not guilty and, following a bench trial, was found guilty of rape.
    On February 15, 2019, Uzzle appeared before the trial court for a sentencing hearing,
    where he chose to testify. At the beginning of his testimony, Uzzle stated, “First of all, I wanted
    to say that I feel like, you know, my case as in a whole wasn’t really hand[l]ed professionally in
    my point of view.” Following this statement, both Pandya and the trial judge explained the
    purpose of the sentencing hearing, and Pandya asked Uzzle to leave for appeal any issues not
    relevant to the sentencing. Pandya then proceeded with direct examination, and Uzzle testified
    about his experiences working multiple jobs after being released from custody in 2010 following
    a manslaughter conviction. Pandya and Uzzle then engaged in the following conversation:
    [Pandya]: And just so we’re clear, you and I spoke about [how] I
    was actually the prosecutor on this case.
    [Uzzle]: You was the prosecutor on the case.
    -3-
    [Pandya]: So I’m very familiar with the actual details of what that
    case was and what it was not.
    [Uzzle]: Of everything.
    After Uzzle testified, the Commonwealth argued for a sentence “around the high end [of
    the sentencing guidelines] of 27 years” of incarceration, describing Uzzle’s prior manslaughter
    conviction as “a crime entrenched in violence” and arguing that Uzzle’s criminal record
    conveyed a pattern of violent behavior. Pandya argued for a sentence at the low end of the
    guidelines. As part of her argument for a lower sentence for Uzzle, she provided the trial court
    with additional information regarding the manslaughter conviction which she had gained from
    her role as the prosecutor in that case. She stated that, while there was an “official version” of
    the facts that led to Uzzle’s conviction, there was also “a lot more to th[at] case.” She explained
    that Uzzle had originally been charged with murder but, upon investigation, it was found that the
    shooting was clearly an “accidental shooting by Mr. Uzzle” of one of his friends. She stated that
    he “either accidentally pulled the trigger on the gun, or it went off accidentally.” Pandya
    represented that Uzzle “was overcharged” when the Commonwealth initially charged him with
    murder, leading her to offer Uzzle a plea agreement for involuntary manslaughter because “it
    was the right disposition in that particular time.”
    Pandya also explained how Uzzle “took personal responsibility” for his actions. She
    stated, “And I can tell you from being the prosecutor, he felt a tremendous amount of remorse.
    This gentleman cried at the sentencing. He cried at the time he took the offer. This was one of
    his very best friends.” Pandya reiterated that she was able to tell the trial court these details
    about Uzzle’s manslaughter conviction “because [she] happen[ed] to be [the] prosecutor that
    handled them.”
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court gave Uzzle a twenty-year active sentence.
    -4-
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. The Motion to Withdraw
    In his first assignment of error, Uzzle contends, “The trial court erred in denying the
    defendant’s Motion to have his defense attorney replaced.” (Emphasis in original.) Uzzle argues
    that by denying his motion, the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He
    contends that “[a]t a minimum, the statements made by Ms. Pandya and Mr. Uzzle to the trial
    court clearly demonstrate that there was a significant breakdown of communication between
    Mr. Uzzle and Ms. Pandya to the point where the client did not trust his attorney.” He also
    claims that, if the trial court had inquired further regarding Pandya’s preparedness, it likely
    would have discovered the alleged conflict of interest for Pandya regarding representing Uzzle.
    The trial court stated that it was treating Uzzle’s complaints about Pandya’s performance
    as a motion to withdraw. “Motions for counsel to be permitted to withdraw . . . are addressed to
    the sound discretion of the trial court.” Spence v. Commonwealth, 
    60 Va. App. 355
    , 369 (2012)
    (quoting Payne v. Commonwealth, 
    233 Va. 460
    , 473 (1987)). “The Sixth Amendment
    guarantees that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
    Assistance of Counsel for his defence.’” Brown v. Commonwealth, 
    288 Va. 439
    , 442 (2014)
    (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). “It is well established that this constitutional guarantee entitles
    indigent criminal defendants to court appointed counsel in felony cases and other criminal cases
    resulting in a sentence of imprisonment.” 
    Id.
     However, the Virginia Supreme Court has
    emphasized that the right to effective assistance of counsel “does not guarantee that the
    defendant will be represented by a particular attorney,” Hummel v. Commonwealth, 
    219 Va. 252
    , 258 (1978), and the United States Supreme Court has “reject[ed] the claim that the Sixth
    Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and his counsel[,]”
    Morris v. Slappy, 
    461 U.S. 1
    , 14 (1983). Furthermore, “the right to choice of counsel ‘does not
    -5-
    extend to defendants who require [court appointed] counsel.’” Brown, 288 Va. at 442 (alteration
    in original) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 
    548 U.S. 140
    , 144 (2006)). “An indigent
    defendant cannot have his original attorney replaced unless he shows good cause.” Kinard v.
    Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 524
    , 526 (1993).
    The trial court in this case heard from both Uzzle and his counsel and concluded that
    there was no basis for granting the “motion to withdraw.” Although Uzzle stated that he was not
    prepared, Pandya represented that she had met with Uzzle less than ten days prior to the trial and
    that they were both completely prepared. She explained that they had discussed how the case
    would turn on credibility, had “gone through what the witness testimony would be,” and had
    spoken about the guidelines and the Commonwealth’s plea offer.2 She explained that, although
    she had hoped to visit Uzzle again, she was unable to do so because of a hurricane. Based on
    Pandya’s adamancy that both she and Uzzle were prepared for trial and the details she provided
    to the trial court about their preparation, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
    denying the motion for new counsel.3
    2
    On appeal, Uzzle claims that Pandya represented to the trial court that she had prepped
    witnesses for trial. He claims that her statement was clearly a misrepresentation because the only
    witness she called was Uzzle. However, the transcript shows that Pandya only told the trial court
    that she and Uzzle had “gone through what the witness testimony would be,” which could refer
    to her preparing Uzzle for the anticipated testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Thus,
    her statement to the trial court does not appear to be a misrepresentation.
    3
    We do not consider Uzzle’s allegation that Pandya’s prior prosecution of him created a
    conflict of interest in connection with this assignment of error because, as Uzzle states in his
    brief to this Court, the trial court was unaware of her role in the prior prosecution at the time of
    the motion. Moreover, Uzzle’s contention that the trial court would have discovered the alleged
    conflict if the court had continued to inquire as to her preparedness is simply speculative. The
    trial court gave both Pandya and Uzzle the time and opportunity to explain why they felt they
    were or were not prepared, and Pandya’s prior prosecution of Uzzle was never mentioned during
    this conversation.
    Uzzle also claims that the trial court erred in not treating the motion to withdraw as a
    motion to continue, but he provides no authority to establish that it was error for a trial court to
    treat his statements to the trial court as a motion to withdraw. While he cites to London v.
    -6-
    B. The Alleged Conflict of Interest
    In his second assignment of error, Uzzle argues that the “trial court erred in failing to
    inquire into the apparent conflict of interest of the defense attorney when it learned that the same
    attorney had prosecuted Mr. Uzzle in a previous unrelated felony conviction.” He contends that
    Pandya’s prior prosecution of him for his 2006 manslaughter conviction created an apparent
    conflict that required the trial judge “to conduct an inquiry into the extent and effect of the
    conflict.” In addition, he argues that the conflict of interest resulted in his having inadequate
    legal counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his due process rights.
    He maintains that “the conflict [of interest] is a structural error because it is pervasive,
    undermines the reliability of the entire case below and cannot be remedied.”
    In support of their arguments, the parties discuss four cases from the United States
    Supreme Court addressing conflicts of interest and the trial court’s duty to inquire into the nature
    and extent of those conflicts: Holloway v. Arkansas, 
    435 U.S. 475
    , 484 (1978); Cuyler v.
    Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. 335
     (1980); Wood v. Georgia, 
    450 U.S. 261
     (1981); and Mickens v. Taylor,
    
    535 U.S. 162
     (2002).
    In Holloway, the petitioners, three co-defendants, were represented by the same
    court-appointed defense counsel in a consolidated trial. 
    435 U.S. at 477
    . A few weeks before
    the trial commenced, their counsel moved for the appointment of separate counsel for each
    petitioner based on the possibility of a conflict of interest. 
    Id.
     That motion was denied. 
    Id.
    Before the jury was empaneled on the day of trial, counsel again moved for the appointment of
    Commonwealth, 
    49 Va. App. 230
     (2006), and Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
    51 Va. App. 369
    , 374
    (2008), those cases involved requests for continuances to allow indigent defendants to replace
    their court-appointed counsel with new, retained counsel. That was not the situation presented in
    the case at bar. Uzzle did not request a continuance, and he did not represent to the trial court
    that he was planning to proceed with retained counsel. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial
    court erred in treating Uzzle’s statements as a motion to withdraw or in denying that motion.
    -7-
    separate counsel, stating “that one or two of the defendants may testify and if they do, then I will
    not be able to cross-examine them because I have received confidential information from them.”
    
    Id. at 478
    . The motion was again denied. 
    Id.
     On the second day of trial, defense counsel
    notified the court that his clients intended to testify, reiterated his concerns about representing all
    three defendants, and informed the court that he would be unable to protect each of their
    interests. 
    Id. at 478-79
    . The trial court required counsel to proceed as counsel for all three
    defendants. 
    Id. at 480
    .
    Upon review, the Supreme Court noted the divergent treatment of cases involving joint
    representation in appellate courts where trial counsel does not alert the trial court to the potential
    conflict. 
    Id. at 483
    . Given the facts of Holloway, however, the Supreme Court concluded that it
    did not need to resolve that issue. 
    Id. at 484
    . Because trial counsel had repeatedly alerted the
    trial court to the probable conflict of interest prior to trial and “the judge then failed either to
    appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to
    warrant separate counsel,” the Court held that the petitioners’ right to the assistance of counsel
    was violated. 
    Id.
    Two years later, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. 335
     (1980), the Court again addressed a
    potential conflict of interest presented by joint representation of co-defendants. Sullivan had
    been indicted with two co-defendants for first-degree murder. 
    Id. at 337
    . All three
    co-defendants were represented by the same two privately retained lawyers throughout the state
    proceedings following the indictment. 
    Id.
     Neither Sullivan nor his attorneys ever objected to the
    multiple representation. 
    Id. at 337-38
    . Sullivan was tried first and convicted, and his
    co-defendants were subsequently acquitted in separate trials. 
    Id. at 338
    . After exhausting his
    state remedies, Sullivan sought habeas relief. 
    Id. at 339
    .
    -8-
    Sullivan required the Supreme Court to answer a question not addressed in Holloway:
    “whether a state trial judge must inquire into the propriety of multiple representation even though
    no party lodges an objection.” 
    Id. at 345
     (emphasis added). The Court recognized that, while
    “Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate timely objections to multiple
    representation[,]” Holloway did not mandate that trial courts make inquiries in every case
    involving joint representation. 
    Id. at 346
    . It stated that “[a]bsent special circumstances,
    therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple representation entails no conflict or that
    the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.” 
    Id. at 346-47
    .
    Accordingly, the Court concluded that “[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should know
    that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry.” 
    Id. at 348
    .
    After considering the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the trial court did not
    have an affirmative duty to inquire about a conflict of interest. 
    Id. at 347
    . It noted that none of
    the participants in Sullivan’s trial ever objected to the joint representation, that the defendants
    were tried in separate trials, and that the opening statement of Sullivan’s counsel “outlined a
    defense compatible with the view that none of the defendants was connected with the murders.”
    
    Id.
     Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court was not
    required to inquire into the potential conflict created by the joint representation. 
    Id. at 348
    .
    In Wood v. Georgia, 
    450 U.S. 261
     (1981), the Supreme Court applied the principles in
    Holloway and Sullivan to a potential conflict of interest created by a third-party’s payment of the
    petitioners’ attorney. In Wood, three defendants were convicted of distributing obscene material
    while working for their employer. 
    Id. at 262
    . They were sentenced to probation upon the
    condition that they make payments toward fines, and when they failed to make those payments,
    their probations were revoked. 
    Id.
     Although they appealed the revocations based on an alleged
    violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of their
    -9-
    claims. 
    Id. at 263
    . Instead, the Court remanded the case for additional findings of fact regarding
    a potential due process violation because the record in the case suggested “that petitioners may
    be in their present predicament because of the divided loyalties of their counsel.” 
    Id.
     The record
    showed that the petitioners had been represented throughout the proceedings by a lawyer paid by
    their employer, that their employer had promised petitioners legal counsel and the payment of
    any fines and bonds necessary, and that these promises were largely kept except for the payment
    of the fines that led to the revocation of the petitioners’ probations. 
    Id. at 266
    . The Court stated
    that these facts “suggest[ed] the possibility that [the employer] was seeking—in its own
    interest—a resolution of the equal protection claim raised” in the appeal. 
    Id. at 267
    . The Court
    found “a clear possibility of conflict of interests on these facts.” 
    Id.
    Particularly relevant to Uzzle’s appeal were the Supreme Court’s statements regarding
    the duty of the trial court to inquire into the conflict of interest. The Supreme Court found “that
    the possibility of a conflict of interest was sufficiently apparent at the time of the revocation
    hearing to impose upon the court a duty to inquire further.” 
    Id. at 272
     (emphasis in original). In
    addition to the trial court’s awareness in Wood of all of the facts surrounding the payment
    arrangement, the Court found that the trial court “must have known that it had imposed
    disproportionately large fines” based on an assumption that the employer would be paying them
    and that the trial court knew the employer-retained counsel was making a constitutional
    argument instead of arguments for leniency for the petitioners. 
    Id. at 266, 272
    . Furthermore,
    “[a]ny doubt as to whether the [trial] court should have been aware of the problem [was]
    dispelled by the fact that the State raised the conflict problem explicitly and requested that the
    court look into it.” 
    Id. at 272-73
    . Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a
    determination of whether the petitioners’ due process rights were violated due to their
    representation by the employer-paid attorney at the revocation hearing.
    - 10 -
    In Mickens v. Taylor, 
    535 U.S. 162
     (2002), the Supreme Court examined Holloway,
    Sullivan, and Wood in addressing another alleged conflict of interest. In Mickens, the petitioner,
    who had been convicted of capital murder and then sentenced to death, filed a habeas petition
    claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on his court-appointed attorney’s representation
    of the victim on assault and concealed weapons charges at the time of the murder. 
    Id. at 164
    .
    The attorney did not disclose to the petitioner, to his co-counsel, or to the trial court that he had
    previously represented the victim. 
    Id. at 165
    . Before the United States Supreme Court, the
    petitioner argued that “where the trial judge neglects a duty to inquire into a potential conflict,
    the defendant, to obtain reversal of the judgment, need only show that his lawyer was subject to a
    conflict of interest, and need not show that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s
    performance.” 
    Id. at 170
    . The Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that “when the
    trial judge is not aware of the conflict (and thus not obligated to inquire),” the Court will only
    presume prejudice “if the conflict has significantly affected counsel’s performance.” 
    Id. at 172-73
    . Because the petitioner failed “to establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected
    his counsel’s performance,” the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. 
    Id. at 174
    .
    As part of its analysis, the Court again touched on what circumstances give rise to a trial
    court’s duty to inquire into a potential conflict of interest. The Supreme Court, relying on
    Sullivan’s construction of Holloway, explained that the duty to inquire arises when “the trial
    court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.” 
    Id. at 168
     (quoting
    Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. at 347
    ). The Supreme Court made clear, however, that the trial court has no
    duty to inquire when it is only “aware of a vague, unspecified possibility of conflict, such as that
    which ‘inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation.’” Id. at 169 (quoting
    Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. at 348
    ).
    - 11 -
    Turning to the case now before us, we hold that the trial court was not obligated under
    these particular circumstances to inquire into the potential conflict of interest now alleged
    because the trial court was only presented with a “vague, unspecified possibility of conflict.”
    See 
    id.
     While Pandya’s representation of Uzzle presented the possibility of a conflict, that
    possibility was not “sufficiently apparent” to actually trigger a duty to inquire by the trial court.
    See Wood, 
    450 U.S. at 272
    . Unlike in Holloway and Wood, Pandya was not actively
    representing an interest that conflicted with Uzzle’s, and thus her representation of Uzzle would
    not have immediately alerted the trial judge of a duty to inquire about a potential conflict. More
    significantly, no participant at the trial ever objected to Pandya’s representation of Uzzle based
    on her role in prosecuting him years before for his completely unrelated manslaughter
    conviction. Although Uzzle was repeatedly given the opportunity to speak for himself about
    Pandya’s representation (and did in fact complain about several aspects of her representation), he
    never told the trial judge that the reason for his dissatisfaction with Pandya’s performance was
    her role in the unrelated prosecution approximately twelve years earlier.4 Even assuming that the
    revelation of Pandya’s prior prosecution of Uzzle presented the possibility of a conflict of
    interest in her representing Uzzle twelve years later on an unrelated separate matter, Pandya’s
    argument at the sentencing hearing allowed the trial court to dismiss that possibility because
    Pandya used the information that she had learned while prosecuting Uzzle to his benefit in
    attempting to reduce his prison sentence. She used her prior knowledge of Uzzle to counter the
    4
    The record is clear that Uzzle certainly was aware at least prior to the sentencing
    hearing of Pandya’s previous prosecution of him for involuntary manslaughter twelve years
    earlier.
    - 12 -
    Commonwealth’s argument that Uzzle had exhibited a pattern of violent behavior. 5 See
    Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. at 347-48
     (holding trial court did not have an affirmative duty to inquire into
    joint representation where no party objected and counsel’s opening statement indicated a theory
    of the case consistent with all the defendants’ innocence). Under these circumstances, the trial
    court did not actually err by apparently assuming either that no conflict existed or “that [Pandya]
    and [Uzzle] knowingly accept[ed] such risk of conflict as may exist.” See 
    id. at 347
    .
    Furthermore, even if the trial court had erred in failing to inquire, Uzzle would not be
    entitled to an automatic reversal of his conviction because he has failed to show “‘an actual
    conflict of interest’ mean[ing] precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance—as
    opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.’” Mickens, 
    535 U.S. at 171
     (emphasis in
    original). To obtain a reversal, Uzzle was required to “establish that the conflict of interest
    adversely affected his counsel’s performance.” 
    Id. at 174
    ; see also Beaver v. Thompson, 
    93 F.3d 1186
    , 1192 (4th Cir. 1996) (“To prevail on a claim of conflict of interest, [the defendant] must
    present convincing evidence of an actual conflict and a resulting adverse effect on
    performance.”).
    While Uzzle asserts that this was a “structural error” that penetrated the entire trial, he
    fails to specifically identify how the alleged conflict adversely affected Pandya’s performance.
    He does not explain how her prosecution of him twelve years earlier in an unrelated case had any
    impact on her defense of him in the rape proceedings. The record demonstrates that the only
    point in the rape proceedings where Uzzle’s earlier manslaughter conviction was relevant was at
    the sentencing hearing, and, rather than hindering Pandya’s representation of Uzzle, her role as
    5
    We note that the Commonwealth – Pandya’s “former client” – never objected to
    Pandya’s representation of Uzzle or to her using information she had learned in the prosecution
    of him in arguing against the Commonwealth’s position here.
    - 13 -
    his prior prosecutor worked to his benefit. Pandya used the information she gained as his former
    prosecutor to combat the Commonwealth’s argument that Uzzle’s criminal record showed a
    pattern of violent behavior. She provided more facts about Uzzle’s manslaughter conviction to
    argue that it truly was an accidental killing and that Uzzle had not shown a pattern over time of
    intentional violent behavior. She also used her knowledge about the case to tell the court about
    how Uzzle was highly remorseful and how he took responsibility for his actions. Consequently,
    because the record fails to reflect how Pandya’s prior prosecution of Uzzle adversely affected her
    performance in the case now before us, Uzzle is not entitled to a reversal of his rape conviction.
    We note that we do not hold that an attorney’s former prosecution of a defendant never
    creates a conflict of interest for a future representation of that defendant in even an unrelated
    future matter as we limit our holding to the circumstances of this particular case. Case law from
    Virginia and other jurisdictions generally supports the conclusion that successive representation
    of the prosecution and the defense in unrelated matters does not create a per se conflict of
    interest and that the facts and circumstances of each case must be considered. See Juniper v.
    Commonwealth, 
    271 Va. 362
    , 391 (2006) (holding by the Supreme Court that the trial court did
    not err in refusing to disqualify Commonwealth’s attorney who had represented the defendant
    ten years earlier in an unrelated matter); John Wesley Hall, Jr., Prof. Resp. Crim. Def. Prac.
    § 13:13 Former Prosecutors as Defense Counsel (3d ed. 2020) (“A defense attorney representing
    someone he or she previously prosecuted does not necessarily create a conflict of interest.”).6
    6
    See also Turner v. Commonwealth, 
    259 Va. 816
    , 820 (2000) (holding by the Supreme
    Court that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a defense attorney’s
    submission of an application for employment with the Office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney
    fourteen days prior to defendant’s trial did not create an impermissible conflict); Beaver, 
    93 F.3d at 1193
     (rejecting argument that defense counsel’s role as a part-time Commonwealth’s attorney
    in a neighboring county created a per se conflict of interest which would disqualify the attorney);
    Pipkin v. United States, D.S.C. No. 4:05-CR-01129-TLW, 
    2015 WL 1810911
    , at *7 (D.S.C.
    Apr. 20, 2015) (holding that the fact that petitioner’s counsel was a former prosecutor who had
    - 14 -
    Having considered the facts and circumstances of this particular case, we conclude that the trial
    court did not err in not inquiring into the “vague, unspecified possibility of conflict,” Mickens,
    
    535 U.S. at 169
    , presented by Pandya’s representation of Uzzle and that Uzzle has failed to show
    an actual conflict of interest.
    III. CONCLUSION
    In short, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Uzzle’s motion
    to have his court-appointed counsel replaced with new counsel. The trial court gave Uzzle and
    Pandya the time and opportunity to present their arguments about their level of preparedness, and
    the trial court was convinced by Pandya’s presentation. She told the trial court she had met with
    Uzzle and discussed the case, the likely witness testimony, the sentencing guidelines, and the
    Commonwealth’s offer. She represented that Uzzle “was completely prepped for this trial” and
    that she had been ready for weeks. She also explained that a hurricane prevented her from
    returning to see Uzzle, but because he was already prepared for trial, her inability to visit him on
    that day did not impact their level of readiness for trial. Under these circumstances, the trial
    court did not err in denying the motion.
    We also cannot say that the trial court erred in failing later to inquire into the “vague,
    unspecified possibility of conflict,” as discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Mickens,
    
    535 U.S. at 169
    , presented by Pandya’s prior role as the prosecutor in Uzzle’s completely
    unrelated manslaughter conviction twelve years earlier. No party ever objected to Pandya’s
    representation of Uzzle on the grounds that she had once prosecuted him – or even alerted the
    prosecuted petitioner in an unrelated case did not present a conflict of interest). We also note
    that, in some rural jurisdictions with few attorneys, there is sometimes little practical choice but
    to allow former prosecutors to represent defendants and that the particular facts of each case are
    relevant in determining whether the trial court has a duty to inquire about the existence of an
    actual conflict.
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    trial court to these circumstances until Uzzle testified at the sentencing hearing. In addition, the
    manner in which these circumstances were finally presented to the trial court likely would have
    gone a long way toward alleviating any concerns the trial court may have had about a potential
    conflict of interest. Pandya used the information that she had gained through prosecuting Uzzle
    actually to his advantage in her efforts to show that he was not a violent person. Furthermore,
    even if we were to assume that the trial court did err in not conducting an inquiry, Uzzle would
    not be entitled to a reversal of his conviction because he has not shown how Pandya’s
    representation of him in this matter was adversely affected by the alleged conflict. The record
    indicates that Pandya’s knowledge from her previous experience prosecuting Uzzle actually
    helped her represent Uzzle here – rather than hurt her representation of him.
    Consequently, for all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s conviction of Uzzle for
    rape.
    Affirmed.
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