Luis Manuel Negron v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Beales, Ortiz and Causey
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Lexington, Virginia
LUIS MANUEL NEGRON
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0274-22-3 JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ
MARCH 21, 2023
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
John T. Cook, Judge
(Craig P. Tiller; Craig P. Tiller, Esq., PLLC, on briefs), for
appellant. Appellant submitting on briefs.
Rebecca M. Garcia, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
The trial court convicted Luis Manuel Negron of driving with a suspended license, in
violation of Code § 46.2-301, and sentenced him to thirty days of incarceration, all suspended.1
Negron challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish his knowledge that his license was
suspended. Because we find the evidence sufficient, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On October 10, 2018, a black Jeep turned left across traffic and toward a restaurant parking
lot. The Jeep did not yield to the oncoming traffic and was struck by a light-colored vehicle. After
the collision, the Jeep drove into the parking lot and parked.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
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Negron was also convicted of failure to yield; the trial court dismissed a charge of
driving while intoxicated, third offense within five years. Negron did not appeal his failure to
yield conviction.
Virginia State Trooper Dalton arrived at the scene and saw the Jeep in the parking lot and
the light-colored vehicle down an embankment on the left side of a guardrail. Negron was in the
parking lot and told Trooper Dalton that he had been driving the Jeep. Negron smelled of alcohol,
his eyes were glassy, and his speech was slurred. Negron claimed that he had “a couple of beers” at
lunch and had consumed an “airplane bottle” of liquor after the accident.
During Negron’s trial in December 2021, the Commonwealth introduced a copy of
Negron’s driving record, which indicated that his current operator’s license was issued in January
2018. One entry on the driving record indicated that Negron’s license had been suspended effective
April 20, 2018:
Suspension Issue: 2018/05/01 Effective: 2018/04/20 Term: INDEFINITE
FAIL PAY CT FINE/COST/FEES
CONVICTION: 2018/03/21 GENERAL DISTRICT CT FRANKLIN COUNTY
CONVICTION: 2018/03/21 GENERAL DISTRICT CT FRANKLIN COUNTY
CONVICTION: 2018/03/21 GENERAL DISTRICT CT FRANKLIN COUNTY
NOTIFIED: 2018/03/21 BY COURT DC225
ORDER DELIVERY DATE:
The final page of the driving transcript contained the following certification from the Commissioner
of the Department of Motor Vehicles: “This is to certify . . . that this machine produced transcript
. . . is an accurate depiction of the driving record of Negron . . . ; and that all notice of orders
indicating personal delivery to the driver were sent and received by the driver pursuant to Section
46.2-416 of the Code of Virginia.”
Negron moved to strike the evidence at the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief,
arguing that it failed to prove that he “had any knowledge that his license was suspended at the time
of the incident.” The trial court denied the motion. Negron declined to present evidence and
renewed his motion to strike during his closing argument. He asserted that “the [DC225]” was “not
sufficient notice because we don’t know if he got it.” Moreover, he maintained that the evidence
raised no more than a “strong suspicion that he was notified in a court proceeding about the
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suspension.” The trial court took the motion under advisement and, at a later hearing, convicted
appellant of driving on a suspended operator’s license. Negron appeals, arguing that the evidence
failed to show that he had “actual notice or other legally sufficient notice [that] his license was
suspended.” He asserts that his driving record does not show that he was in court on March 21,
2018, because “Form DC210 is used when a defendant is present in court” and “Form DC225 is
used when a defendant is absent from court.”
ANALYSIS
On appeal, we view the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires us to “discard the
evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the
credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018) (quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va.
232, 236 (2016)).
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting
Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the
relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez, 291 Va. at 248 (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth,
278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is
not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions
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reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.
Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).
“[N]o resident or nonresident . . . whose driver’s license . . . has been suspended or revoked
. . . shall thereafter drive any motor vehicle . . . on any highway in the Commonwealth until the
period of such suspension or revocation has terminated or the privilege has been reinstated.”
Code § 46.2-301(B). To sustain a conviction under that statute, “the Commonwealth must prove
that appellant previously had received actual notice that his license had been suspended when he
drove on” October 10, 2018. Hodges v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 687, 692 (2015)
abrogated on other grounds by Myers v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 671, 678 n.2 (2021); see also
Bibb v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 249, 250 (1971) (holding that the evidence must prove that a
defendant “knew” his license had been suspended). “[A]ctual notice embraces all degrees and
grades of evidence, from the most direct and positive proof to the slightest circumstance from
which a [factfinder] would be warranted in inferring notice.” Yoder v. Commonwealth, 298 Va.
180, 182 (2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting Hofheimer v. Booker, 164 Va. 358, 365-66
(1935)). “Notice is a matter of fact, and is to be proved like all other facts, by direct proof of the
fact itself, or by proof of circumstances from which the fact may be justly inferred.” Id. at 183
(quoting Hofheimer, 164 Va. at 366).
Moreover, notice that a driver’s license is suspended may be sent by “certified mail to the
driver at the most recent address of the driver on file at the Department.” Code § 46.2-416(A).
If the certificate of the Commissioner or someone designated by
him for that purpose shows that the notice or copy has been so sent
or provided, it shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the notice
or copy has been sent and delivered or otherwise provided to the
driver for all purposes involving the application of the provisions
of this title.
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Id. Accordingly, we have held that Code § 46.2-416 evinces the General Assembly’s intent that
a “certified driving record . . . is ‘prima facie evidence’ of [a] violation of Code § 46.2-301.”
Hodges, 64 Va. App. at 693.
Negron cites Bishop v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 9 (2008), to support his assertion that the
driving record failed to prove actual notice of his suspension. In Bishop, a habitual offender
case, the Supreme Court held that the appellant’s driving record was confusing and failed to
prove that he had received actual notice that he had been determined a habitual offender. Id. at
14. Although the record indicated that the appellant had been notified “by law enforcement,” it
did not provide “the content of any notification.” Id. In addition, the record indicated that the
order had been “mailed,” but it did not indicate whether it had been delivered and provided “no
proof of actual notice to anyone.” Id.By contrast, in Hodges, we held that a driving record demonstrated actual notice when it
unambiguously stated that the appellant had been “NOTIFIED . . . BY LAW ENFORCEMENT”
that his license had been suspended. 64 Va. App. at 692-93. In distinguishing Bishop, we held
that the driving record in Hodges contained “no analogous ambiguity.” Id. at 693. We also
noted that, in Bishop, the Commonwealth did not rely on Code § 46.2-416, which provides that a
certified driving record is “prima facie evidence” of a violation of Code § 46.2-301. Id.
Here, as in Hodges, Negron’s driving record unambiguously indicates that he was
notified on March 21, 2018, that his license was suspended, “BY COURT DC225.” Negron
asserted that Form DC225 was “mailed to” him and that the form used for in-court delivery was
Form DC210, but he introduced no evidence to support these assertions.2 Moreover, under Code
§ 46.2-416, notice could be sent “by certified mail” even if Negron was not in court. As in
2
Citing to sources outside the record, Negron argues that he was not in court on March
21, 2018. We will not consider factual assertions that are based in sources that “are not a part of the
record before this Court.” Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 193, 223 (2003).
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Hodges, the Commonwealth relies on the certification by the Commissioner of the Department
of Motor Vehicles on Negron’s driving record that “all notice of orders indicating personal
delivery to the driver were sent and received by the driver pursuant to Section 46.2-416 of the
Code of Virginia.” That certification provides “prima facie evidence” of the Code § 46.2-301
violation, Hodges, 64 Va. App. at 693, and Negron did not provide any evidence that would
negate such a notification. Thus, Negron’s driving record is sufficient evidence “to allow the
factfinder to conclude that the Commonwealth had proven that [Negron] was guilty of driving on
a suspended license after having previously been notified of the suspension.” Id. Accordingly,
having reviewed the record, we find the Commonwealth’s evidence sufficient to sustain
Negron’s conviction.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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