Tony Jacob Thomas v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges AtLee and Friedman
Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
TONY JACOB THOMAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1234-21-4 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR.
APRIL 11, 2023
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY
James E. Plowman, Judge
T. Brooke Howard, II (Howard, Clark & Howard, on brief), for
appellant.
Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Appellant Tony Jacob Thomas appeals his conviction for unlawful wounding, in violation of
Code § 18.2-51. On appeal, Thomas contends that the Fauquier County Circuit Court erred by
convicting him pursuant to the first proposed plea agreement rather than the second, renegotiated
plea agreement. He argues that the circuit court did not follow the formalities of Rule 3A:8 when he
tendered his plea. Specifically, he argues: (1) that the circuit court did not arraign him under a
“properly amended indictment” and the plea was thus void and invalid and (2) that the circuit court
never accepted his proposed plea agreement leaving the parties free to renegotiate. Alternatively, he
argues that even if the conviction is not void for such errors, the conviction should be vacated “by
virtue of [Thomas] being denied his ability to withdraw any ‘plea,’ valid or otherwise, both prior to
adjudication of guilt and sentencing.” For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm Thomas’s
conviction.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1 413.
I. BACKGROUND
“On appeal of criminal convictions, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and [we] draw all reasonable inferences from those facts.” Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 393, 396 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Payne v.
Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 194, 198 (2015)). So viewed, the facts are as follows.
A. The January 22, 2020 Hearing and the Original Plea Agreement
On September 23, 2019, a grand jury indicted Thomas on one count of aggravated malicious
wounding, in violation of Code § 18.2-51.2. On January 22, 2020, the morning trial was set to
begin, the parties informed the circuit court that both parties had reached and endorsed a plea
agreement. Upon questioning, Thomas informed the circuit court that it was a plea agreement with
an agreed disposition. The circuit court indicated it would “take the plea,” release the jury, and
order a presentence report. It also explained that it would set a date to accept the plea and sentence
because it did not yet know the terms of the plea agreement.
Thomas gave the circuit court a copy of the plea agreement and the Commonwealth’s
proffer of facts, and he explained that he would like to provide his own proffer. The
Commonwealth clarified that the agreed disposition was only an agreement that Thomas would be
sentenced within the sentencing guidelines, and the parties were free to argue within the guidelines.
The parties also informed the circuit court that the plea agreement contemplated amending the
original aggravated malicious wounding charge to unlawful wounding. Because it was not yet
accepting the agreement, the circuit court explained that it would arraign Thomas on the original
charge, aggravated malicious wounding, “[s]ince the amendment is part of the agreement we won’t
amend it just yet.” The circuit court also noted for the record that no amendment to the indictment
would be made unless and until the plea agreement was accepted. Neither party objected.
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When the clerk asked Thomas how he pled to the aggravated malicious wounding, defense
counsel intervened. The circuit court clarified:
Mr. Thomas, you’ve been asked whether or not you plead guilty to
the charge as indicted which is aggravated malicious wounding. Is
it your understanding that you will be pleading guilty if the Court
accepts an agreement? Because there’s an agreed amendment and
disposition in this case, it is your understanding is it not that you’ll
be pleading guilty to that amended charge and not the indicted
charge?
Thomas responded, “Yes, sir. No contest.” After further clarification, Thomas confirmed he
intended to plead no contest to the amended charge of unlawful wounding.
The circuit court placed Thomas under oath and conducted a plea colloquy. Thomas
affirmed that he had signed both the plea-of-guilty-to-a-felony form and the plea agreement. After
the circuit court allowed Thomas to review the Commonwealth’s proffer of facts with his attorney,
Thomas confirmed that he understood the Commonwealth’s evidence. He also indicated that he
understood that by entering his plea he was waiving certain rights.
During the colloquy, the circuit court questioned Thomas, “Do you understand the charge
against you which is currently aggravated malicious wounding, but this plea is in anticipation of an
amendment to unlawful wounding?” It also asked if he understood the elements of both charges,
and Thomas confirmed that he did. The circuit court then asked him if he was aware of the
punishment range for both charges, noting that
[f]or aggravated malicious wounding it’s anywhere from 20 years
to life in prison and a $100,000 fine. And for what could possibly
be the amended charge of unlawful wounding is up to five years,
one to five years or at the discretion of a judge or jury a fine of up
to $2,500 and/or confinement for up to 12 months[.]
Thomas responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” Thomas affirmed that he understood that the circuit
court would be bound to the sentencing guidelines if the plea agreement was accepted.
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With respect to the plea agreement, Thomas asserted that he understood that there was an
agreement and that if the circuit court did not accept the plea agreement, he would have the right
to withdraw his plea and have the case heard by a different judge. He confirmed that he had had
enough time to discuss the case with his attorney, that it was his decision to enter the plea
agreement, and that no one forced him to enter his plea. Thomas also confirmed that he
understood he would be found guilty if the plea agreement was accepted. After the colloquy, the
circuit court found that the plea had been made “knowingly and voluntarily with an
understanding of the nature of the charge -- the two charges, in fact, and the consequences of
[the] plea.”
Additionally, the circuit court found the facts sufficient for a finding of guilt, but it
withheld a finding of guilt because of the plea agreement and the need to amend the indictment if
it accepted the agreement. The circuit court explained that “as far as procedurally I think it’s
maybe more efficient, because if the Court doesn’t accept the plea then we don’t have to go
through the process of your client withdrawing the plea. . . . [P]rocedurally I think it would be a
little bit easier to do it that way.” Thomas agreed.
The circuit court then asked the Commonwealth to explain why it believed the proposed
agreement was “in the best interests of the Commonwealth.” The prosecutor explained that one
eyewitness was hospitalized for health reasons and would be unable to come to court and a
second eyewitness was on probation for misdemeanor crimes that could be considered crimes of
moral turpitude. The victim, who was intoxicated during the incident, was unable to remember
exactly what happened.
The circuit court ordered preparation of a presentence report and sentencing guidelines.
It continued the case to April 20, 2020, for “status of the plea agreement and sentencing.” On
February 4, 2020, the circuit court entered an order, stating, “The Court, on the stipulation of a
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plea to be entered, finds that the evidence would be sufficient for a finding of guilt, but the Court
defers adjudication of guilt at this time to consider . . . whether or not to accept the Agreement of
the Commonwealth.”
B. A Judge Designate and The Second Plea Agreement
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting Supreme Court of Virginia emergency
orders, the circuit court continued the hearing for acceptance of the plea and sentencing until May
18, 2020. In the meantime, Thomas and the Commonwealth took it upon themselves to renegotiate
the terms of the plea agreement while the matter remained under advisement.
On May 8, 2020, the parties returned to court. This time, however, the parties appeared
before a different judge, a judge designate—who was not the judge that took the original plea
agreement under advisement. Because Thomas was inadvertently not transported to the hearing, the
case had to be continued. While discussing the date for the next hearing, Thomas’s counsel
informed the judge designate that the charge was going to be amended from a felony to a
misdemeanor. Counsel also informed the circuit court that he wished to submit a motion to request
bond pending sentencing and that he had an agreed order from the Commonwealth to grant bond.
The Commonwealth confirmed that it did intend to amend the charge, which would remove the
presumption against bond, and that it did not object to the circuit court granting bond.
The circuit court clarified that bond would last only from that date until May 13, 2020, the
date chosen for the next hearing, at which time the charge would be “dropped to a misdemeanor”
and Thomas would be sentenced. The parties agreed, and the judge designate set a $1,000 secured
bond.
At that point, Thomas’s counsel handed up both the motion to request bond pending
sentencing and the agreed order. Neither party verbally informed the judge designate that the
original plea agreement was under advisement with another judge. The bond motion, however, did
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mention that an earlier plea agreement had been presented to the circuit court but never accepted. It
also had a copy of the January 22, 2020 hearing transcript attached as an exhibit. The hearing
concluded.
On May 13, 2020, the parties returned to court. They presented the judge designate with a
new, fully endorsed plea agreement. On the Commonwealth’s motion, the indictment was amended
from aggravated malicious wounding to assault and battery in accordance with the terms of the new
agreement. Per the new agreement, Thomas would plead nolo contendere to the amended charge,
spend 12 months in jail, with credit for time served, pay full restitution, and remain on good
behavior. The written plea agreement referenced the original plea agreement but did not recite the
procedural history or posture of the agreement, and neither party orally referred to the earlier
agreement. Thomas waived reading of the amended indictment and pled guilty to assault and
battery. The judge designate accepted Thomas’s plea, found him guilty, and sentenced him
according to the terms of the new plea agreement.1
C. Vacating the Conviction
On May 20, 2020, the judge who presided over the January 22, 2020 hearing, and took the
original plea agreement under advisement, issued an order staying the judge designate’s bond and
sentencing orders. That same day, the judge entered a notice of hearing and ordered the parties to
appear in court and show cause why the bond and sentencing orders should not be vacated.
On May 27, 2020, the parties appeared by telephone. The judge explained that the hearing
came on the court’s own motion “because it came to the Court’s attention that these matters were
heard when the Court believed they were under advisement by this Court.” The circuit court first
asked how the case had come to be on the docket when the Supreme Court of Virginia
1
The sentencing order stated that the aggravated malicious wounding had been amended
to unlawful wounding, but it cited the code section for assault and battery. Otherwise, the May
14, 2020 order reflected the terms of the second proposed plea agreement.
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emergency orders, and the corresponding orders signed by the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court,
prohibited in-person hearings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thomas’s counsel explained that
from his communications with the clerk’s office, it was his understanding that the circuit court
would hear any matters where there were agreements. Given the amended agreement in
Thomas’s case, he put the case on the docket.2
The circuit court then asked the parties what their understanding of the posture of the
case was after the January 2020 hearing. Thomas’s counsel explained that it was his position
that a plea agreement was offered but never accepted. The circuit court asked what defense
counsel thought “withholding adjudication to consider” meant. Counsel explained that it meant,
“[c]ontemplation of whether or not to accept the plea agreement,” but he reiterated that it also
meant “the plea agreement was not, in fact, accepted.” The circuit court asked, “Do you think
not accepted also equates with rejected?” Defense counsel responded, “No, sir.” But he argued
that under contract principles, a contract, in this case the plea agreement, could be amended or
rejected because it had not yet been accepted by the circuit court.
The circuit court focused on the fact that it had taken the matter under advisement, and it
questioned whether counsel thought it would be okay to present a matter under advisement to a
different judge before the first judge could rule. Thomas’s counsel denied that this was the parties’
intention, and he explained that the parties thought they were complying with the request of the
circuit court to expedite cases that were agreed upon to alleviate the backlog caused by the
pandemic. The circuit court pointed to the fact that neither Thomas nor the Commonwealth
verbally disclosed the procedural posture of the case. The Commonwealth supported defense
counsel, and it explained to the circuit court that it did not believe that defense counsel had
2
After further discussion on this issue, the circuit court closed the discussion by stating
that the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court sets the procedure for the court and judges and judge
designates are required to follow that procedure.
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attempted to circumvent the judge. It confirmed Thomas’s explanation of how the case came on the
docket, though it acknowledged that the parties contravened the Supreme Court emergency orders.
The Commonwealth also agreed with defense counsel that it could renegotiate the plea agreement
because the circuit court had not yet accepted it.
Ultimately, the circuit court found that the situation “reek[ed] of gamesmanship” and “it
seem[ed] manipulative and deceptive.” The circuit court was also concerned with the lack of
candor to the judge designate about the original plea agreement being under advisement. The
circuit court concluded that good cause existed to vacate the orders entered by the judge designate,
including the sentencing order. Accordingly, the case and indictment were returned to the same
posture as existed before the parties appeared before the judge designate.
Both the Commonwealth and Thomas filed objections to the ruling. The Commonwealth
filed a motion to reconsider asking the circuit court to reconsider its finding that the parties lacked
candor. Thomas filed a motion to reconsider asking the circuit court to reconsider its rulings and
reinstate the judge designate’s orders. The circuit court overruled the objections and denied both
motions to reconsider. The circuit court continued the case to August 6, 2020, for consideration of
the original plea agreement.
D. Conviction on the Original Plea and the Motion to Withdraw the Plea
On August 5, 2020, Thomas filed a “Motion to Set Aside Judgment of Conviction* and
Withdraw Plea of Guilty.*” On August 6, 2020, the parties returned to court. Thomas asked the
circuit court to hear his motion to set aside and withdraw his guilty plea. But the circuit court
refused, stating that they were there for the circuit court to determine whether it would accept the
plea tendered January 22, 2020, the original plea agreement, and the amendment that was part of
that plea agreement. The circuit court stated that it had reviewed the facts and the presentence
report, and it was accepting the plea agreement that was presented on January 22, 2020, and
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amending the aggravated malicious wounding charge to unlawful wounding. It found Thomas
guilty of unlawful wounding and asked the parties if they were prepared to go forward on
sentencing.
Thomas renewed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued first that the circuit
court had not accepted the plea agreement or adjudicated guilt until that day. The circuit court did
not dispute that, but it reiterated that it took the plea agreement under advisement to consider
whether it would accept the agreement. Next, Thomas argued that the facts had changed
significantly and that the ends of justice would be served by permitting him to withdraw his plea.
He explained that the Commonwealth had two main witnesses, and one had died and the other had
new felony charges. The Commonwealth agreed and stated, “I don’t think justice is being served at
this point.” It agreed that the circuit court had not accepted the plea agreement in January and, as a
result, the parties were free to renegotiate the agreement. The circuit court reminded the parties that
defense counsel had agreed with this procedure on January 22. After more argument, the circuit
court stated, “I think we are just going in circles here.” It moved on to the issue of the witnesses.
Ultimately, it concluded that “that is not a sufficient ground to withdraw the plea,” and it denied
Thomas’s motion to withdraw his plea. It continued the sentencing hearing to August 12, 2020, and
it entered an order reflecting its decision on August 10, 2020.
Both Thomas and the Commonwealth filed objections. Thomas also filed a motion seeking
to set aside the conviction, arguing that the guilty plea was void ab initio. The Commonwealth filed
a supplemental brief, reiterating its position that the circuit court had not accepted the plea on
January 22, 2020, and arguing that it did not have authority to vacate the judge designate’s orders.
On November 9, 2020, the parties appeared before the circuit court for sentencing. Thomas
renewed his prior motions, which the circuit court denied. Thomas also argued that he had never
been arraigned on an amended indictment. The circuit court responded that Thomas had been
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arraigned on January 22, 2020. Defense counsel responded, “Yes sir, he was.” The circuit court
also pointed out that it had conducted a plea colloquy contemplating the unlawful wounding charge.
Defense counsel agreed, noting that he just wanted to make his position clear for the record. The
circuit court denied the motions, and it imposed a sentence of five years in prison with all but 12
months suspended for a period of three years. Thomas now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The circuit court did not err in convicting Thomas under the original plea agreement.
Thomas contends that the circuit court erred because it “failed to adhere to the formalities of
Va. S. Ct. R. 3A:8(c)” on January 22, 2020, and consequently, “no valid plea was tendered,
accepted[,] or adjudicated,” which left the parties free to amend the plea agreement in accordance
with contract principles. In support of his position, Thomas first argues that the circuit court never
arraigned him under a properly amended indictment, rendering any plea attempt void and invalid.
We find, however, that the doctrine of approbate and reprobate bars us from reaching this issue.
The approbate and reprobate doctrine prohibits a party from “taking successive positions in
the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or mutually contradictory.”
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 397, 403 (2020) (quoting Rowe v. Commonwealth, 277
Va. 495, 502 (2009)). “The ‘doctrine against approbation and reprobation’ applies both to
assertions of fact and law and precludes litigants from ‘playing fast and loose’ with the courts, or
‘blowing hot and cold’ depending on their perceived self-interests.” Id. (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Babcock & Wilcox v. Areva, 292 Va. 165, 204 (2016)).
At multiple points throughout the January 22, 2020 hearing, the circuit court explained the
procedure it intended to follow and Thomas agreed to that procedure. After conducting a thorough
plea colloquy, the circuit court explained that it was “thinking procedurally,” and explained that it
would “find the facts are sufficient for a finding of guilt, but I’m going to withhold that because
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we’re dealing with an amended indictment or potentially an amended indictment.” Defense counsel
agreed with this procedure. The circuit court also stated,
And I think as far as procedurally I think it’s maybe more efficient,
because if the Court doesn’t accept the plea then we don’t have to
go through the process of your client withdrawing the plea. Or we
would but I think it would be -- procedurally I think it would be a
little bit easier to do it that way.
Again, Thomas’s counsel agreed, responding, “Absolutely, Your Honor.”
The circuit court conducted a lengthy and thorough colloquy with Thomas. During the
colloquy, Thomas affirmed he understood that he would plead no contest to the amended charge
of unlawful wounding rather than the indicted charge of aggravated malicious wounding. He
affirmed that he understood the plea agreement he signed and the waiver of his rights. He
affirmed that it was his decision to enter the plea. The circuit court then took the plea agreement
under advisement, pending preparation of a presentence report. Although this may not have been
the ideal process, not only did Thomas not object to this procedure, he repeatedly agreed to the
circuit court’s use of this procedure. Furthermore, when the circuit court later noted that Thomas
had been arraigned on January 22, 2020, defense counsel responded, “Yes sir, he was.” Thus,
Thomas, “having agreed upon the action taken by the trial court, should not be allowed to
assume an inconsistent position.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201, 214 (1979).
Thomas also argues that the circuit court never accepted the original plea agreement and
the parties were therefore free to renegotiate the terms. His argument, however, does not account
for the fact that the original agreement, though not accepted, had been presented to and taken
under advisement by the circuit court—as the circuit court was permitted to do both by rule and
its inherent authority. See Rule 3A:8 (“If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision
(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the
acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider a presentence report.”);
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Moreau v. Fuller, 276 Va. 127, 137 (2008) (finding it is within the inherent powers of a court to
take matters under advisement). Even assuming Thomas is correct, and the parties can
renegotiate a plea agreement that is not yet accepted, a party cannot simply ignore the fact that a
circuit court, acting within its authority, has taken an issue under advisement and present that
same issue to a different judge.
At a minimum, Thomas was required to either present the new plea agreement to the
same trial judge that already had taken the agreement under advisement or otherwise inform the
circuit court that he requested that the issue be withdrawn from the circuit court’s consideration.
Thomas did not do so. The parties simply presented a new plea agreement to a different judge
without clearly informing that judge that a prior plea agreement was under consideration by
another judge. We will not enable this type of gamesmanship and allow parties to ignore courts
acting within their lawful authority. Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 226 (2011)
(noting a circuit court has the inherent authority to take the matter under advisement or continue
the case to a later date); Pritchett v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 777, 788 (2013) (explaining
that the purpose of allowing a party to withdraw a plea is not “to enable gamesmanship or mere
regret”).
B. The circuit court did not err by denying the motion to withdraw the plea agreement.
Alternatively, Thomas argues that even if his felony conviction is not void based on the
procedural errors, it should be vacated because the circuit court erred by refusing to allow him to
withdraw his plea prior to adjudication of guilt and sentencing “pursuant to the manifest injustice
standard.” We disagree.
On appeal, we review a circuit “court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere under an abuse of discretion standard.” Spencer v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 183, 186 (2017). “Whether the trial court abused its discretion ‘is to be determined by
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the facts and circumstances of each case.’” Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 67, 77
(2016) (quoting Hoverter v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 454, 464 (1996)). The circuit court’s
ruling will be reversed “only upon ‘clear evidence that [the decision] was not judicially sound.’”
Spencer, 68 Va. App. at 186 (alteration in original) (quoting Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 27
Va. App. 477, 488 (1998)).
Thomas first argues that he had the “unilateral ability” to withdraw his guilty plea
because the circuit court had not yet accepted his plea. His argument suggests that he can,
without further action, decide to withdraw from the plea until such time as the circuit court
accepts it. But as previously noted, Thomas does not account for the fact that the circuit court
took the plea agreement under advisement. Unlike the federal rule, which expressly allows a
defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere “before the court accepts the plea, for
any reason or no reason,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(1), Virginia law does not contain a similar
provision. And we do not need to decide whether such a right or ability exists in Virginia
because Thomas did not seek to withdraw his plea at that point. Instead, Thomas presented a
new plea agreement to a different judge without clearly informing him that a prior plea
agreement was under consideration by another judge. By the time Thomas sought to withdraw
his plea, the original trial judge had already found that the situation “reek[ed] of gamesmanship”
and the parties lacked candor when appearing before the judge designate.
Thomas next argues that the circuit court erred by refusing to allow him to withdraw his
plea because it was in the interests of justice based on the facts and circumstances in this case.
Code § 19.2-296 provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be
made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of a sentence
is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice, the court within
twenty-one days after entry of a final order may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his
plea.
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In a presentencing motion to withdraw a plea, a defendant must establish two things: (1) “a
good-faith basis for making the guilty plea and later seeking to withdraw it,” and (2) “a
reasonable basis for contesting guilt.” Hernandez, 67 Va. App. at 75 (quoting Cobbins v.
Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 28, 34 (2008)). “The first requirement protects the integrity of the
judicial process by precluding defendants from using a guilty plea as a subterfuge to manipulate
the court. The second requirement defeats motions to withdraw which would result in an
essentially futile trial.” Id. (quoting Cobbins, 53 Va. App. at 34). The object of this standard “is
to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in situations where the defendant would not have
pled guilty but for some external circumstance such as coercion, or poor or erroneous advice
from counsel.” Pritchett, 61 Va. App. at 788. But the Supreme Court did not “set about to
enable gamesmanship or mere regret.” Id.
Here, Thomas entered the original plea agreement and affirmed that it was his intention
to plead no contest to the amended charge of unlawful wounding. The circuit court concluded
that he entered that plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and Thomas does not suggest
that there was any fraud, coercion, or undue influence that caused him to enter the original plea.
See Hernandez, 67 Va. App. at 76 (stating that leave should be given if there is a mistake or
misconception of the charge, fraud, misrepresentation, or was made involuntarily). Essentially,
Thomas’s only challenge to the original plea agreement is that he was later able to negotiate a
better deal.3
3
Thomas argued below that the situation changed because one witness died and was now
unavailable and a second witness had credibility issues because of new criminal charges. But
issues with these same witnesses were known to Thomas at the time of the original plea on
January 22, 2020. During the January 22, 2020 hearing, the Commonwealth indicated that it had
reached the original plea agreement because of the ill health and unavailability of the first
witness and the credibility issues of the second witness, who already had multiple charges and
convictions for crimes of moral turpitude.
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Additionally, Thomas did not make any attempt to withdraw his original plea before
presenting a new plea agreement to a different judge. The original trial judge specifically found
that the decision to present a new plea agreement to a different judge and the lack of candor in
informing that new judge that there was already a plea agreement under advisement was the
exact type of gamesmanship that the good faith prong aims to prevent. Despite Thomas’s
argument that his written filings fully explained the procedural posture of the case, neither filing
mentions that the first circuit court judge took the original plea agreement under advisement
pending preparation of a presentence report. Instead, both filings mention only that the plea
agreement was proffered and that it had not been accepted. Based on the facts and circumstances
of this case, the circuit court did not err in finding there was not a genuine good faith basis to
withdraw the original plea.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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