Commonwealth, DSS v. Neil C. Righter ( 1996 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
    VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
    DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
    ex rel. ELEANOR KENITZER                    OPINION BY
    JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF
    v.   Record No. 1252-95-4                 SEPTEMBER 17, 1996
    NEIL C. RICHTER
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    Jack B. Stevens, Judge
    Nancy J. Crawford, Regional Special Counsel
    (Betsy S. Elliott, Senior Special Counsel;
    James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General;
    William H. Hurd, Deputy Attorney General;
    Siran S. Faulders, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellant.
    Wayne Hartke (Hartke & Hartke, on brief), for
    appellee.
    The Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) appeals the
    decision of the circuit court granting appellee's motion to
    dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.   DCSE contends the Virginia
    trial court lacked statutory authority to register the South
    Carolina court order staying implementation of a wage withholding
    petition; petitioner made a general, not special appearance
    seeking to effect registration; the Virginia trial court erred
    when it declined to exercise jurisdiction to enforce its divorce
    decree; and the Virginia trial court erred when it confirmed the
    registration without first resolving the substantive issues.
    We conclude that the South Carolina family court order was
    not an order which could be registered under the provisions of
    the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), Code
    §§ 20-88.32 to -88.82.   We also find that the trial court erred
    in ruling Virginia did not have jurisdiction.   We remand this
    matter to the trial court for it to determine the question of
    support arrearages.
    Background
    In 1973, Eleanor Kenitzer was granted a decree of divorce a
    mensa et thoro by the Fairfax County Circuit Court from Neil
    Richter.   The decree ratified and confirmed the parties' property
    settlement agreement, which had been executed in Virginia on July
    5, 1973.   Under the terms of the agreement, Richter agreed to pay
    $100 per month to Kenitzer for support of the parties' minor son.
    On July 20, 1973, Richter signed a notarized waiver of service,
    which provided in part that he waived "notice of any further
    proceedings held in this matter" and "[consented] to the validity
    of all proceedings held in this matter."
    The circuit court entered a decree of divorce a vinculo
    matrimonii on August 5, 1974.    Both parties had substantial
    contact with Virginia.   Their son was born in Virginia, and they
    had lived in Virginia for the last three years of their marriage.
    However, after the divorce, Kenitzer and Richter relocated to,
    respectively, California and South Carolina, and neither party
    currently resides in Virginia.
    Through the California child support agency, in 1991
    2
    Kenitzer filed a request to withhold wages in South Carolina to
    recover delinquent child support payments from Richter.   By order
    entered January 9, 1992, a South Carolina family court ruled that
    it had jurisdiction over Richter and over the wage withholding
    request.   Based upon evidence presented to the court, however, it
    granted Richter's petition to stay implementation of Kenitzer's
    request, noting "[t]here is a genuine question or dispute
    concerning the existence of the arrearage."   No further action
    was taken on the South Carolina order.
    Later in 1992, again through the California child support
    agency, Kenitzer sought to recover the alleged support arrearages
    by an action in Virginia.   Mother registered the 1973 Virginia
    order in California on February 19, 1992.   A Uniform Reciprocal
    Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) petition was received by DCSE
    in October 1992.   In 1995, DCSE filed a motion to intervene and a
    motion for judgment and interest in Fairfax County Circuit Court.
    Richter made a special appearance in the circuit court to
    register the 1992 South Carolina family court order staying
    Kenitzer's earlier wage withholding petition.   The Virginia
    circuit court ruled that it was bound by the 1992 South Carolina
    order, including that court's finding that it had jurisdiction
    over Richter and the subject matter.    The Virginia trial court
    granted Richter's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    DCSE appeals the trial court's order.
    3
    Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
    In 1994, Virginia repealed Code §§ 20-88.12 to -88.31, the
    Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, and
    enacted Code §§ 20-88.32 to -88.82, the Uniform Interstate Family
    Support Act.   Both acts, as well as the original Uniform
    Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, were intended to provide
    "a means to establish and enforce child support obligations and
    spousal support obligations across state lines."    John J. Sampson
    and Paul M. Kurtz, UIFSA:   An Interstate Support Act for the 21st
    Century, 27 Family Law Quarterly 85, 86 (1993).    However, "the
    most significant improvement offered by UIFSA [over provisions of
    URESA and RURESA] is the elimination of the multiple-order
    system."   
    Id. at 88. UIFSA
    adopts the concept of continuing,
    exclusive jurisdiction to establish and
    modify the levels of child support due a
    particular child. Thus, once a court or
    administrative agency enters a support decree
    with jurisdiction, it is the only body
    entitled to modify it so long as it retains
    continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the
    Act. Another state, while required by UIFSA
    to enforce the existing decree, has no power
    under that Act to modify the original decree
    or enter a support order at a different
    level.
    
    Id. UIFSA also contains
    long-arm jurisdictional provisions that
    are "designed to allow the forum state to obtain as much such
    jurisdiction as is constitutionally possible."     
    Id. at 89. Registration
    of the Order
    DCSE argues that the trial court erred in registering the
    4
    South Carolina stay of Kenitzer's petition to withhold wages.     We
    agree.   Code § 20-88.66 provides that "[a] support order or an
    income-withholding order issued by a tribunal of another state
    may be registered in this Commonwealth for enforcement."   A
    "support order" is defined as
    a judgment, decree, or order, whether
    temporary, final, or subject to modification,
    for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a
    former spouse, which provides for monetary
    support, health care, arrearages, or
    reimbursement, and may include related costs
    and fees, interest, income withholding,
    attorney's fees, and other relief.
    Code § 20-88.32.   The South Carolina order did not provide for
    the payment of monetary support or arrearages.   The order did not
    determine the merits of Kenitzer's claim or Richter's defense.
    Cf. Price v. Price, 
    17 Va. App. 105
    , 114-15, 
    435 S.E.2d 652
    ,
    658-59 (1993).   The order merely barred automatic withholding in
    light of Richter's possibly meritorious defense, and stayed
    further action without making a factual determination.    While we
    agree with Richter that an order finding that no support or
    arrearage is due could be a "support order" registerable under
    UIFSA, the South Carolina order is not such an order.
    Similarly, the South Carolina order was not an
    "income-withholding order."   "Income-withholding order" is
    defined as "an order or other legal process directed to an
    obligor's employer or other debtor, to withhold amounts for child
    or spousal support from the obligor's earnings as defined in
    § 63.1-250."   Code § 20-88.32.   The South Carolina order was not
    5
    directed to Richter's employer, and did not direct the
    withholding of any funds.
    Consequently, the South Carolina order was not within the
    scope of those orders which can be registered in Virginia under
    UIFSA.    The trial court erred in registering the order.
    Effecting Registration by Special Appearance
    Richter contends that this issue was not raised in the trial
    court and that DCSE may not raise it for the first time on
    appeal.    Rule 5A:18.   The record supports Richter's contention.
    We do not address this issue.
    Jurisdiction of Virginia Court
    DCSE contends that the trial court erred by declining to
    exercise its continued jurisdiction to enforce its order.    We
    agree.    "[A] tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal
    jurisdiction over a nonresident individual" when, among other
    bases, the "individual resided with the child in this
    Commonwealth" or when the "exercise of personal jurisdiction is
    authorized under subdivision A8 of § 8.01-328.1."    Code
    § 20-88.35(3) and (6).    In pertinent part, Code § 8.01-328.1
    extends personal jurisdiction to an individual who has "been
    ordered to pay spousal support or child support pursuant to an
    order entered by any court of competent jurisdiction in this
    Commonwealth having in personam jurisdiction over such person."
    Code § 8.01-328.1(A)(8)(ii). 1
    1
    Under the circumstances of this case, we find that neither
    Code § 20-88.38 (addressing when Virginia courts may exercise
    6
    Moreover, this holding is consistent with the
    Virginia Supreme Court's decision
    in Sheffield v. Sheffield, 
    207 Va. 288
    , 
    148 S.E.2d 771
    (1966).     There,
    the parties were divorced in
    Virginia and the husband was
    ordered to pay support.   The
    husband moved to Illinois, where he
    was personally served with the
    wife's petition to enter judgment
    on support arrearages.    The husband
    did not appear before the court in
    Virginia, although he wrote a
    letter to the court admitting the
    arrearage.    The Supreme Court found
    that the Virginia court had
    jurisdiction over the husband,
    noting that
    a proceeding to reduce alimony arrears to
    judgment is not a new and independent action
    but merely a step taken in the original
    matrimonial action; that having obtained
    jurisdiction of the defendant husband in the
    original proceeding such jurisdiction remains
    unimpaired.
    jurisdiction following the filing of a petition in another state)
    nor Code § 20-88.39 (addressing when Virginia courts may exercise
    continuing exclusive jurisdiction) either require or prohibit the
    Virginia courts from exercising their pre-existing jurisdiction.
    7
    
    Id. at 291, 148
    S.E.2d at 773.   See also Shinn v. Kreul, 
    427 S.E.2d 695
    , 698 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993).   Thus, the Virginia circuit
    court had personal jurisdiction over Richter as part of its
    continuing jurisdiction to enforce its original support order.
    While Richter argued that the divorce decree was ex parte, the
    record demonstrates conclusively that the Virginia circuit court
    had personal jurisdiction over Richter at the time the divorce
    decree was entered.
    Code § 20-88.39(A)(1) provides that the Commonwealth of
    Virginia "has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction . . . [a]s long
    as this Commonwealth remains the residence of the obligor, the
    individual obligee, or the child."   The statute does not state,
    either by express terms or by implication, that Virginia loses
    all jurisdiction if none of the parties are residents of the
    Commonwealth.   We hold that Virginia continues to have the right
    to enforce its own decrees even if all parties are no longer
    residents.   The intent of the statute is simply to facilitate the
    enforcement of support decrees by making other states equally
    available to an obligee.   When South Carolina declined to issue
    an income-withholding order and made no determination of
    arrearages, Kenitzer could invoke Virginia's jurisdiction for the
    purpose of enforcing its own decree.
    In summary, we find that the trial court erred in concluding
    that the South Carolina family court order staying Kenitzer's
    wage-withholding petition was an order registerable under UIFSA.
    8
    We also find that the trial court erred in ruling it did not
    have jurisdiction over this matter.   We remand to the trial court
    to determine what arrearages, if any, exist.
    Reversed and remanded.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1252954

Filed Date: 9/17/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021