AV Automotive and VADA Group Self-Insurance Association v. Yahia Mohammed ( 2017 )


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  •                                            COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    UNPUBLISHED
    Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judge Humphreys and Senior Judge Annunziata
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    AV AUTOMOTIVE AND VADAGROUP
    SELF-INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.     Record No. 1432-16-4                                JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
    FEBRUARY 7, 2017
    YAHIA MOHAMMED
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Ian A. Spreat (Joshua M. Wulf; Pietro F. Sanitate; Midkiff,
    Muncie & Ross, P.C., on brief), for appellants.
    Arturo H. Hernandez (Arturo H. Hernandez, PC, on brief), for
    appellee.
    AV Automotive (AV) appeals the August 3, 2016 decision of the Virginia Workers’
    Compensation Commission (the “Commission”) awarding Yahia Mohammed (“Mohammed”)
    medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits. AV’s single assignment of error is that
    the Commission erred in finding that Mohammed proved an injury by accident arising of out his
    employment.
    “On appeal, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
    party below.” Town & Country Hosp., LP v. Davis, 
    64 Va. App. 658
    , 660, 
    770 S.E.2d 790
    , 791
    (2015). “If supported by credible evidence, the factual findings of the commission are binding
    on appeal. This includes the actual determination of causation, which is a factual finding.”
    Dominion Coal Corp. v. Bowman, 
    53 Va. App. 367
    , 373-74, 
    672 S.E.2d 122
    , 126 (2009)
    (citations omitted).
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. Moreover,
    as this opinion has no precedential value, we recite only those facts necessary to our holding.
    Pursuant to the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act, a claimant must prove that he
    “suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” TBC Corp.
    v. Stephens, 
    49 Va. App. 650
    , 655, 
    644 S.E.2d 84
    , 87 (2007) (quoting Virginia Employment
    Commission/Commonwealth v. Hale, 
    43 Va. App. 379
    , 384, 
    598 S.E.2d 327
    , 329 (2005)). A
    claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has satisfied the separate and
    distinct requirements of “arising out of” and “in the course of.” Bassett-Walker, Inc. v. Wyatt,
    
    26 Va. App. 87
    , 92, 
    493 S.E.2d 384
    , 387 (1997) (en banc). In this case, the sole issue on appeal
    is whether Mohammed’s injury arose out of his employment.1 Whether an employee’s
    work-related injury arises out of his employment “involves a mixed question of law and fact,
    which we review de novo on appeal.” Blaustein v. Mitre Corp., 
    36 Va. App. 344
    , 348, 
    550 S.E.2d 336
    , 338 (2001).
    “The phrase ‘arising out of’ refers to the origin or cause of the injury.” County of
    Chesterfield v. Johnson, 
    237 Va. 180
    , 183, 
    376 S.E.2d 73
    , 74 (1989). “Virginia employs the
    actual risk test.” Vint v. Alleghany Reg’l Hosp., 
    32 Va. App. 60
    , 63, 
    526 S.E.2d 295
    , 297
    (2000).
    Under the actual risk test, an injury arises out of the
    employment when “‘there is apparent to the rational mind upon
    consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection
    between the conditions under which the work is required to be
    performed and the resulting injury.’” Marketing Profiles [v. Hill],
    17 Va. App. [431,] 434, 437 S.E.2d [727,] 729 [(1993) (en banc)]
    (quoting Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 
    170 Va. 329
    , 335, 
    196 S.E. 684
    ,
    686 (1938)).
    Conversely, “[a]n injury does not arise out of the
    employment when it ‘cannot fairly be traced to the employment as
    a contributing proximate cause and . . . comes from a hazard to
    which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from
    1
    “The phrase ‘in the course of’ refers to the time, place and circumstances under which
    the accident occurred.’” TBC Corp., 49 Va. App at 
    655, 644 S.E.2d at 87
    (quoting County of
    Chesterfield v. Johnson, 
    237 Va. 180
    , 183, 
    376 S.E.2d 73
    , 74 (1989)). Yet, in this case, it is not
    disputed that Mohammed sustained an injury in the course of his employment.
    -2-
    the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the
    work and not common to the neighborhood.’” Vint v. Alleghany
    Reg’l Hosp., 
    32 Va. App. 60
    , 63-64, 
    526 S.E.2d 295
    , 297 (2000)
    (quoting 
    Bradshaw, 170 Va. at 335
    , 196 S.E. at 686).
    Dollar Tree Stores, Inc. v. Wilson, 
    64 Va. App. 103
    , 108-09, 
    765 S.E.2d 151
    , 153 (2014).
    On July 13, 2015, Mohammed fell on AV’s showroom floor while walking away from
    his general manager’s, Salim Alakim, office and sustained a fracture to the humerus bone in his
    right forearm. AV argues the Commission’s decision that Mohammed’s injury was a
    work-related injury arising out of his employment is not supported by credible evidence because
    the medical reports and Mohammed’s July 17, 2015 recorded statements to Vonita Crawley
    (“Crawley”), a Senior Account Claims Adjustor for PMA Management Corporation, question the
    credibility of Mohammed’s hearing testimony. Essentially, AV argues that Mohammed never
    made a contemporaneous statement about the reason for his fall to any medical personnel and did
    not state that the floor was slippery during his initial interview with Crawley.
    AV speculates that Mohammed’s fall could have been caused by a slippery substance on
    his shoes; however, there is no credible evidence in the record to support this argument. Rather,
    the Commission found the cause for Mohammed’s fall to be a slippery floor. Because this is the
    actual determination of causation, it is a factual finding and binding on this Court. See 
    Bowman, 53 Va. App. at 373-74
    , 672 S.E.2d at 126. Mohammed’s testimony before the Commission that
    he fell because the floor was slippery and the surveillance camera video that clearly shows that
    Mohammed’s fall was the result of slipping on the floor provide ample credible support for the
    Commission to determine the cause of the fall. In this case, the slippery showroom floor was a
    hazard to which Mohammed would not have been equally exposed apart from the employment.
    Therefore, because Mohammed, as the claimant, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
    he has satisfied the requirements of “arising out of” employment, we affirm the Commission’s
    -3-
    decision awarding Mohammed medical benefits due to his injury and temporary disability
    benefits from July 14, 2015 through October 29, 2015.
    Affirmed.
    -4-