Noor Ul-Qamar v. Prince William Co. School Board ( 2001 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Overton
    NOOR UL-QAMAR
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 2695-00-4                         PER CURIAM
    MARCH 13, 2001
    PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Julie H. Heiden; Koonz, McKenney, Johnson,
    DePaolis & Lightfoot, on brief), for
    appellant.
    (Thomas C. Palmer, Jr.; Brault, Palmer,
    Grove, Zimmerman, White & Steinhilber, LLP,
    on brief), for appellee.
    Noor Ul-Qamar (claimant) contends that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission erred in finding that she was able to
    return to light duty work as of December 17, 1998, and in
    terminating her compensation benefits as of February 1, 1999,
    the date she refused selective employment.     Upon reviewing the
    record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this
    appeal is without merit.     Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
    commission's decision.     See Rule 5A:27.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.     R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Factual findings made by the commission will be upheld on appeal
    if supported by credible evidence.    James v. Capitol Steel
    Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).
    In terminating claimant's benefits as of February 1, 1999,
    the commission found as follows:
    While the claimant has a longer treatment
    history with Dr. [Mohammad] Akbar, he was
    not her treating physician for her
    work-related accident. Dr. [G.A.] Nejad, an
    orthopedist, is her treating physician. He,
    in turn, referred her to Dr. [John A.] Bruno
    and to Dr. [Mayo F.] Friedlis. . . . We
    find the claimant was released to light duty
    work on December 10, 1998, which was
    followed up with a note on December 17,
    1998, by Dr. Nejad. The claimant testified
    that she was aware of being released to
    return to work. Ms. [Rebecca] Irvin[, loss
    control specialist,] testified that on the
    following day she provided the claimant with
    information about returning to light duty.
    While we are not persuaded by the opinion of
    Dr. Nejad based on a telephone call from the
    claimant's daughter that she was unable to
    work, we note that Ms. Irvin did not follow
    up at the time with making a job offer. By
    her own testimony, Ms. Irvin waited until
    the claimant returned to Dr. Nejad. We find
    Dr. Nejad, on January 7, and specifically on
    January 28, 1999, again found that the
    claimant [was] able to return to light duty
    work. We are more persuaded by his report,
    which is buttressed by the report of Dr.
    Bruno, to whom he referred the claimant for
    additional care than Dr. Akbar. We note
    that Dr. Akbar was treating the claimant for
    similar symptoms as a result of a motor
    vehicle accident that occurred prior to the
    work incident. Dr. Akbar stated the
    claimant could not perform the position in
    her "job description." This job apparently
    was the claimant's regular work. He has
    never directly addressed whether the
    - 2 -
    claimant could perform light duty work. Dr.
    Friedlis, the claimant's current treating
    physician, has not expressed an opinion on
    her disability or cause. In addition, at
    the time of the January 28, 1999, release,
    Dr. Friedlis was not seeing the claimant.
    The complaints voiced by the claimant are
    subjective and not supported by any of the
    diagnostic testing.
    We find the opinions of the treating
    physician are more persuasive than Dr.
    Akbar, who has not provided any actual
    basis, other than the claimant's subjective
    complaints, for finding that she is
    disabled. Therefore, in view of the
    claimant's failure to make even an attempt
    to return to light duty but giving her the
    benefit of the doubt, we find benefits
    should be terminated effective February 1,
    1999, the date the claimant failed to report
    for selective employment.
    "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is
    subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."
    Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 
    11 Va. App. 675
    , 677, 
    401 S.E.2d 213
    , 215 (1991).   The commission weighed the medical
    evidence and, as fact finder, was entitled to accept the
    opinions of the treating orthopedists, Dr. Nejad, and Dr. Bruno,
    and to reject the contrary opinions of Dr. Akbar.   "Questions
    raised by conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the
    commission."   Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    ,
    318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236 (1989).   Dr. Nejad's January 7, 1999
    and January 28, 1999 notes and opinions releasing claimant to
    light duty work and Dr. Bruno's February 23, 1999 report
    constitute credible evidence to support the commission's
    - 3 -
    findings.   As the commission noted, Dr. Akbar relied upon a job
    description of claimant's regular work and never addressed the
    light-duty position.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2695004

Filed Date: 3/13/2001

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021