City of Richmond School Bd. v. Joan Jones ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
CITY OF RICHMOND SCHOOL BOARD
AND TRIGON ADMINISTRATORS
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0649-98-2 PER CURIAM
AUGUST 25, 1998
JOAN E. JONES
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(M. Janet Palmer; Wilder & Gregory, on
brief), for appellants.
(Ruth E. Nathanson; Marks & Harrison, on
brief), for appellee.
City of Richmond School Board ("employer") contends that the
Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in finding
that Joan E. Jones ("claimant") proved that her post-February 7,
1997 disability was causally related to her compensable November
13, 1995 injury by accident. Upon reviewing the record and the
briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
decision. See Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). In
granting claimant's change-in-condition application, the
commission found as follows:
The Deputy Commissioner weighed the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
inconsistencies in the medical evidence and
the testimony and found the claimant was not
a credible witness. Upon Review, we do not
find the inconsistencies significant with
regard to the determination of causation.
The claimant testified, and the medical
records confirm, that she suffered ongoing
back pain following her return to work after
the industrial accident. She denied injury
resulting from a second motor vehicle
accident which occurred in March, 1997.
Although we discount Dr. [Walton M.] Belle's
opinion regarding causation because he did
not know about the second accident, we find
Dr. [Ralph E.] Hagan's reports support a
finding that the claimant's disability
beginning February 7, 1997 resulted from the
industrial accident.
* * * * * * *
[W]e find the second accident did not
materially change the claimant's symptoms
from the previous industrial accident. The
facts indicate that if the funeral accident
exacerbated the claimant's back condition,
the aggravation was mild and insufficient to
justify a finding that the claimant's back
problems are not related to [sic] industrial
accident.
(Citations omitted.).
Employer contends that the commission erred in reversing the
deputy commissioner's credibility determination. However,
"[w]hen the deputy commissioner makes an explicit finding of
credibility based upon a witness' demeanor or appearance at the
hearing, the commission may reverse that factual finding when it
articulates a basis for its different conclusion that is
supported by credible evidence." Bullion Hollow Enters., Inc. v.
Lane, 14 Va. App. 725, 728, 418 S.E.2d 904, 907 (1992).
Here, the commission clearly articulated its reasons for
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reversing the deputy commissioner's credibility determination.
Moreover, the commission's findings are supported by credible
evidence, and are therefore, conclusive and binding on appeal.
See Ross Laboratories v. Barbour, 13 Va. App. 373, 377-78, 412
S.E.2d 205, 208 (1991).
Claimant's testimony, along with the medical records and
opinions of Dr. Hagan, constitutes credible evidence to support
the commission's finding that claimant proved that her
post-February 7, 1997 disability was causally related to her
compensable industrial accident. Based upon claimant's
testimony, the commission could reasonably infer that although
Dr. Hagan mistakenly recorded an incorrect date for the second
accident, he was fully aware of it and, yet, did not relate
claimant's post-February 7, 1997 disability to that second
accident. "Where reasonable inferences may be drawn from the
evidence in support of the commission's factual findings, they
will not be disturbed on appeal." Hawks v. Henrico County Sch.
Bd., 7 Va. App. 398, 404, 374 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1988).
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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