Rocco Further Processing v. Barbara E Nelson ( 1995 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Senior Judges Cole and Duff
ROCCO FURTHER PROCESSING
AND
HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY
v. Record No. 1618-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
PER CURIAM
BARBARA ELLEN NELSON DECEMBER 29, 1995
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Cathleen P. Welsh; Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, on
brief), for appellants.
(A. Thomas Lane, Jr., on brief), for appellee.
Rocco Further Processing and its insurer (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that Barbara E. Nelson's
bilateral de Quervain's tenosynovitis qualifies as a compensable
occupational disease within the meaning of "disease" under the
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). Upon reviewing the record
and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
decision. Rule 5A:27.
The facts are not in dispute. The parties stipulated that
claimant's job as a line worker required repetitive use of her
hands and arms. Claimant presented to Dr. Irvin E. Hess, an
orthopedic surgeon, on July 22, 1994, complaining of bilateral
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
arm pain. Dr. Hess diagnosed bilateral de Quervain's
tenosynovitis. The parties stipulated that claimant had no known
exposure to this condition outside of the employment. Dr. Hess
did not find the presence of any other disease which could cause
claimant's condition. Based upon Dr. Hess' opinions and the
medical records, the commission found that claimant's condition
constituted a "disease" caused by her employment.
In Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438
S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993), we defined "disease" as
any deviation from or interruption of the
normal structure or function of any part,
organ, or system (or combination thereof) of
the body that is manifested by a
characteristic set of symptoms and signs and
whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis may
be known or unknown.
"[T]he definition enunciated in Piedmont [has been
recognized by this Court] as the general and accepted meaning of
the term 'disease,' a term which is presumed to be known by the
legislature and is employed by it without restriction in Code
§§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401." Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan, 21
Va. App. 65, 69, 461 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1995). In Piedmont, we
cited the Sloane-Dorland Ann. Medical Legal Dictionary definition
of de Quervain's disease. Piedmont, 17 Va. App. at 503-04, 438
S.E.2d at 772. This general medical definition places
de Quervain's tenosynovitis within the definition of disease set
forth in Piedmont and approved of in Perdue.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
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to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). On
appeal, this Court will uphold the commission's factual findings
if supported by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel
Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989).
Similar to the facts of the Perdue case, claimant's
condition did not present an obvious, sudden, mechanical or
structural change in her body. Based upon our holdings in
Piedmont and Perdue, we conclude that credible evidence supports
the commission's finding that claimant's bilateral de Quervain's
tenosynovitis is a condition characterized as a "disease" within
the meaning of the Act.
Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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