Reginia Gayle Roman, f/k/a Reginia Gayle Price v. Vincent J. Price ( 2008 )


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  •                                COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judge Haley and Senior Judge Coleman
    REGINA GAYLE ROMAN, F/K/A
    REGINA GAYLE PRICE
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.     Record No. 1177-08-3                                         PER CURIAM
    NOVEMBER 12, 2008
    VINCENT J. PRICE
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    Ray W. Grubbs, Judge
    (Mary Beth Long; VA Family Law, PLC, on brief), for appellant.
    (H. Gregory Campbell, Jr.; Bettye Ackerman, on brief), for appellee.
    Regina Gayle Roman, wife, appeals from the circuit court’s final order confirming the
    commissioner’s report. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred in: (A) confirming the
    report of the commissioner in chancery; (B) failing to consider her testimony on the tax assessed
    value of the marital real estate; and (C) failing to take judicial notice of the county assessment.
    Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
    merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
    BACKGROUND
    “On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to [husband], the
    prevailing party below, granting to [her] evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
    therefrom.” Donnell v. Donnell, 
    20 Va. App. 37
    , 39, 
    455 S.E.2d 256
    , 257 (1995).
    On December 22, 2005, the trial court entered a final divorce decree, in which it deferred
    the equitable division of property until a later time. On January 19, 2007, the trial court referred
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    the matter to a commissioner in chancery and directed her to determine issues of equitable
    distribution, spousal support, and attorney’s fees.
    Wife received notice on November 1, 2007 that the commissioner’s hearing would take
    place in husband’s attorney’s office on December 11, 2007. At that hearing, husband presented a
    detailed May 2006 appraisal report valuing the marital real estate at $165,000. Wife objected,
    claiming the appraisal amount “is less than the tax value.” Wife asserted that she has “had to go
    to the county and fix the property value where [husband] went and, you know, got it reduced and
    everything.” The commissioner acknowledged wife’s disagreement with the figure in the report,
    but admitted the appraisal into evidence. Later during the hearing, wife testified that “the tax
    value alone [on the property] is $226,000.” The commissioner stated she would “check on that.”
    After asserting that the tax value on the property to be $226,000, wife indicated she “had one of
    those,” however, she failed to explain what item she was referring to or make it a part of the
    record.
    On February 5, 2008, the commissioner filed her report. In it, she indicated, “Since
    neither party proposed a different valuation date, the date of the Commissioner’s Hearing shall
    be deemed the date of valuation of the property.” The commissioner included the following as to
    valuation:
    The only competent evidence of valuation of the real estate that
    was offered was the appraisal dated May 29, 2006 by David A.
    Epperly, which valued the real estate and all improvements thereon
    at $165,000.00. It is the finding of the Commissioner that this is
    the fair market value of the improved real estate.
    On February 19, 2008, more than ten days after the report was filed and mailed, wife
    filed objections to the commissioner’s report, one of which stated:
    Commissioner of Chancery, Harriett Dorsey, allowed a settlement
    using an old expired appraisal that my ex-husband possessed,
    which is less than what the county assesses the fair market value
    at. My ex-husband’s appraisal was $165,000 well over a year old.
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    The county’s fair market assessment values presently states
    $226,300.
    On April 17, 2008, the trial court entered the following order:
    Came this day the Plaintiff, Vincent J. Price, by counsel, and
    Regina Price Roman upon proper notice to Defendant, Regina
    Gayle Price (Roman), and requested that the Report of the
    Commissioner in Chancery be affirmed in total.
    Whereupon, the court noting that the Report was filed on February
    5, 2008, and that ten (10) days for filing exceptions has expired
    and no exceptions were filed, the court approves and confirms the
    Report in total and orders the parties to comply with its terms.
    Wife did not sign the order, and the record contains no evidence or transcript from that hearing.
    On May 6, 2008, wife filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider and vacate its
    April 17, 2008 order. In it, wife contended, inter alia, the commissioner erred in ruling that the
    only competent evidence of the valuation of the real estate was husband’s proffered appraisal.
    She stated in her motion that she “intend[s] to present fraudulent statements and evidence and
    will be able to prove all that I have stated above, and numerous other issues that were not taken
    into account.”
    On May 7, 2008, the trial court denied the order. Wife’s attorney signed the order under
    the phrase, “Objected to,” without elaboration. The record on appeal contains no transcript or
    signed statement of facts to show what took place at the hearing on the motion to reconsider.
    Therefore, there is no record of what evidence, if any, was proffered, what arguments were
    made, and how the trial court ruled on each argument on the motion to reconsider.
    ERROR CONFIRMING COMMISSIONER’S VALUATION OF HOUSE
    Wife argues the trial court abused its discretion because it adopted a report in which the
    commissioner “ignored evidence introduced at trial.” Wife claims the commissioner made a
    “factual error regarding the value of the marital real estate” and asserts her testimony about the
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    tax value was competent evidence. Wife stated that she “enclosed with her letter a copy of the
    then-current tax assessment for the real estate.” 1
    The record demonstrates that wife testified that the current tax value of the house was
    $226,000. Therefore, the commissioner had evidence from two sources: husband’s detailed
    appraisal of $165,000 prepared eighteen months before the commissioner’s hearing and wife’s
    undocumented avowal that the current tax value was $226,000. The commissioner accepted the
    detailed, written appraisal and rejected wife’s avowal of the taxed value, finding her evidence not
    competent or sufficient to justify the valuation proposed by wife.
    “Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the sound discretion of the trial
    judge and that award will not be set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
    support it.” Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 
    10 Va. App. 728
    , 732, 
    396 S.E.2d 675
    , 678 (1990). Where
    a trial court refers matters in an equitable distribution proceeding to a commissioner in chancery
    to receive and consider the evidence, and to make a report to the trial court with her
    recommendations based on her findings, we give “great weight” to the factual findings of the
    commissioner approved by the trial court. Cooper v. Cooper, 
    249 Va. 511
    , 518, 
    457 S.E.2d 88
    ,
    92 (1995). We will not reverse such findings on appeal unless they are plainly wrong, without
    credible evidence in the record to support them. Barker v. Barker, 
    27 Va. App. 519
    , 531, 
    500 S.E.2d 240
    , 246 (1998); Taylor v. Taylor, 
    5 Va. App. 436
    , 444, 
    364 S.E.2d 244
    , 249 (1988).
    As part of her argument on this issue, wife also contends that husband failed to timely file
    a pleading pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(A), “seeking to have a value adopted in place of a
    trial-date value.” “The Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which was not
    presented to the trial court.” Ohree v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 299
    , 308, 
    494 S.E.2d 484
    ,
    1
    The record on appeal contains no documentation regarding the assessed tax value of the
    property.
    -4-
    488 (1998). See Rule 5A:18. Wife never raised this issue at trial. Accordingly, Rule 5A:18 bars
    our consideration of this question on appeal.
    ERROR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER WIFE’S TESTIMONY OF VALUE
    Wife argues the commissioner and trial court erred in refusing to consider her opinion as
    to the property’s tax assessment value and they also erred “in not considering the more
    contemporaneous tax assessment value which [wife] introduced orally and attempted to
    introduce in written form.” 2
    Wife claims the commissioner erred in finding her avowal of the property’s tax
    assessment was not competent evidence. She references Black’s Law Dictionary definition of
    competent evidence which defines competent evidence as “admissible evidence.” Actually,
    Black’s includes the term “competent evidence,” but it does not define it. Instead, it directs the
    reader to see one of two alternative subjects, “admissible evidence” and “relevant evidence.”
    Black’s Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed. 2004). It defines “relevant evidence” as “probative and
    material” evidence “offered to prove or disprove a matter in issue,” and notes that “relevant
    evidence” is “also termed competent evidence.” 
    Id. at 599
    . Husband’s evidence of the
    property’s value was supported by documentary evidence, whereas wife failed to document her
    avowal of the tax assessment. Thus, although wife’s testimony was admissible, the
    commissioner deemed it insufficiently probative or material on the issue of value.
    Here, the commissioner and the trial court accepted husband’s detailed appraisal as
    properly reflecting the property’s value and rejected wife’s unsupported avowal of the tax
    assessment value. “It is well established that the trier of fact ascertains [witnesses’] credibility,
    2
    Contrary to wife’s assertion, the record fails to show she submitted any documentation
    or that it was rejected. At the hearing, wife told the commissioner, “I have one of those, if you
    want it,” and the commissioner responded, “Well, I will check on it at the courthouse.” Nothing
    in the record showed that wife requested a document be made a part of the record or that the
    commissioner refused to make it a part of the record.
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    determines the weight to be given their testimony, and has the discretion to accept or reject any
    of the [witnesses’] testimony[, whether in whole or in part].” Street v. Street, 
    25 Va. App. 380
    ,
    387, 
    488 S.E.2d 665
    , 668 (1997) (en banc).
    Credible evidence supports the trial court’s decision regarding the valuation of the
    property.
    ERROR NOT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
    Initially, we disagree with wife’s representation in the portion of her brief where she
    claimed that the commissioner “rejected [her] proffer of a copy of the assessment.” Our review
    of the record fails to show that wife proffered any such document or that the commissioner
    refused a proffer. Notwithstanding that flaw, the record fails to show wife preserved this issue
    below.
    “The Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented
    to the trial court.” Ohree, 
    26 Va. App. at 308
    , 
    494 S.E.2d at 488
    . See Rule 5A:18. Accordingly,
    Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of this question on appeal.
    ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
    Wife requests that she be awarded attorney’s fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this
    appeal. Husband argues wife is not entitled to fees and costs because her assignments of error
    were not supported by the law. Husband also requests that he be awarded attorney’s fees and
    costs because “the trial court was correct in confirming the report.” 3 We decline to award
    appellate attorney’s fees to either party. See Petry v. Petry, 
    41 Va. App. 782
    , 796 n.7, 589
    3
    Husband’s argument as to why he should be awarded attorney’s fees and costs appears
    to be missing the beginning of his argument. Husband concluded his argument that wife should
    not be awarded fees and costs at the end of page 8 of his brief. Page 9 of his brief, where he
    ostensibly intended to begin his argument as to why he should be awarded fees, begins with an
    incomplete sentence.
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    S.E.2d 458, 465 n.7 (2003); O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 
    23 Va. App. 690
    , 695, 
    479 S.E.2d 98
    ,
    100 (1996).
    For the reasons stated, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See
    Rule 5A:27.
    Affirmed.
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