Ruth A. Fifer v. Virginia Retirement System ( 1998 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
    RUTH A. FIFER
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 2924-97-3                              PER CURIAM
    AUGUST 25, 1998
    VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY
    John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge
    (Grant A. Richardson, on brief), for
    appellant.
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Michael K.
    Jackson, Senior Assistant Attorney General &
    Chief; Brian J. Goodman, Assistant Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee.
    Ruth A. Fifer, appellant, was denied disability retirement
    from the Virginia Retirement System (VRS) pursuant to Code
    § 51.1-156(E).    On appeal, appellant contends that there was
    insufficient evidence in the record to support the VRS's decision
    that her disability was not likely to be permanent.       Because we
    find that there is substantial evidence to support the VRS's
    finding, we summarily affirm.     See Rule 5A:27.
    Background
    Appellant was employed as a school teacher for about thirty
    years when she obtained an unpaid leave of absence to care for
    her elderly parents.    During the leave of absence, appellant had
    one or more operations for various sinus conditions.       On April
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    20, 1996, in her first application for disability, appellant
    asserted that she suffered from fibromyalgia and leukoaraiosis.
    She stated that she was unable to perform her teaching duties
    because she was in bed eighteen hours per day, she suffered
    dizziness, nausea, constant body aches, chronic fatigue,
    unpredictable vision, uncontrollable seizure-like chills,
    fluctuating fever, thumping headaches, watery diarrhea, and
    dry-mouth.    She also said that she was unable to concentrate.
    Reports from her treating neurologist, Glen E. Deputy, M.D.,
    confirmed most of these complaints.
    On June 6, 1996, the VRS denied appellant disability based
    on the Medical Board's finding that "[n]o evidence of disabling
    disease is presented."    The Medical Board also found that
    appellant was not "felt to be permanently disabled."    Appellant
    appealed this decision, and the Medical Board requested that
    Morris E. McCrary, III, a neurologist, examine appellant.
    Dr. McCrary examined appellant on or about September 17,
    1996.    He noted that she reported a large number of complaints,
    but that she had "a relatively normal objective neurologic
    examination." He further stated:
    I am hard pressed to say that I have physical
    findings, consistent history or studies that
    would denote a degree of function or specific
    limitation that would permanently prevent her
    from performing her duties as a teacher as
    described in her disability information
    questionnaire. As to the question of chronic
    fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia, I find
    little to support this, but I would defer to
    evaluation by a qualified rheumatologist if
    indicated.
    -2-
    The VRS again denied appellant's request for disability
    benefits based on the Medical Board's recommendation, and
    appellant appealed.    On April 2, 1997, an informal fact-finding
    hearing was held.   The hearing examiner examined medical records
    and heard oral testimony from appellant and another witness who
    had observed appellant's behavior over the past eight years.
    Appellant presented evidence of treatment notes and
    diagnoses performed by Dr. Deputy.     Dr. Deputy opined that
    appellant suffered from fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome,
    chronic fatigue syndrome, and neuropathy.    However, Dr. Deputy
    did not state whether, in his opinion, her illnesses were
    permanent in nature.   Over the course of his treatment of
    appellant, Dr. Deputy prescribed numerous medications for
    appellant, many of which appellant claimed caused side effects.
    He noted after her April 18, 1996 visit, that he was "hopeful we
    can get her feeling better over the next few months."    His notes
    from February 20, 1997 indicated that her "[r]ight peroneal
    neuropathy, [had] improved from a previous study obtained last
    April."   He also stated in this report that "[h]er conditions are
    improving" and that she was "improving symptomatically" with the
    use of a certain prescription, with which he continued to treat
    appellant.
    On December 6, 1996, Carolyn M. Brunner, M.D., a
    rheumatology specialist, examined appellant.    Dr. Brunner did not
    comment on the permanency of appellant's condition, but noted
    -3-
    that she found "no gross motor or sensory deficits."    She also
    recommended a continuation of appellant's "supportive care" and
    suggested that appellant begin an exercise program.
    Appellant also presented evidence of her treatment by John
    T. Glick, M.D., who administered acupuncture treatments on
    appellant.     In a letter to appellant's counsel, Dr. Glick wrote:
    As my approach to [appellant's] complaints
    was based on the acupuncture model of health
    and illness, the information you request is
    not likely to be of use to you. Be that as
    it may, I certainly can speak to the high
    degree of disability that she experiences and
    the weakness along with diminished vitality
    she evidences. She is, by my experience with
    her, unable to do more than sedentary
    activity and ambulates very slowly with a
    cane. Unless breakthroughs in the treatment
    of fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue occur, I
    feel she is permanently disabled.
    Appellant also presented evidence from her family doctor,
    D.L. Perry, M.D.    On March 28, 1997, Dr. Perry wrote, "It is my
    opinion that [appellant] is fully disabled at this time and most
    likely will continue well into the future unless technology
    advances to the point where these conditions can be treated
    successfully."
    Pamela Collins, a home health care nurse, testified at the
    hearing.   Collins had never treated appellant, but had been to
    her home approximately every other week for eight years, treating
    appellant's bedridden father.    Collins opined that appellant was
    totally disabled, but did not comment on the permanency of her
    condition.
    -4-
    The hearing officer found that, while the medical evidence
    was "not overwhelming," it evidenced problems that appellant was
    experiencing.   He found that "[t]he problem is that her
    physicians can't find the correct combination of treatment in
    which to help her."   The hearing officer also found that, while
    the evidence showed that appellant was unable at that time to
    return to her position, "it is not clear that her condition is
    one of permanency."   Thus, the hearing officer found that
    appellant failed to carry her burden of proof to show that her
    incapacity is "likely to be permanent."   See Code
    § 51.1-156(E)(ii).
    On June 11, 1997, the VRS again denied appellant disability
    benefits.   Appellant appealed this decision to the circuit court.
    The trial court stated:
    In reviewing the agency record in this
    case, it is clear that there are two somewhat
    opposed views on the question of the
    permanency of [appellant]'s disability. Her
    treating neurologist, Dr. Deputy, and the
    specialist[s] to whom she's been referred,
    Dr. McCrary and Dr. Brunner, have never
    opined that her disability is permanent in
    nature. In fact, the totality of their
    medical records appears to basically analyze
    the multitudinous complaints of [appellant]
    and conclude that they do not appear to be
    based on any objective findings and have
    proven to be resistant to any drug regimens
    that have been prescribed to her. . . . The
    conclusion of these doctors appears to be as
    stated in the record, that since they cannot
    really determine the exact identity of the
    medical illnesses of which [appellant] is
    suffering, they do not have the requisite
    knowledge upon which to base a conclusion
    that the disability is permanent.
    The evidence on the opposite side
    -5-
    consists of Dr. Glick, the family
    practitioner and acupuncturist, who
    administered a regimen of acupuncture
    treatment to [appellant] and based on his
    observations of [appellant] during that
    period of time concluded that she was in all
    likelihood permanently disabled. Dr. Perry,
    the general practitioner, who was her
    personal physician, also rendered a short
    opinion to the effect that he thought her
    disability was permanent.
    Therefore, the record is clearly one
    where there i[s] considerable evidence on
    both sides of the issue of whether or not the
    disabilities currently being suffered by
    [appellant] are permanent in nature. The
    Medical Review Board of the VRS has reviewed
    the record on three separate occasions and
    each time has concluded that there is no
    medically sufficient evidence to prove
    disability. The VRS has, in turn, adopted
    the position of the Medical Review Board and
    denied the disability benefits.
    The trial court concluded that there was substantial
    evidence in the record upon which the VRS could base a denial of
    appellant's claim.   Therefore, the trial court denied appellant's
    appeal.
    Analysis
    "The burden shall be upon the party complaining of agency
    action to designate and demonstrate an error of law subject to
    review by the court."    Code § 9-6.14:17.   The VRS is required to
    use a Medical Board to certify that a claimant's disability "is
    likely to be permanent."    Code § 51.1-156(E)(ii).   Our review of
    this determination asks only whether there was substantial
    evidence in the agency record to support the holding of the
    administrative agency.     See Code § 9-6.14:17.   "The phrase
    -6-
    'substantial evidence' refers to 'such relevant evidence as a
    reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.'"     Virginia Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 
    226 Va. 264
    ,
    269, 
    308 S.E.2d 123
    , 125 (1983) (citation omitted).
    Dr. Glick was the only physician who opined that appellant
    was permanently disabled.    However, he qualified his opinion,
    stating that it was based on "the acupuncture model of health and
    illness."   Dr. Perry opined that appellant was "fully disabled at
    this time and most likely will continue well into the future."
    However, this opinion falls short of a conclusion that
    appellant's incapacity is "likely to be permanent."    Dr. McCrary
    was "hard pressed to say that [he] had physical findings,
    consistent history or studies that would denote a degree of
    function or specific limitation that would permanently prevent
    [appellant] from performing her duties as a teacher . . . ."
    Also, Drs. Deputy and Brunner did not opine that appellant's
    disability was permanent in nature.     In fact, Dr. Deputy's notes
    of February 20, 1997 indicated that appellant showed improvement
    in certain conditions.
    The VRS chose to believe the opinions of Drs. McCrary and
    Deputy and to lend less weight to Dr. Glick's opinion, as it was
    entitled to do.     See Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991) ("[T]he appellate court does
    not retry the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence,
    or make its own determination of the credibility of the
    -7-
    witnesses.").   The opinions of Drs. McCrary and Deputy are
    adequate to support the VRS's decision.
    For the foregoing reasons, the denial of claimant's
    application for disability retirement is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2924973

Filed Date: 8/25/1998

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021