Floyd William Logan, IV v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2016 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Chafin, Malveaux and Senior Judge Frank
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
FLOYD WILLIAM LOGAN, IV
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0867-15-1 JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX
NOVEMBER 1, 2016
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
Marjorie Taylor Arrington, Judge
David L. Jones, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Dalton L. Glass,
Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for appellant
Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General
(Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Floyd William Logan, IV (“appellant”) appeals his convictions of first-degree murder, in
violation of Code § 18.2-32, and felony child abuse, in violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(A). He
contends that a rational fact-finder could not find beyond a reasonable doubt either that he
premeditated his daughter’s murder or that he caused her fatal injuries. We affirm both convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
Late in the afternoon of August 15, 2012, W.B.’s brothers and sisters found her lying
dead in a bedroom she shared with her parents, Kiba Brown and appellant. She was sixteen
months old at the time.
According to a number of witnesses, W.B. was fine earlier that day. Brown’s mental
health support counselor, Shaila Wylie, arrived shortly before 11:00 a.m. to take her to a doctor’s
appointment. Wylie observed that W.B. was sleepy but otherwise behaved normally. Later,
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Brown’s godson, Marquan Hunter, carried W.B. to the bedroom so appellant could change her
diaper. He also noticed nothing unusual about her behavior. And when her sister, Daaiyah,
entered the bedroom to retrieve some juice boxes, W.B. was playing normally on the foot of the
bed while appellant rested.
Daaiyah left appellant and W.B. alone together in the bedroom. Both Marquan and
Daaiyah saw appellant coming in and out of the bedroom at various times. Although Marquan
admitted he could not always see the bedroom door, he never saw W.B. leave the bedroom and
never saw anyone else go in.
At 3:11 p.m., another in-home counselor, Lachelle Elliott, arrived to meet with Brown’s
child, Samirah. Brown returned from her doctor’s appointment a few minutes later. While
Brown, Elliott, and appellant were outside, the other children decided to wake W.B. Finding her
lying at the head of the bed near the pillows, three of her siblings began jumping on the bed at its
foot. When Marquan noticed W.B. had not responded to the bouncing, he told the others to stop
jumping. Marquan and one of W.B.’s brothers, Khalil, checked her for signs of life. Both
noticed that her lips were blue.
Khalil ran out to the yard, where Brown and Elliott were talking as appellant loaded his
truck. When they learned W.B. was unwell, the adults ran to the bedroom. Brown began
screaming, and Marquan noticed that appellant was also upset. As Marquan, Elliott, and Brown
each called 911, appellant attempted to resuscitate his daughter, using both hands and his full
arms to compress W.B.’s chest.
When paramedics arrived about seven minutes after the emergency call, they noticed that
while W.B.’s core was warm, her limbs were already cool. A paramedic indicated that this
meant that W.B. was “without breath and cardiac activity for a period of time.” Some of the first
responders also noted that while Brown was inconsolable, appellant was quiet.
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An autopsy later revealed three separate, acute fractures to W.B.’s skull on three different
sides of her head. The autopsy also found a number of fractured ribs—some of which apparently
had been broken weeks before her death. W.B.’s chest bore a number of smaller, superficial
bruises. Blunt force trauma to her abdomen split her liver nearly in two and caused a significant
fracture to her pancreas. These wounds caused massive internal hemorrhaging.
Appellant gave a number of inconsistent explanations about what happened that day. He
first told paramedics that he discovered W.B. when he woke up from a nap. Soon afterwards, he
told a police officer that he was outside getting ready to leave with Brown when one of the
children came to say something was wrong with his daughter. During two interviews with
detectives, appellant repeatedly denied doing anything to harm his daughter. But he gave
inconsistent accounts of his own movements. In his first interview, he claimed that after
changing W.B.’s diaper, he left her napping in the bedroom. In his second interview, he told
detectives that he remained in the bedroom watching Netflix until Elliott arrived.
During appellant’s bench trial, the medical examiner, Dr. Jeffery Gofton, testified that
W.B. died from blood loss caused by at least four blows. Based on her three skull fractures,
Dr. Gofton concluded that someone struck W.B.’s head at least three times. He also opined that
W.B. must have suffered at least one serious blow to her torso.
A pediatrician specializing in child abuse, Dr. Michelle Clayton, agreed with those
conclusions. She noted that “a very high level of force” must have been used to fracture W.B.’s
occipital bone, the strongest portion of her skull. And she opined that in light of the extent and
severity of W.B.’s injuries, any accidental cause would have been analogous to being thrown
from an automobile crash or landing on concrete after falling several stories.
Dr. Clayton also opined that the bruises on W.B.’s chest had the characteristic size and
shape of an adult’s fingertips and knuckles, suggesting that an adult had caused them by striking
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the child. Although Dr. Gofton acknowledged that such bruises could result from resuscitation,
both doctors agreed this was unlikely because bruising usually requires a heartbeat.
Testimony also established that appellant was the only adult in the home from
approximately 11:30 a.m. until 3:11 p.m.. No other adult entered the bedroom that afternoon
until after the children found W.B.’s body. Marquan, the oldest minor in the home, was fifteen
years old at the time and is slight of build. Khalil was twelve, and Daaiyah was ten. None of
the remaining children—including any of the children who jumped on the bed—was older than
eight years of age.1
The trial court denied appellant’s motions to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence and
found him guilty of both charges. The court determined that appellant was the only person in the
home with the opportunity to cause W.B.’s fatal injuries. The court also found that appellant
premeditated the murder, emphasizing the disparity of size between appellant and W.B., the
brutality of the attack, and appellant’s apparent lack of remorse.
II. ANALYSIS
After a bench trial, an appellate court may not set aside the judgment of the trial court
“unless it appears from the evidence that such judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.” Code § 8.01-680; Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193, 677 S.E.2d 280,
282 (2009). This Court reviews the evidence “in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
as the prevailing party at trial, and considers all inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.”
Powell v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 20, 26, 766 S.E.2d 736, 738 (2015) (quoting Allen v.
Commonwealth, 287 Va. 68, 72, 752 S.E.2d 856, 858-59 (2014)). “[T]he relevant question is
whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
1
Including W.B., Marquan, Daaiyah, and Khalil, there were eight children in the home
that day. Aamir Brown was eight years old. Samirah Brown was seven. Halimah Brown was
two. Their cousin, Nakhari Mohammed, was four. Aamir was the only other child to testify at
appellant’s trial.
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reasonable doubt.’” Williams, 278 Va. at 193, 677 S.E.2d at 282 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “Circumstantial evidence of guilt is sufficient to support a conviction
when the Commonwealth’s evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis except guilt.”
Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 146, 314 S.E.2d 371, 385 (1984).
Murder of the first degree includes “any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” that
would not otherwise be defined as capital murder. Code § 18.2-32. The same offense may also
give rise to liability for felony child abuse if the victim was a minor under the accused’s care:
Any parent, guardian, or other person responsible for the care of a
child under the age of 18 who by willful act or willful omission or
refusal to provide any necessary care for the child’s health causes
or permits serious injury to the life or health of such child is guilty
of [child abuse and neglect].
Code § 18.2-371.1(A).
Appellant contends that the evidence cannot support a conviction of first-degree murder.
He argues that a rational fact-finder could not have found that he premeditated W.B.’s killing.
He further argues that the evidence could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he inflicted
W.B.’s fatal injuries. For similar reasons, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving
that he caused the injuries underlying his child abuse conviction. We disagree with each of his
arguments.
A. The Evidence Is Sufficient To Support Appellant’s First-Degree Murder Conviction.
1. A reasonable trier of fact could find that appellant premeditated W.B.’s murder.
Appellant first argues that the evidence is insufficient to allow any fact-finder to convict
him of first-degree murder because there is no proof of premeditation. Thus, he contends that the
trial court could have convicted him only of murder in the second degree. We disagree.
Premeditation, or the “adopt[ion] [of] a specific intent to kill . . . is what distinguishes
first and second degree murder.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 259, 389 S.E.2d 871,
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879 (1990) (quoting Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 485, 384 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1989)).
Although the accused need not have planned the killing for any specific period of time, “[t]he
intent to kill must come into existence at some time before the killing.” Smith v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 700, 261 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1980).
By its very nature, “premeditation . . . seldom can be proved by direct evidence” and
must instead be established circumstantially. Rhodes, 238 Va. at 486, 384 S.E.2d at 98.
Circumstantial factors related to the killing itself, including the “brutality of the attack, and
whether more than one blow was struck, [and] the disparity in size and strength between the
defendant and the victim” can support a reasonable inference of premeditation. Avent v.
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 208, 688 S.E.2d 244, 262 (2010) (quoting Epperly v.
Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 232, 294 S.E.2d 882, 892 (1982)). A fact-finder may also infer
the accused’s premeditation from conduct after the killing, including efforts to conceal the body,
lack of remorse, and efforts to avoid detection. Id.
In Knight v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 617, 625, 587 S.E.2d 736, 740 (2003), this
Court held that evidence of an especially brutal beating supported a jury’s finding that a father
premeditated the murder of his infant daughter. Knight’s daughter died after receiving several
severe skull fractures resulting from blunt force trauma. See id. at 619, 587 S.E.2d at 737.
Although medical experts could not opine as to the number of blows that caused the injuries, a
pediatrician observed that he might see similar injuries “in a child who has been . . . in a car
crash . . . and was thrown so many feet after traveling 55 miles per hour.” Id. Knight eventually
admitted to hitting his daughter several times until she stopped crying. See id. at 621, 587 S.E.2d
at 738. This Court concluded from the number and severity of the blows that “[t]he jury had
sufficient evidence to find the killing was brutal.” Id. at 625, 587 S.E.2d at 740.
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Similarly, the evidence here shows that W.B.’s murder was especially brutal. Both
testifying physicians agreed that W.B. was struck at least four times to cause her skull fractures
and internal injuries. The blows that fractured her occipital bone and destroyed her liver must
have been particularly severe. Dr. Gofton noted that because the liver is partially protected by
the rib cage as well as a layer of fatty tissue, splitting the organ in half by blunt force trauma
would require significant force. Dr. Clayton underscored the violence of the attack when she
testified that the injuries suffered by W.B. would be present in an unrestrained car crash victim,
who was thrown from a vehicle or someone who fell several stories from a building.
A fact-finder reasonably could infer from the scope and degree of the injuries suffered by
the toddler that appellant intended to kill W.B. when he beat her. The infliction of multiple
blows and the size disparity between the appellant and his sixteen-month-old daughter could
further support that inference.
Appellant emphasizes, however, that he later attempted to revive W.B.. Relying on
Rhodes, he contends that his resuscitative efforts negate any inference of his intent to kill. His
reliance is misplaced. In Rhodes, the defendant called emergency services to ask for help after
beating her infant daughter into unconsciousness. 238 Va. at 482, 384 S.E.2d at 96. Nothing in
that case suggested Rhodes deliberately delayed calling for help; rather, Rhodes’s daughter was
still alive when paramedics arrived. See id. Our Supreme Court determined from both the
emergency call and from Rhodes’s unquestionably distraught reaction that she neither concealed
her crime nor lacked remorse. Id. at 487, 384 S.E.2d at 99. The Court concluded that the
evidence, taken as a whole, was insufficient to prove premeditation. Id.
In this case, however, appellant did nothing to help W.B. while she was still alive. Prior
to the children’s entry into the bedroom, appellant appeared to rush Brown out of the house.
Because W.B.’s limbs had already cooled by the time paramedics arrived, W.B. must have been
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dead when her siblings found her. The doctors’ testimony also indicates that the toddler was
deceased when resuscitation was administered. Appellant was the only person with W.B. prior
to the children’s discovery of her body. A reasonable fact finder could determine that appellant
was aware of W.B.’s condition and did nothing to assist until others detected her condition.
Appellant’s failure to seek help for W.B. reasonably supports a finding that he attempted
to conceal his crime and avoid its consequences. Cf. Knight, 41 Va. App. at 625 n.2, 587 S.E.2d
at 740 n.2 (determining that Knight did not conceal his daughter’s body because while he did not
call 911 after the attack, “he did take the child to his mother for her assistance”). His
inconsistent explanations for what happened that day further support this finding.
Finally, a fact-finder could have found that appellant lacked remorse for his crime from
his demeanor at the crime scene. While the trial judge acknowledged that some witnesses
described appellant as upset, others observed that he appeared reserved while paramedics worked
on his daughter. Cf. Knight, 41 Va. App. at 626, 587 S.E.2d at 740-41 (noting that a jury could
resolve conflicting testimony about the defendant’s emotional state and find that the defendant
lacked remorse).
Here, we must affirm if the “evidence, considered as a whole, is sufficient to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused . . . acted with a premeditated intent to kill.” Rhodes,
238 Va. at 487, 384 S.E.2d at 99. The evidence demonstrated that appellant inflicted brutal
injuries on his young daughter, failed to seek help for her after causing these injuries, and
seemed to lack remorse. A rational trier of fact could find from this evidence that appellant
premeditated his daughter’s murder.
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2. A fact-finder reasonably could reject appellant’s hypothesis of innocence.
Alternatively, appellant asserts that the trial court could not have found him guilty of
murder because W.B.’s siblings could have caused her fatal injuries by jumping on her bed and
play fighting. His argument is unpersuasive.
While the Commonwealth’s circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence, see Stockton, 227 Va. at 146, 314 S.E.2d at 385, “[w]hether the
hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is itself a ‘question of fact,’” Clanton v. Commonwealth,
53 Va. App. 561, 572, 673 S.E.2d 904, 910 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Emerson v.
Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277, 597 S.E.2d 242, 249 (2004)). Although “a factfinder
cannot ‘arbitrarily’ choose” between theories of the case, such a choice is arbitrary “only when
no rational factfinder could believe the incriminating interpretation . . . and disbelieve the
exculpatory one.” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 250, 781 S.E.2d 920, 930 (2016).
The critical question “is not whether ‘some evidence’ supports the hypothesis, but whether a
rational factfinder could have found that the incriminating evidence renders the hypothesis of
innocence unreasonable.” Id.
In this case, the evidence is more than sufficient to render appellant’s theory of the case
untenable.
First, the expert testimony in this case tended to suggest that causing W.B.’s injuries
would require more strength than a child would possess. Dr. Clayton testified that fracturing
W.B.’s occipital bone would have required a high degree of force. Likewise, Dr. Gofton opined
that “[i]t is not easy” to sever a liver because “it requires a large amount of force . . . .” He
expressed a similar opinion about the fracture in W.B.’s pancreas. While neither expert could
quantify exactly how much force was necessary to cause those wounds, Dr. Clayton testified
unequivocally that the injuries were inconsistent with “play of any sort.” Because appellant was
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the only adult present, a rational fact-finder could infer that no one else in the home had the
strength necessary to cause those injuries.
Additionally, Dr. Clayton testified that the bruises inflicted upon W.B. were consistent
with an adult’s hand, rather than a child’s. While Dr. Gofton noted that appellant’s improper
resuscitation efforts could cause bruising, both he and Dr. Clayton agreed that such postmortem
bruising was unlikely. The trial court reasonably found that an adult caused those bruises by
striking W.B.
Appellant’s assertion that W.B. could have suffered these injuries during rough horseplay
also runs contrary to the children’s testimony. Although appellant argues that the children’s
testimony as inconsistent, “[p]otential inconsistencies in testimony are resolved by the fact
finder.” Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 292, 718 S.E.2d 463, 467 (2011). We may
not revisit such conflicts on appeal “unless ‘the evidence is such that reasonable [persons], after
weighing the evidence and drawing all just inferences therefrom, could reach but one
conclusion.’” Molina v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 369, 624 S.E.2d 83, 98 (2006)
(quoting City of Bedford v. Zimmerman, 262 Va. 81, 86, 547 S.E.2d 211, 214 (2001)).
In this case, the lay witnesses corroborated each other’s accounts in a number of
important respects. Khalil agreed with Wylie that W.B. behaved normally on the morning of her
death. Marquan and Daaiyah both testified that W.B. appeared healthy before she was left alone
with appellant in the bedroom. Aamir, Khalil, and Marquan each testified unambiguously that
when they went to wake W.B., no one ever jumped anywhere near her on the bed.
All of this evidence tends to refute appellant’s theory that the children might have fatally
wounded W.B. through earlier play fighting or by jumping on her bed. Because a reasonable
fact-finder, “upon consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected [appellant’s] theories in
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his defense,” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003), the
evidence was sufficient to prove that he murdered his daughter.
B. The Evidence Was Sufficient To Prove Appellant Caused The Injuries
Underlying His Child Abuse Conviction.
Appellant finally argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to strike the
evidence as to his child abuse conviction. As with his murder conviction, he contends that the
trial court could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because W.B.’s siblings
might have caused her injuries. And for the same reasons, we disagree. Dr. Clayton opined that
W.B.’s injuries were not consistent with play of any sort. The bruises on W.B.’s chest were
consistent with an adult’s hands. And a rational fact-finder could have determined W.B.’s
siblings lacked the strength necessary to cause her extraordinary injuries. A reasonable trier of
fact could have rejected appellant’s hypothesis of innocence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s convictions of murder in the first degree
and felony child abuse.
Affirmed.
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