S T G, Inc. and Travelers Indemnity v. Ivan Tooks ( 2001 )


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  •                                              Tuesday           23rd
    October, 2001.
    S T G, Inc. and
    Travelers Indemnity Company,                               Appellants,
    against       Record No. 2664-00-4
    Claim No. 196-57-09
    Ivan H. Tooks,                                              Appellee.
    Upon a Rehearing En Banc
    Before Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Elder, Bray,
    Annunziata, Bumgardner, Frank, Humphreys, Clements and Agee
    Amy L. Epstein (Law Offices of Roger S.
    Mackey, on brief), for appellants.
    Andrew S. Kasmer for appellee.
    By unpublished opinion, a divided panel of this Court
    reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission.
    S T G, Inc. v. Tooks, No. 2664-00-4 (Va. Ct. App. June 12,
    2001).   We stayed the mandate of that decision and granted
    rehearing en banc.
    Upon a rehearing en banc, the stay of the June 12,
    2001 mandate is lifted, and the order of the commission is
    reversed in accordance with the majority panel opinion.
    Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton, Elder and
    Annunziata dissent for the reasons set forth in the panel
    dissent.
    This order shall be certified to the Virginia Workers'
    Compensation Commission.
    A Copy,
    Teste:
    Cynthia L. McCoy, Clerk
    By:
    Deputy Clerk
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    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Clements
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    S T G, INC. AND
    TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.   Record No. 2664-00-4              JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    JUNE 12, 2001
    IVAN H. TOOKS
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Amy L. Epstein (Law Offices of Roger S.
    Mackey, on brief), for appellant.
    Andrew S. Kasmer (Chasen & Boscolo, on
    brief), for appellee.
    S T G, Inc. and Travelers Indemnity Company appeal the
    Workers' Compensation Commission's award of benefits to Ivan H.
    Tooks.   They raise several issues, but we only address the
    contention the commission erred in finding the employee's injury
    arose out of his employment.   We conclude the commission erred
    in that finding and reverse.   Our decision makes it unnecessary
    to address the remaining issues.
    The employee was a computer network manager who updated
    computer systems for the State Department.    He was receiving
    on-the-job training that required him to walk from his second
    floor work area to a computer training lab on the first floor.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
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    The staircase consisted of two sets of steps divided by a
    landing.    The front portion of the stair tread had a vinyl,
    crosshatched (skid proof) covering while the back portion was
    smooth.    The stairs complied with all codes and regulations.
    The employee carried a three-ring notebook in his right
    hand while walking down the steps.       It contained his training
    notes and weighed under one or two pounds.      The employee walked
    down the first set of steps without incident.      While going down
    the second set, he "stumbled and fell" when his "foot got caught
    on the step."    The employee missed five steps, landed on his
    right ankle, and fell back on the stairs.
    The commission affirmed the deputy's findings that the
    employee's injury arose out of the employment. 1     It found the
    injury compensable because the employee's foot caught on the
    step and the binder he carried prevented him from grabbing onto
    the handrail.    "The claimant was carrying a binder in his right
    1
    The deputy concluded the claim was compensable because
    there are added risks, peculiar to the
    claimant's employment, which created a
    hazard of the employment here. First, the
    claimant was carrying a binder in his hands.
    This prevented him from grabbing the
    railing. Had he been able to do so, he may
    well have been able to prevent the fall or,
    at a minimum, lessen the effects of the
    fall. Additionally, his foot caught on the
    rubberized or textured portion of the steps.
    While this is not a defect in the stairs, it
    is not necessarily a condition to which the
    claimant may be equally exposed outside his
    employment.
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    hand, which prevented him from grabbing on to the railing when
    he fell.   Additionally, his foot got stuck or caught in the
    rubberized or textured part of the steps."     One member dissented
    because the claimant's statement that his "foot got caught was
    impeached."
    Whether an accident arises out of the employment is a mixed
    question of law and fact reviewable on appeal.      Mullins v.
    Westmoreland Coal Co., 
    10 Va. App. 304
    , 307, 
    391 S.E.2d 609
    , 611
    (1990).    An employee's claim is compensable if he establishes
    either that the stairs were defective or that there was a causal
    connection between the way in which the work is required to be
    performed and the resulting injury.      County of Buchanan Sch. Bd.
    v. Horton, 
    35 Va. App. 26
    , 29, 
    542 S.E.2d 783
    , 784-85 (2001);
    Southside Virginia Training Ctr. v. Shell, 
    20 Va. App. 199
    , 203,
    
    455 S.E.2d 761
    , 763 (1995).
    In Horton, the commission awarded the employee benefits for
    an injury resulting from a fall while attempting to descend some
    steps because her heel caught.    While the commission found no
    defect in the step upon which the employee fell, it awarded
    benefits because a condition of the employment caused the
    injury.    We reversed the commission's finding because there was
    no evidence that a condition of the employment caused the
    employee's fall.
    In Shell, the employee injured herself when she fell down
    stairs at work and was awarded benefits.     She testified there
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    was nothing unusual about the steps, they were well lit, and did
    not contain any debris.   We reversed the commission's finding
    that the fall arose out of the employment because the steps were
    not defective and there was no evidence the fall resulted from a
    particular risk of the employment such as being hurried or
    distracted.
    In this case, the employee did not see any debris or
    foreign objects and thought the steps were pretty clean.     He
    could recall nothing wrong with the steps.   At one point he
    suggested the height of the steps may have caused the fall but
    could not state if they were steeper than normal.   The employee
    noted that the second set of steps was darker than the first but
    was unsure if that affected his fall.   He traversed the steps
    twenty times a day without prior incident.
    The employee presented no evidence of a defect in the
    steps.   His early explanations exclude any claims of defect in
    the steps or the maintenance of them.   At the hearing, he first
    mentioned his foot "caught" on the textured portion of the
    steps.   However, his statement only describes the step.   Nothing
    in that statement suggests a defect or condition that would
    cause a fall; nothing in the other evidence suggests it either.
    As in Horton, the deputy found that the rubberized or textured
    portion of the steps was not a defect in the stairs.   The
    commission made no finding that the steps were defective.
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    While the employee claims that the textured vinyl stairs
    was a condition that caused his fall, his testimony only stated
    his foot "caught" on the textured portion of the step.    That
    testimony does no more than prove that he fell while traversing
    the steps.   Nothing supports the deputy's finding that "it is
    not necessarily a condition to which the claimant may be equally
    exposed outside his employment."   The record contains no
    photographs, diagrams, or samples from which to draw that
    inference by inspection.    The decision by the commission is not
    based on finding that the step was defective or any facts that
    support such a finding.
    The commission also rests it decision on the fact the
    employee was carrying a binder that prevented his grabbing the
    railing as he fell.   Under the actual risk test, the employee
    must establish that he was at greater risk of injury as a result
    of his employment than the general public.     Olsten v. Leftwich,
    
    230 Va. 317
    , 319, 
    336 S.E.2d 893
    , 894 (1985).    In order to
    prevail, the employee must prove a causal connection between the
    manner in which the employer required the work to be performed
    and the resulting injury.
    The employee claimed carrying a binder was a condition of
    the workplace that caused his fall.     He testified on re-direct
    examination, "when I was falling, I was on the right side of the
    stairs.   I couldn't reach the left side of the handrail to stop
    myself and being that my right hand was already full with the
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    binder, I couldn't grab the right rail, so I fell."    No evidence
    indicated how carrying the binder of training notes created a
    danger peculiar to the workplace.   Nothing inherent in the act
    of negotiating steps while carrying the binder, which weighed no
    more than two pounds, permitted that finding.
    In Marion Corr. Treatment Ctr. v. Henderson, 
    20 Va. App. 477
    , 
    458 S.E.2d 301
     (1995), we affirmed a finding that the
    employee's injury arose out of his employment as a prison guard.
    The employee fell down steps while looking at a guard tower.
    His duties required him to receive an acknowledgement signal
    from the tower guards.    The employee had to observe the towers
    rather than the steps he was traversing.   "The way in which he
    performed this aspect of his job increased his risk of falling
    on this occasion and directly contributed to cause his fall and
    injury."   Id. at 480-81, 458 S.E.2d at 303 (citation omitted).
    In this case, no evidence suggested that carrying the binder was
    a risk greater than that faced by the general public.
    Additionally, the employee's own evidence contradicts his
    contention that carrying the binder caused his fall.    When
    specifically asked if the binder caused him to fall, the
    employee replied, "No, it did not cause my fall, no."   As in
    Shell, the employee's "case can rise no higher than [his] own
    uncontradicted testimony."   20 Va. App. at 203, 455 S.E.2d at
    763 (citation omitted).
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    The limited evidence supported neither a finding that the
    steps were defective nor a finding that the conditions of
    employment caused the accident.   Accordingly, the commission
    erred in concluding the injury arose out of the employment.
    Accordingly, we reverse the decision.
    Reversed.
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    Annunziata, J., dissenting.
    I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion reversing
    the commission's decision.      Appellant asserts claimant failed to
    prove his injury "arose out of" his employment.     "Whether an
    accident arises out of employment is a mixed question of law and
    fact . . . ."   Mullins v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 
    10 Va. App. 304
    , 307, 
    391 S.E.2d 609
    , 611 (1990).     It is well established
    that, upon review, this Court construes the evidence before the
    commission in the light most favorable to the party prevailing
    below.   See Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 1 Va.
    App. 503, 504, 
    339 S.E.2d 916
    , 916 (1986).     Furthermore, factual
    findings by the commission that are supported by credible
    evidence are conclusive and binding upon this Court.      Rose v.
    Red's Hitch & Trailer Serv., Inc., 
    11 Va. App. 55
    , 60, 
    396 S.E.2d 392
    , 395 (1990).   "In determining whether credible
    evidence exists, [this Court will] not retry the facts, reweigh
    the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own determination
    of the credibility of the witnesses."      Wagner Enterprises, Inc.
    v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).        The
    fact that there is contrary evidence in the record is of no
    consequence if there is credible evidence to support the
    commission's findings.    Id.    In the instant case, the deputy
    commissioner found the injury arose from Tooks's employment
    based on the following findings of fact:
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    We find that there are added risks, peculiar
    to the claimant's employment, which created
    a hazard of the employment here. First, the
    claimant was carrying a binder in his hands.
    This prevented him from grabbing the
    railing. Had he been able to do so, he may
    well have been able to prevent the fall or,
    at a minimum, lessen the effects of the
    fall. Additionally, his foot caught on the
    rubberized or textured portion of the steps.
    The full commission affirmed these findings and the conclusions
    of law.   Applying the requisite standard of review, I would
    affirm the commission's decision.
    To be sure, neither the deputy nor the full commission
    found the steps were defective.   Evidence of defect, however, is
    not a prerequisite to an award where evidence in the record
    supports the conclusion that a condition of employment, such as
    something unusual about a step, is causally related to the
    injury.   County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 
    237 Va. 180
    , 186,
    
    376 S.E.2d 73
    , 76 (1989) (finding there was "nothing unusual
    about or wrong with the steps" in question); see also Southside
    Virginia Training Center v. Shell, 
    20 Va. App. 199
    , 201-02, 
    455 S.E.2d 761
    , 762 (1995).   In Shell, we reversed an award on the
    ground that "nothing in the record shows an abnormality in
    either the angle of the rise or the dimensions of the tread or
    carriage[,] a handrail is attached," and the claimant testified
    "the area was well lit, . . . no foreign substance on the steps
    caused her fall, and [] there was nothing unusual about the
    steps."   Shell, 20 Va. App. at 201-02, 455 S.E.2d at 762; see
    - 11 -
    also County of Buchanan School Board v. Horton, 
    35 Va. 26
    , 31,
    
    542 S.E.2d 783
    , 785 (2001) (claimant failed to prove step was
    defective or a condition of her employment caused the fall).
    The overarching principle which governs in such a case was
    stated by the Virginia Supreme Court in Lipsey v. Case, 
    248 Va. 59
    , 
    445 S.E.2d 105
     (1994):   "an accident arises out of the
    employment when it is apparent to a rational mind, under all
    attending circumstances, that a causal connection exists between
    the conditions under which the work is required to be performed
    and the resulting injury."   Id. at 61, 445 S.E.2d at 107; see
    Johnson, 237 Va. at 183, 376 S.E.2d at 75; Marketing Profiles,
    Inc. v. Hill, 
    17 Va. App. 431
    , 434, 
    437 S.E.2d 727
    , 729 (1993).
    Accordingly, I would affirm the commission's decision to
    award claimant benefits in this case.   See Wagner Enterprises,
    12 Va. App. at 894, 407 S.E.2d at 35; Rose, 11 Va. App. at 60,
    396 S.E.2d at 345; see also Southern Motor Lines Co. v. Alvis,
    
    200 Va. 168
    , 170-71, 
    104 S.E.2d 735
    , 737 (1958) ("[T]he phrase,
    'arising out of' the employment should receive a liberal
    construction to effectuate the humane and beneficent purposes of
    the Act.").
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