Terrance Darnell Boykin v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
TERRANCE DARNELL BOYKIN
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1718-97-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
DECEMBER 8, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Frank A. Hoss, Jr., Judge
Corinne J. Magee for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Upon appeal from his conviction for rape, in violation of
Code § 18.2-61, Terrance Darnell Boykin contends that the trial
court erred in granting the Commonwealth's motion in limine to
prevent Boykin from mentioning on voir dire the penalty for rape.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Boykin was charged with rape, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-61, and his case was set for trial before a jury. The
Commonwealth moved in limine to bar Boykin from stating on voir
dire the specific penalty he faced if convicted. The trial court
granted the motion, and limited Boykin to telling the venire only
that the charge was "a most serious offense with great
consequences." The jury found Boykin guilty of rape and,
following a sentencing hearing, fixed his punishment at seven
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
years in prison.
Boykin contends that the trial court's ruling impaired his
constitutional right to an impartial jury. 1 He argues that
because he was forbidden to ask the venire on voir dire about
their predispositions concerning punishments, he was prevented
from striking those veniremen who were predisposed to heavy
sentences regardless of the evidence and the trial court's
instructions.
Boykin is barred from raising the constitutional issue on
appeal because he did not state that issue as a ground for
objection at trial. Rule 5A:18. See Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12
Va. App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991). Objecting at
trial to the motion in limine, Boykin argued simply that the
gravity and enormity of the sentence should be considered by the
jury. Counsel for Boykin argued as follows:
I understand that this is a bifurcated trial
but I also think that the jury needs to
understand that this is a most serious
offense under Virginia statutes and that in
fact Mr. Boykin could in fact received [sic]
a life sentence. This is not a ten or
fifteen year offense and I think that the
magnitude and the enormity of that sentence
is something and a fact that the jury should
be made aware of up front . . . . Because I
think that when they consider all of the
evidence and they consider the credibility of
the witnesses and they consider all the other
tangible and intangible demonstrative
evidence they need to have in the back of
their mind that they are considering these
things in view of the fact that they could
1
Boykin cites U.S. Constitution Amendments VI and XIV and
Virginia Constitution Article 1, Section 8.
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give this person a life sentence. I think
it's proper and that they should have that
information prior to hearing the case.
Boykin never argued that granting the motion in limine would
violate his constitutional right to an impartial jury. See
Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 570, 574, 405 S.E.2d 438,
441 (1991).
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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