Donald Eugene Umphlett v. Norfolk Ship. etc. ( 1996 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    DONALD EUGENE UMPHLETT
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.         Record No. 1502-95-1            JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    FEBRUARY 27, 1996
    NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORPORATION
    and RICHARD-FLAGSHIP SERVICES, INC.
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Robert E. Walsh (Rutter & Montagna, L.L.P.,
    on brief), for appellant.
    William C. Walker (Bradford C. Jacob; Taylor &
    Walker, P.C., on brief), for appellees.
    Donald Eugene Umphlett (claimant) appeals the decision of
    the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) which
    "suspended" benefits as a result of claimant's "refusal to
    cooperate with vocational rehabilitation" services provided by
    his employer, Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation
    (employer).    Claimant contends that his conduct was reasonable
    and justified and caused no prejudice to employer.    Finding no
    error, we affirm the decision.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and we
    recite only those facts necessary to a disposition of this
    appeal.
    On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the party prevailing below, employer in this
    instance.     Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 
    1 Va. App. 503
    , 504, 
    339 S.E.2d 916
    , 916 (1986).    Findings of fact by the
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    commission, supported by credible evidence, are binding and
    conclusive on appeal.      James v. Capitol Steel Const. Co., 8 Va.
    App. 512, 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989); see Code § 65.2-706.
    Incidental to his application for benefits resulting from an
    occupational disease, claimant was contacted by Barbara Byers, a
    "vocational rehabilitation specialist" provided by employer.
    Byers "evaluated the claimant's academic and intellectual
    capacities, reviewed his physical limitations, . . . and selected
    potential employment which was approved by [his] treating
    1
    physician."       However, as the commission noted, claimant refused
    "to cooperate with [Byers'] rehabilitation efforts" and instead
    unsuccessfully sought "retraining" through a vocational
    rehabilitation program offered by the U.S. Department of Labor.
    Code § 65.2-603(B) provides that
    [t]he unjustified refusal of the employee to
    accept . . . vocational rehabilitation
    services when provided by the employer shall
    bar the employee from further compensation
    until such refusal ceases and no compensation
    shall at any time be paid for the period of
    suspension unless, in the opinion of the
    Commission, the circumstances justified the
    refusal.
    (Emphasis added.)      "[P]hrases such as 'unless in the opinion of
    the Commission such refusal was justified' are provided so that
    those appointed to implement the compensation laws may make
    discretionary judgments that carry out the legislative intent."
    DePaul Medical Center v. Brickhouse, 
    18 Va. App. 506
    , 508, 445
    1
    Byers testified that she was aware of "six employers with
    employment opportunities within [claimant's] restrictions."
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    S.E.2d 494, 495 (1994).   Here, the commission found that claimant
    "unilaterally refused to follow up on the[] prospects [suggested
    by Byers] and elected to pursue [other] rehabilitation efforts
    . . . ."   The determination that such conduct was unjustified
    constituted a factual finding by the commission, supported by
    credible evidence.   See Chesapeake Masonry Corp. v. Wiggington,
    
    229 Va. 227
    , 229-30, 
    327 S.E.2d 121
    , 122 (1985).
    Accordingly, we affirm the decision.
    Affirmed.
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