April D. Gallop v. Cameron Bay Homeowners Association ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, White and Retired Judge Frank*
UNPUBLISHED
APRIL D. GALLOP
MEMORANDUM OPINION**
v. Record No. 1715-22-2 PER CURIAM
JUNE 6, 2023
CAMERON BAY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Steven C. McCallum, Judge
(April Gallop, on briefs), pro se.
(David H. Solodar; Lenora Solodar; Solodar & Solodar, on brief), for
appellee.
April D. Gallop, pro se, appeals the Chesterfield County Circuit Court’s order dismissing
her appeal of the Chesterfield County General District Court’s (“GDC”) order denying her motion
to set aside an earlier order granting Cameron Bay Homeowners Association’s (“Cameron Bay”)
warrant in debt for unpaid condominium fees. On appeal, Gallop seeks to challenge the underlying
order granting Cameron Bay’s warrant in debt. Gallop also argues that the circuit court’s dismissal
of her appeal of the GDC’s denial of her motion to set aside the warrant in debt for lack of
jurisdiction was “misguided.” After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel
unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.”
Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s
judgment.
*
Retired Judge Frank took part in the consideration of this case by designation pursuant
to Code § 17.1-400(D).
**
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
BACKGROUND
Under familiar appellate principles, we defer to the circuit court’s factual findings and state
the facts in the light most favorable to Cameron Bay, the prevailing party below. Koons v. Crane,
72 Va. App. 720, 732 (2021). On January 26, 2022, the GDC entered judgment for Cameron Bay
against Gallop in the amount of $525. Gallop did not appeal the GDC’s order. In March 2022,
however, Gallop filed a “motion to set aside default judgment” in the GDC. The GDC denied the
motion, and Gallop appealed to the circuit court.
In the circuit court, Cameron Bay filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the circuit court did
not have jurisdiction under Code § 16.1-106 to consider Gallop’s appeal.1 Gallop opposed the
motion. The circuit court granted Cameron Bay’s motion to dismiss. The circuit court summarized
Gallop’s appeal as “not [challenging] the validity (vel non) of the debt asserted in the warrant in
debt, but rather the lower court’s denial of a Motion to Set Aside/Vacate the judgment that the debt
claimed is due.” Citing Ragan v. Woodcroft Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322 (1998), the circuit
court found that Gallop’s appeal was not from a final order or judgment and that the circuit court
1
Code § 16.1-106 provides for appeals from the GDC in civil cases and states in relevant
part that an appeal may be taken
[f]rom any order entered or judgment rendered in a court not of
record in a civil case in which the matter in controversy is of
greater value than $20, . . . or when the case involves the
constitutionality or validity of a statute of the Commonwealth, or
of an ordinance or bylaw of a municipal corporation, or of the
enforcement of rights and privileges conferred by the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act (§ 2.2-3700 et seq.), or of a protective
order pursuant to § 19.2-152.10, or of an action filed by a
condominium unit owners’ association or unit owner pursuant to
§ 55.1-1959, or of an action filed by a property owners’ association
or lot owner pursuant to § 55.1-1819, or from any order entered or
judgment rendered in a general district court that alters, amends,
overturns, or vacates any prior final order, there shall be an appeal
of right, if taken within 10 days after such order or judgment, to a
court of record.
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lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The circuit court remanded the matter to the GDC. Gallop
appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Jurisdiction
Much of Gallop’s argument on appeal challenges the underlying award of the warrant in
debt to Cameron Bay. Gallop, however, did not appeal the GDC’s order granting the warrant in
debt, and the GDC’s order became final. See Code § 16.1-106(A); Rule 1:1(a).
Gallop does not challenge the circuit court’s holding that her appeal was of the GDC’s
denial of her motion to set aside default judgment. Rather, Gallop argues the circuit court erred in
dismissing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the circuit court’s reliance on Ragan was
“misguided.” Gallop contends that the appellant in Ragan “did not in any way address the final
judgment,” while, in comparison, Gallop “addressed the final judgment in her motion to set aside
judgment.” Gallop argues that, based on this distinction, the circuit court erred in dismissing her
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Whether the record establishes subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case is a question of
law reviewed de novo on appeal. Parrish v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc., 292 Va. 44, 49 (2016). As
noted above, the circuit court relied upon Ragan to determine that Gallop’s appeal from the GDC’s
denial of her motion to set aside was not from a final order or judgment and that the circuit court
lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. In Ragan, the Supreme Court held that “[a] final order or
judgment is one that disposes of the whole subject of the case and gives all relief contemplated.”
Ragan, 255 Va. at 327. The Supreme Court determined that although a GDC order entering a
default judgment in an unlawful detainer action was an appealable order, the GDC’s order denying a
motion to set aside that default judgment was not because it “was not a final order or judgment
[that] dispose[d] of the merits of the unlawful detainer summons.” Id. Likewise, in Architectural
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Stone, LLC v. Wolcott Center, LLC, 274 Va. 519, 523 (2007), the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a GDC’s ruling to deny a motion to set aside a default judgment was not a final, appealable
order or judgment.
We find the circuit court did not err in holding that Gallop’s appeal from the GDC’s denial
of her motion to set aside default judgment was not from a final order or judgment and that the
circuit court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Gallop’s appeal. See Ragan, 255
Va. at 327. We reject Gallop’s unsupported attempt to distinguish the facts of this case from that in
Ragan by emphasizing that she sought to challenge the underlying order granting Cameron Bay’s
warrant in debt. As Gallop’s appeal was from the GDC’s denial of her motion to set aside default
judgment, we therefore hold that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Gallop’s appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.
II. Attorney fees
Cameron Bay asks this Court to award it attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. “The
decision of whether to award attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal is discretionary.”
Friedman v. Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 545 (2018). Having reviewed and considered the entire record
in this case, we grant Cameron Bay’s request for a reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs
incurred on appeal. We remand this case to the circuit court for determination and award of the
appropriate appellate attorney fees and costs, which also should include any additional attorney fees
incurred at the remand hearing. Rule 5A:30(b).2
2
Cameron Bay’s request for this Court to impose a prefiling injunction on Gallop is
denied. We further deny Gallop’s request for accommodation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, as we dispensed with oral argument.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed. We remand this case to
the circuit court for determination and award of the appropriate appellate attorney fees, which also
should include any additional attorney fees incurred at the remand hearing.
Affirmed and remanded.
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