Matthew Scott Chapman v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Raphael, White and Senior Judge Petty
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MATTHEW SCOTT CHAPMAN
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0514-22-2 JUDGE STUART A. RAPHAEL
AUGUST 15, 2023
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LANCASTER COUNTY
R. Michael McKenney, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Matthew Scott Chapman appeals his convictions of second-degree murder, shooting in
the commission of a felony, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Chapman
contends that the evidence showed that he killed the victim in self-defense, so the trial court
should have granted his motion to strike. He also attacks the jury instruction on shooting in the
commission of a felony, arguing that it permitted him to be convicted without proof of mens rea.
Finding neither claim meritorious, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
“Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74
Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
requires that we “discard” the defendant’s evidence when it conflicts with the Commonwealth’s
evidence, “regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth,” and read
“all fair inferences” in the Commonwealth’s favor. Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
Chapman married K.C. (“wife”) in 2018, but in January 2020, Chapman “assaulted and
injured” wife and the couple separated. Chapman pleaded no contest to assault and battery of a
family member in the Lancaster County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court. The
sentencing order prohibited personal contact between them “except by reasonable email or texts”
and “upon mutual agreement.” The order also prohibited Chapman from entering wife’s
property on Beach Road in White Stone, Virginia. During their separation, wife lived at the
Beach Road residence while Chapman lived in a rental property with his son. Wife and
Chapman continued to communicate with each other to manage a business that they owned
together.
Sometime during the separation, Chapman found out that wife was dating J.C.G.
(“victim”). Wife told Chapman at some point that victim had wanted to marry her. On March 3,
2020, Chapman asked victim’s ex-girlfriend if victim drove “a grey chevy with a . . . dog box in
back.” The ex-girlfriend responded, “Last time I knew he drove a blue ford.” On March 15,
victim visited a friend. While victim and the friend were out, the friend’s wife saw Chapman
drive slowly by the house and turn around in a neighbor’s parking lot.
On March 16, Chapman approached a cook at a local restaurant, showed her a photo of
Chapman’s wife, and asked if she had seen her there with a man. The cook said no, and when
Chapman asked to befriend the cook on Facebook so she could update him if she saw wife, the
cook refused.
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After three months of dating, wife broke up with victim on March 16, 2020. Wife and
Chapman spent the nights of March 16 and 17 together, and wife told Chapman that she had
ended her relationship with victim. But wife also told Chapman that she still wanted a divorce.
On the afternoon of March 18, victim texted friends, “I might go to jail,” and “I didn’t
start [the drama]. But I will f***ing finish it.” Wife’s security camera then showed victim
arriving and leaving wife’s residence twice between 4:44 p.m. and 4:58 p.m.
Chapman arrived at wife’s residence at 5:03 p.m. When wife told Chapman that victim
had been there, Chapman asked why and if victim was upset with wife. Wife said that she and
victim had returned each other’s belongings and that victim was “okay,” though he was crying,
upset, and vomiting.
About ten minutes later, wife heard a car horn and looked out the window to see victim’s
truck. The security camera at the front of the residence recorded Chapman saying, “You better
call ‘em; you better call ‘em.” Police Lieutenant Tim Self testified at trial that, for Chapman’s
voice to have been captured, Chapman was likely inside, at the front of the residence. Wife
testified that Chapman insisted that victim was “not going to come up in here.” Knowing that
Chapman “gets into altercations easily,” wife implored Chapman, “Don’t do this here. Don’t go
outside. Please just let me handle it.”
Ignoring wife’s pleas, Chapman grabbed wife’s gun from the hallway table and went
outside. As wife fumbled with her phone and caged her dogs, she heard yelling. She then heard
(1) a gunshot, (2) Chapman say, “warning shot,” and (3) a second gunshot. Wife went outside
and saw Chapman standing with a gun in a gravel area, near a ramp leading to the back door.
Victim sat on the sidewalk about ten feet from Chapman. Wife told Chapman to put down the
gun and go to the neighbor’s yard, which he did. Chapman told her that victim had been choking
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him. Victim “laid back and started gurgling,” and vomited. Upon seeing a gunshot wound to
victim’s stomach, wife yelled at Chapman and began CPR on victim.
Wife’s next-door neighbor A.D. (“neighbor”) also heard the gunshots. Neighbor, who
knew both Chapman and victim, was at home when he saw victim arrive. Fearing that Chapman
and victim would fight, neighbor went to his back door, which opens “at the fence” between
wife’s property and his own. On his way to the door, neighbor heard “a lot of yelling” and one
gunshot. As he opened his back door, neighbor heard Chapman say, “[b]ack away,” followed by
a second shot. Neighbor then looked through his fence and saw Chapman and victim facing each
other. As neighbor walked around the fence towards wife’s residence, he saw Chapman at the
bottom of the ramp and victim on the sidewalk. The two men did not appear to have moved
since neighbor first saw them through the fence. Neighbor saw the gun in Chapman’s hand and
told him to put it on the ground by a tree, which Chapman did. Chapman said aloud, “[W]hat did
I do?”
The police officers who arrived found one handgun in the yard and another on the deck
railing. One gun belonged to Chapman, the other to wife.1 The officers also recovered two shell
casings, one near victim’s right arm and the other on the sidewalk. Chapman told the officers
that when victim approached him aggressively, he fired a warning shot into the ground and told
victim to leave. Chapman said that victim kept approaching and wrestled with him and that
Chapman shot victim when victim tried to strangle him. Chapman’s clothes were not bloody,
and a police photo showed no visible injuries to his neck. Several law-enforcement officers
testified at trial that victims of strangulation typically have marks on their necks. The police
found no weapon on victim’s body.
1
Wife and Chapman provided conflicting accounts about whose gun Chapman fired.
Wife testified that after the shooting, she saw Chapman holding her gun in his hand. Chapman
testified that he put wife’s gun on the deck railing and used his own gun.
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EMS personnel who responded to the scene pronounced victim dead at 5:48 p.m. The
autopsy confirmed that victim died from “an indeterminate distance gunshot wound to the right
abdomen.” The toxicology report showed victim’s blood alcohol content was approximately
.08%. Victim’s fingernail clippings contained no DNA profile other than his own.
At trial, Chapman testified that he was outside at the bottom of the ramp when victim
arrived. He said that victim ran at him, screaming, “I got you now, bitch boy. I’m going to f***
you up.” Chapman told victim to leave, and as victim approached, Chapman “pulled [his] gun
and shot in the ground.” When victim did not stop, Chapman announced, “A warning shot.”
Chapman testified that he was “petrified” and that as he backed up to the top of the ramp, victim
“locked on” his neck and threw him off the ramp’s handrail onto a trash can. Chapman said that
victim then choked him and that when victim reached back for what he thought was a weapon,
Chapman “[c]losed [his] eyes and pulled the trigger.”
The Commonwealth introduced evidence at trial to impeach Chapman’s credibility. In a
jailhouse interview with a police detective, Chapman did not mention being strangled or thrown
onto the trash can, or victim reaching for what Chapman thought was a weapon. Chapman also
told a fellow inmate that he shot victim after victim produced a knife. On jailhouse phone calls
to friends and family members, Chapman said that victim threw him to the ground. And before
April 18, Chapman did not mention strangulation but said that victim “locked up” with him.
Chapman twice moved to strike the murder charge on the ground that the evidence
showed that he acted in self-defense, but the trial court denied both motions. During the
charging conference, the Commonwealth proposed the following jury instruction on the elements
of shooting during the commission of a felony under Code § 18.2-53:
(1) That the defendant shot . . . another person; and
(2) That the shooting . . . occurred while the defendant was
committing or attempting to commit a felony.
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Chapman objected: “[I]t just sounds by the Court’s reading . . . that this appears to be a strict
liability crime for which no mens rea is necessary.” The trial court overruled the objection,
ruling that “the intent that is required is the intent to commit the [underlying] felony.”
The jury convicted Chapman of second-degree murder,2 use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony, and shooting in the commission of a felony. The court sentenced
Chapman to 48 years’ incarceration, with 26 years suspended.3 Chapman appeals.
ANALYSIS
Chapman asserts that the trial court should have struck the Commonwealth’s evidence
because it “failed to exclude the hypothesis” that he acted in self-defense. He also argues that
the jury instruction about shooting in the commission of a felony permitted him to be convicted
without proving mens rea.
A. Self-Defense (Assignment of Error I)
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)
(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does
not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,
228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.
Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193
2
Chapman was indicted for first-degree murder; the jury convicted him of the
lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.
3
The court also ordered Chapman to pay restitution of $1,500 to the Virginia Victims
Fund.
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(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted
to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by
the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.
Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).
“Self-defense is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder, and in making such a plea,
a ‘defendant implicitly admits the killing was intentional and assumes the burden of introducing
evidence . . . that raises a reasonable doubt’” of his guilt. Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App.
70, 86 (2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729 (2001)). “‘Whether an
accused’ meets this threshold ‘is a question of fact.’” Washington v. Commonwealth, 75
Va. App. 606, 617 (2022) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 71 (1993)).
Virginia law recognizes two forms of self-defense: justifiable self-defense and excusable self-
defense. Id. Both constitute a complete defense to a murder charge. Jones, 71 Va. App. at 94.
Justifiable self-defense is reserved for when the accused is “without any fault on his part in
provoking or bringing on the difficulty.” Washington, 75 Va. App. at 617 (emphasis altered)
(quoting Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 199 (2010)).
The trial court here, with the agreement of both parties, instructed the jury only on
excusable self-defense. Excusable self-defense
occurs when the accused is at “some fault in the first instance in
provoking or bringing on the difficulty” but, when attacked, he
“retreats as far as possible, announces his desire for peace,” and
acts “from a reasonably apparent necessity to preserve his own life
or save himself from great bodily harm.”
Id. (quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 479, 487 (2016)). In short, Chapman needed to
show that (1) he reasonably feared serious bodily harm or death, (2) an overt act or other
circumstance made that harm imminent, and (3) he retreated as far as possible and announced his
desire for peace. Id.-7-
But the evidence here did not require the jury to resolve any of those elements in
Chapman’s favor. Chapman relies heavily on his own testimony that victim advanced on him,
forced him up the ramp, threw him onto a trash can, choked him, and reached for what Chapman
thought was a weapon. Yet the jury, which had “the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses as they testify,” did not have to credit Chapman’s testimony. Dalton v.
Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300,
304 (1993)).
Indeed, much of Chapman’s testimony was uncorroborated or conflicted with other
testimony. Chapman claimed that he was outside when victim arrived, but wife testified that
Chapman was inside the residence, where she implored him to stay put. The security footage,
recording Chapman’s voice inside at the front of the residence, corroborated wife’s testimony,
not Chapman’s.
No other witness saw victim threaten, “charge,” or strangle Chapman. Pictures of the
yard, including the trash cans and several potted plants, did not show signs of a struggle. The
officers found no evidence of ground disturbance, despite Chapman’s claim that he fired the
warning shot into the ground. Moreover, victim’s fingernails contained only his own DNA. And
even though strangulation typically leaves marks on the neck, the photographic evidence showed
no marks on Chapman’s neck.
Chapman’s story was also inconsistent. When interviewed in jail by police, he did not
mention being strangled or thrown onto the trash can, nor that he thought victim was reaching for
a weapon. Later, after telling a fellow inmate that victim had a knife, Chapman admitted that he
never saw victim with a weapon. While Chapman said in jailhouse phone calls that victim threw
him to the ground, at trial, he said that victim threw him onto a trash can.
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Wife and neighbor’s testimony also contradicted significant aspects of Chapman’s
account. To be sure, wife heard Chapman say, “warning shot” after the first shot was fired;
neighbor heard Chapman say, “[b]ack away.” But that bare corroboration of Chapman’s
statements did not prove that Chapman shot victim to defend himself. Neither wife nor neighbor
witnessed the shooting or saw victim’s actions. And soon after the second shot, wife and
neighbor both saw Chapman at the bottom of the ramp and victim on the sidewalk—a good
distance from the trash can where Chapman said he shot victim.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we cannot say
that a reasonable juror would have been compelled to conclude that victim committed an overt
act that put Chapman in reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm, let alone that
Chapman retreated as far as possible and announced his desire for peace before shooting victim
to death. See Jones, 71 Va. App. at 95. A rational juror could infer from the totality of the
evidence that Chapman acted out of anger, not fear, thus rejecting his claim of self-defense.
Whether the defendant’s alternative “hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is itself a [factual
question] subject to deferential appellate review.” Bennett v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 475,
492 (2018) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)). We see no basis to set
aside the jury’s verdict and therefore affirm the trial court’s decision denying Chapman’s motion
to strike the evidence.
B. Jury Instruction (Assignment of Error II)
Chapman also challenges the jury instruction on the elements of shooting in the commission
of a felony. “A reviewing court’s responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is ‘to see that the
law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly
raises.’” Fahringer v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 208, 211 (2019) (quoting Darnell v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488 (1988)). We review a trial court’s decisions in giving or
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denying requested jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Id. But we review de novo
whether a jury instruction accurately states the law. Id.Code § 18.2-53 provides, “[i]f any person, in the commission of, or attempt to commit,
felony, unlawfully shoot, stab, cut or wound another person he shall be guilty of a Class 6
felony.” The jury instruction on that offense explained:
The defendant is charged with the crime of shoot, stab, cut
or wound another person in the commission of, or attempt to
commit, a felony. The Commonwealth must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the following elements of that crime:
(1) That the defendant shot, stabbed, cut or wounded
another person; and
(2) That the shooting, stabbing, cutting or wounding
occurred while the defendant was committing or attempting
to commit a felony.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the above elements of
the crime as charged, then you shall find the defendant guilty of
shoot, stab, cut or wound another person in the commission of, or
attempt to commit, a felony.
If you find that the Commonwealth has failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt either or both of the elements of the
crime, then you shall find the defendant not guilty.
Jury Instr. 14.4 Chapman asserts that the instruction “was inappropriate because it suggested that
an inference of guilt could be drawn in the absence of any evil [intent] or mens rea.” He says
that the instruction “erroneously stated the applicable law and served only to confuse the jury.”5
4
The instruction did not include the statutory term “unlawfully” before the words “shot,
stabbed, cut or wounded,” but Chapman has not challenged its absence. We express no opinion
on whether the omission of that word rendered the instruction erroneous. See Rule 5A:18.
5
We find that Chapman adequately preserved this argument under Rule 5A:18 by
objecting to the instruction during the charging conference on the ground that it “appears to be a
strict liability crime for which no mens rea is necessary.”
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We are not persuaded. We do not undervalue the “fundamental importance” of mens rea
in our criminal-justice system. Clayton v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 416, 425 (2022)
(Raphael, J., concurring). But the jury instruction here did not dispense with the need to prove
scienter. The instruction required the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Chapman shot victim while committing or attempting to commit an underlying felony—namely,
first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. By convicting Chapman
of second-degree murder, the jury found that his killing of victim was “malicious.” Jury Instr.
4.6 Thus, the malice required to prove second-degree murder sufficed to support Chapman’s
conviction under Code § 18.2-53 for shooting victim in the course of murdering him.
CONCLUSION
We find no reversible error in the trial court’s denial of Chapman’s motion to strike or in
its jury instruction on shooting in the commission of a felony.
Affirmed.
6
Our Supreme Court “has long employed a volitional definition of malice requiring that
the ‘wrongful act be done “willfully or purposefully.”’” Flanders v. Commonwealth, 298 Va.
345, 357 (2020) (quoting Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 280 (1984)). “[M]alice may be
implied from use of a deadly weapon” when committing a homicide. Id. at 358.
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