LKQ Corporation and CCMSI v. Joseph Galarreta Morales ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED
Present: Judges Beales, Fulton and Lorish
Argued by videoconference
LKQ CORPORATION AND
CCMSI
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1173-22-4 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
AUGUST 1, 2023
JOSEPH GALARRETA MORALES
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Dennis Boyd Cook; Midkiff, Muncie & Ross, P.C., on brief), for
appellants. Appellants submitting on brief.
Joseph Galarreta Morales (Jan F. Hoen; Hampton Injury Law PLC,
on brief), for appellee.
LKQ Corporation and its claims administrator, CCMSI, (collectively “LKQ”) appeal from a
decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission that held that Joseph Galarreta Morales
(“claimant”) was not required to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation services that were
inappropriate for a disabled claimant. In its first assignment of error, LKQ argues that the
“Commission erred in finding that [LKQ] failed to meet their burden to prove that vocational
rehabilitation was appropriate” and that the Commission erred by declining to find that claimant
“failed to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation without justification.” LKQ also assigned error to
the Commission’s determination that claimant “was entitled to a reinstatement of temporary total
disability benefits” following what LKQ contends was claimant’s unjustified failure to cooperate.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2015, claimant was employed with LKQ as a driver delivering automobile parts. On
the night of July 30, 2015, claimant was driving a delivery route for LKQ when his 26-foot box
truck left the roadway and rolled onto its driver’s side. Claimant sustained compensable injuries to
his neck, left shoulder, and lower back. Between August 2015 and August 2020, claimant saw a
variety of physicians. Due to the changing status of his injuries, claimant’s physicians periodically
gave him light-duty work restrictions or took him completely off of a work-duty status for certain
periods of time. On March 7, 2016, claimant filed a claim for benefits with the Commission in
connection with his injuries. On December 28, 2016, the deputy commissioner awarded claimant
medical benefits and temporary total disability for three periods. The most recent period began on
March 1, 2016, and continued without a definite end date.
On July 30, 2020, claimant’s treating physician, Dr. Sunjay Berdia, released him to
light-duty work with restrictions “until surgery.” Claimant reported to the Commission that he
underwent surgery by Dr. Berdia on August 18, 2020. On August 28, 2020, Dr. Berdia determined
that claimant would be unable to return to work until September 28, 2020, and noted that he would
see claimant again on September 25, 2020. The Commission found that the August 28, 2020 note
by Dr. Berdia, which took claimant out of work, was the last statement in the record of claimant’s
work status.
The following year, on August 3, 2021, LKQ filed an application to terminate claimant’s
temporary total disability benefits alleging that he “refused vocational rehabilitation from July 7,
2021 through August 3, 2021.” In support of its application, LKQ produced a letter from Carlos
Encinas, a vocational case manager, to claimant dated July 22, 2021, which states in relevant part:
With this letter allow me to advise you of a vocational appointment
for Thursday 7/28/2021 at 11:00. I have attempted to reach you via
telephone unsuccessfully and no possibility of leaving voice mail
message.
At this time, we will discuss the job search process and I will inform
you regarding any job interviews. As part of this process I will also
assist you in completing job application, if appropriate and whenever
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possible. Please have with you any record you may have on your
employment history no more than 10-15 years.1
LKQ’s application to terminate benefits also included a letter from Encinas which stated that he had
made “repeated attempts to contact” claimant on July 7, 2021, and attempted to contact claimant
again on July 8, 2021. On August 4, 2021, claimant replied to Encinas’s July 22, 2021 letter. In the
reply letter, claimant stated that he would meet with Encinas after Encinas agreed to several
pre-conditions, such as the reimbursement of certain medical expenses and the providing of copies
of reports Encinas would prepare following the meeting.
Following a hearing on LKQ’s application to terminate claimant’s benefits, the deputy
commissioner released an opinion on December 30, 2021. The deputy commissioner found that
claimant’s August 4, 2021 reply letter “setting forth pre-conditions to his cooperation with the
vocational rehabilitation process” constituted an unjustified refusal to engage in vocational
rehabilitation services under Code § 65.2-603(B). The deputy commissioner then suspended
claimant’s award of temporary total disability benefits effective August 6, 2021.
Claimant filed a request for review with the Commission. On July 11, 2022, a majority of
the Commission reversed the decision of the deputy commissioner and reinstated claimant’s
temporary total disability benefits. The Commission found that LKQ “failed to meet [its] burden to
prove vocational rehabilitation was appropriate.” In support of its finding, the Commission found
that the deputy commissioner “overlooked the August 28, 2020 form taking [claimant] out of work”
and that there “was no evidence [that he] was released to light duty work at the time vocational
rehabilitation was offered.” LKQ now appeals to this Court.
LKQ’s application also included a letter from Encinas to claimant on the same date that
1
communicated a substantially similar message in Spanish.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
On appeal, the appellant bears “the ‘burden of showing’ that the Commission committed
‘reversible error.’” Jones v. Crothall Laundry, 69 Va. App. 767, 774 (2019) (quoting Burke v.
Catawba Hosp., 59 Va. App. 828, 838 (2012)); see Humphries v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 183 Va. 466, 476 (1945) (“The finding of the Industrial Commission is presumed to
be correct and the burden is on appellant in this court to point out the error committed by the
Commission.”). “[T]he full commission is the factfinder for commission proceedings.” Meidan,
Inc. v. Leavell, 62 Va. App. 436, 442 (2013). As such, “the Commission’s factual findings are
‘conclusive and binding’ if ‘supported by credible evidence.’” Jones, 69 Va. App. at 774 (quoting
Layne v. Crist Elec. Contractor, Inc., 64 Va. App. 342, 350 (2015)); McCaskey v. Patrick Henry
Hosp., 225 Va. 413, 415 (1983); see Carrington v. Aquatic Co., 297 Va. 520, 522-23 (2019) (“The
Commission’s determinations of fact are conclusive and binding on appeal.”). “This deference to
the Commission’s factfinding necessarily requires that we . . . construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing parties before the Commission.” Jeffreys v. Uninsured
Employer’s Fund, 297 Va. 82, 87 (2019). However, this Court reviews questions of law de novo.
Rusty’s Welding Service, Inc. v. Gibson, 29 Va. App. 119, 127 (1999) (en banc).
“Whether the employee unjustifiably has refused to cooperate with vocational
rehabilitation services is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the evidence.”
Anderson v. Anderson, 65 Va. App. 354, 362 (2015). Also, whether a claimant is disabled is a
question of fact. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Robertson, 218 Va. 1051, 1053, 1055 (1978);
see also Georgia Pac. Corp. v. Dancy, 17 Va. App. 128, 133-34 (1993) (affirming the
Commission’s finding that the claimant “continued to be totally disabled” because that finding
was supported by credible evidence).
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What constitutes “reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation services” authorized
by Code § 65.2-603(A)(3), as applied to a particular claimant’s case, is a mixed question of law
and fact. See City of Salem v. Colegrove, 228 Va. 290, 293 (1984); Yeargain v. Daniel Int’l, 9
Va. App. 82, 84 (1989). When reviewing whether certain vocational rehabilitation services are
appropriate for a claimant, this Court will, as with all mixed questions of law and fact, “review
the legal principles de novo but show great deference to the Commission’s direct and inferential
factfinding.” See Jeffreys, 297 Va. at 95.
B. Whether Claimant Refused Appropriate Vocational Rehabilitation
On appeal, LKQ argues that claimant “failed to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation”
that was appropriate for him and that he did so without justification. Generally, Code
§ 65.2-603(A)-(B) requires a claimant to cooperate with “reasonable and necessary vocational
rehabilitation services” offered by his employer. As summarized by this Court, “[a]fter an award
of benefits, an employer owes a duty to an injured employee to provide ‘reasonable and
necessary vocational rehabilitation services.’” Anderson, 65 Va. App. at 361 (quoting Code
§ 65.2-603(A)(3) (“The employer shall also furnish or cause to be furnished, at the direction of
the Commission, reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation services.”)). In turn, “[o]nce
an employer provides such services, an unjustified refusal of the employee to accept the services
‘shall bar the employee from further compensation until such refusal ceases.’” Id. at 362
(quoting Code § 65.2-603(B)). Also, an “employer shall not be required to furnish, or cause to
be furnished, services under this subdivision to any injured employee not eligible for lawful
employment.” Code § 65.2-603(A)(3).
Ordinary vocational services are generally inappropriate for a totally disabled employee.
See id. This Court has repeatedly cited and proceeded under the Commission’s well-established
rule that an “employee has no obligation to work with vocational rehabilitation until [he or] she
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is medically released to return to selective employment.” Liz’s Blue Diamond, Inc. v. Rico, No.
1943-98-1, slip op. at 5-6 (Va. Ct. App. June 1, 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Gardner v.
Legum Home Health/Home I.V. Care & Nutritional Svc., 74 O.W.C. 97 (Apr. 19, 1995));
Food/Bev Serv-Crystal City v. Al-Boarab, No. 0215-17-4, slip op. at 8 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 8,
2017) (same); see also U.S. Auto. Mfg. v. Mauice Gordon, No. 0633-97-4, slip op. at 3-4
(Va. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1997).2 Indeed, in Homescapes, Ltd. v. Anderson, No. 2536-10-2, slip
op. at 4 n.2 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2011) (quoting Gardner, 74 O.W.C. at 99), this Court
requested argument from counsel to determine, in light of this rule, whether the claimant had
been released to work.
Here, the Commission has found that claimant was totally disabled. Once an award has
been entered declaring that a claimant is disabled, the burden is on the employer to show that the
effects of the claimant’s injury have dissipated and that the claimant is no longer disabled as a
result of his compensable injury. See Rossello v. K-Mart Corp., 15 Va. App. 333, 335 (1992)
(“In an application for review of an award on the ground of a change in condition, the burden is
on the party alleging such change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.”
(quoting Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 438 (1986))); Celanese Fibers
Co. v. Johnson, 229 Va. 117, 120 (1985). Here, LKQ has failed to show that claimant is no
longer disabled. Indeed, LKQ did not enter any medical evidence into the record that would
show that claimant is no longer disabled. In fact, LKQ acknowledges that “at the time vocational
rehabilitation efforts were commenced, the Appellee [claimant] did not have medical
authorization to return to work.” The Commission found “no evidence” that claimant was no
2
“Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for
their persuasive value.” Castillo v. Loudoun Cnty. Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 572
n.7 (2018) (quoting Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 350 n.3 (2012)); see also Rule
5A:1(f).
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longer disabled, and indeed, found that “[t]he only contemporaneous evidence on file with the
Commission took him completely out of work.” Consequently, LKQ has failed to show that
claimant is no longer disabled. See Justis v. Young, 202 Va. 631, 632 (1961) (“We have many
times pointed out that on appeal the judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct and the
burden is on the appellant to present to us a sufficient record from which we can determine whether
the lower court has erred in the respect complained of. If the appellant fails to do this, the judgment
will be affirmed.”).
Nevertheless, LKQ argues that claimant’s disability status is not dispositive here. LKQ
contends that a mere assessment of a claimant’s potential to return to work is appropriate even if
the claimant is totally disabled. To support this position, LKQ relies heavily on the
Commission’s decision in Gardner, 74 O.W.C. 97. The Commission in that decision
acknowledged that a claimant “has ‘no obligation to work with vocational rehabilitation’ until
she is medically released to return to selective employment.” Id. (quoting Gibson v. Freeman
Decorating Co., VWC No. 144-17-57 (Feb. 26, 1992)). In Gardner, the Commission then went
on to find that a minimally intrusive assessment of a claimant’s potential to return to work could
be appropriate in certain circumstances despite a claimant’s disability. Id. For instance, the
Commission found that where the claimant had been on an open award for temporary total
disability for an injury that occurred over four years ago, and “[w]here, as in the present case, the
employer continues to pay wage loss indemnity benefits on a regular basis, the employer has a
right to minimally intrusive evaluations of the employee in order to attempt [to] relieve its
burden of future compensation.” Id. Specifically, the Commission found that for such a disabled
employee, “the employer is entitled to have the benefit of advice from a vocational consultant
who has met with and assessed the employee regarding her potential for returning to work.” Id.The Commission described this assessment as “meeting with and providing background
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information to a vocational consultant.” Id. However, the Commission in Gardner clearly
distinguished an assessment from “job search or [other] vocational rehabilitation efforts.” Id.LKQ relies on the Commission’s decision in Gardner, and argues that, just as the disabled
employee in Gardner unjustifiably failed to cooperate with an assessment, claimant here has
likewise unjustifiably failed to cooperate with an assessment. See id.What LKQ construes as a mere assessment of claimant here is what LKQ described as
the “vocational appointment” that was scheduled for July 28, 2021. LKQ, through its vocational
consultant, Carlos Encinas, had instructed claimant to attend that appointment, and because
claimant refused to do so until certain conditions were met, LKQ contends that claimant
unjustifiably refused vocational rehabilitation services. This Court is, of course, not bound in
any way by the Commission’s decision in Gardner although we can consider it as persuasive
authority. Anderson, 65 Va. App. at 365 n.4 (“We note that, although they are often persuasive,
‘decisions [of the Commission] are not binding authority on this Court.’” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)). However, if LKQ were correct that the “vocational appointment” here
resembled the assessment that was at issue in Gardner, then LKQ would have a more persuasive
argument. See Linda D. Slough, Virginia Practice Series: Virginia Workers’ Compensation
§ 21:7 (2022-2023 ed.) (“[A] claimant is required to meet with the vocational rehabilitation
counselor to allow [an] assessment of the claimant’s potential for returning to work.”).
Nevertheless, under the Commission’s own standard in Gardner (upon which LKQ relies), the
“vocational appointment” at issue here was not a mere assessment.
The assessment described in Gardner explicitly excluded requirements that a claimant
engage in “job search” efforts, yet those efforts are exactly what LKQ demanded here. In his
July 22, 2021 letter, Encinas stated that the purpose of the “vocational appointment” was to
“discuss the job search process,” during which Encinas would “inform” claimant “regarding any
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job interviews.” In addition, Encinas would “assist [claimant] in completing job application[s],
if appropriate and whenever possible.” Encinas also asked that claimant bring a copy of his
employment history going back “no more than 10-15 years.”
The July 22, 2021 letter plainly communicates an intent to have claimant engage in job
search efforts. This was not a minimally intrusive assessment of claimant’s work capacity or
potential to return to work, and it was not a simple attempt to obtain claimant’s background
information. The letter never states that the purpose of the appointment is to assess claimant’s
potential to return to work. Instead, the stated purpose is to “discuss the job search process.” On
its face, the letter communicates an attempt to quickly begin vocational rehabilitation efforts and
find claimant a job while he was still totally disabled—and not medically released to return to
work.
A majority of the Commission, as factfinder, found that requiring claimant to engage in
job search efforts was the purpose of the vocational appointment: “Encinas’ letters described
more than an assessment. He intended to begin job search services.” In addition, the
Commission found that claimant (still being totally disabled) had not “failed to cooperate with
vocational rehabilitation without justification.” The Commission’s findings of fact are
conclusive and binding upon us if credible evidence exists in the record to support those
findings. McCaskey, 225 Va. at 415; Anderson, 65 Va. App. at 362. Furthermore, the
Commission found that LKQ “failed to meet [its] burden to prove vocational rehabilitation was
appropriate for the claimant.” Indeed, the job search services offered here were not appropriate
for claimant because, according to the evidence in the record on appeal before us and according
to the Commission, as factfinder, he was totally disabled at the time the services were offered.
See Code § 65.2-603(A)(3); see also Slough, supra, § 21:7 (“A claimant cannot be required to
engage in job search efforts until he is released to return to work.”).
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The evidence in the record, and the inferences drawn by the Commission therefrom, support
the Commission’s finding of fact that claimant was not medically permitted to return to work at the
time LKQ began its vocational rehabilitation efforts. This evidence, including the July 22, 2021
letter, further supports the Commission’s finding of fact that LKQ sought to “begin job search
services” for claimant even though he was not permitted to return to work. Consequently, we hold
that the Commission did not err in holding that claimant did not unjustifiably refuse vocational
rehabilitation services. See Jeffreys, 297 Va. at 87.3
III. CONCLUSION
In short, LKQ has provided no evidence in the record that is before us on appeal that
shows that claimant is no longer totally disabled. LKQ, which was the moving party before the
Commission and is now the appellant before this Court, bore the burden to show that claimant
was no longer entitled to disability benefits, but did not provide such medical evidence in the
record, and even acknowledged that “at the time vocational rehabilitation efforts were
commenced, [claimant] did not have medical authorization to return to work.” Consequently, we
must conclude (as did the Commission) that claimant is still totally disabled. Furthermore, even
though LKQ contends that it merely offered a vocational assessment that is appropriate for a
totally disabled claimant, we hold that the Commission did not err in rejecting LKQ’s claim that
it merely offered a vocational assessment because LKQ actually asked the totally disabled
claimant, who had not been medically released to return to work, to work with LKQ’s job search
efforts for him. LKQ asked claimant to do much more than be assessed for what he was able to
do; rather, LKQ also asked claimant to involve himself with job interviews and job applications,
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LKQ’s second assignment of error argued that the Commission erred in reinstating
claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. This argument relies on the premise that claimant
unjustifiably refused vocational rehabilitation, and for the reasons stated supra, this premise is
incorrect. Consequently, LKQ’s second assignment of error also necessarily fails.
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compile 10-15 years of job history, and engage in a job search process—even though, according
to the record before us, claimant was still totally disabled as he had not been medically released
to return to work. The Commission did not err in finding that these requests in their totality go
beyond a mere assessment. Consequently, for all these reasons, we do not disturb the decision of
the Workers’ Compensation Commission.
Affirmed.
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