Paris C. Graves v. Roanoke City Department of Social Services ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Huff, Athey and Fulton
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Lexington, Virginia
PARIS C. GRAVES
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1339-22-3 JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
NOVEMBER 8, 2023
ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
J. Christopher Clemens, Judge
John S. Koehler (Ruth Blaskis; The Law Office of James Steele; The
Law Office of Ruth Blaskis, on brief), for appellant.
Jennifer L. Crook, Assistant City Attorney (Timothy R. Spencer,
City Attorney; Lalita Brim-Poindexter, Guardian ad litem for the
minor child; Poindexter Law, LLC, on brief), for appellee.
Paris C. Graves (“mother”) appeals the circuit court’s order terminating her parental rights
under Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). She argues that the circuit court erred in finding the evidence
sufficient to support termination under those statutory sections and in finding that termination was
in the child’s best interests. Finding no error, this Court affirms the circuit court’s judgment.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
BACKGROUND1
On appeal from a termination of parental rights, this Court “review[s] the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party prevailing in the circuit court”—here, the Roanoke City
Department of Social Services (“the Department”). Yafi v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69
Va. App. 539, 550-51 (2018) (quoting Thach v. Arlington Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 63
Va. App. 157, 168 (2014)).
Mother is the biological parent of K.G., who is the subject of this appeal.2 K.G. was born
in August 2020 in North Carolina; mother intentionally delivered K.G. in North Carolina so that
the Department could not “take [K.G.] away from her.” Mother has an extensive history with the
Department, having been in foster care through the Department herself from age fourteen until
she aged out at eighteen. The Department first became involved with K.G. following a
September 15, 2020 report of domestic violence between mother and mother’s stepfather, John
Blaney (“stepfather”). According to the Department’s records there were several previous
reports of domestic violence involving mother, she had a history of being “aggressive and
impulsive[,]” and had been diagnosed with “Mood Disorder—NOS and Oppositional Defiant
Disorder.” In 2016, the Department received a report that mother had left two of her infant
children—J.S.G. and Z.G., who were fourteen months and three months old, respectively—home
alone for several hours without supervision. After investigating the report, the Department
determined that the “threat of harm [to the children was] consistent with a Level One finding of
1
The record in this case was sealed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates unsealing
relevant portions of the record to resolve the issues mother has raised. “To the extent that this
opinion mentions facts found in the sealed record, we unseal only those specific facts, finding
them relevant to the decision in this case. The remainder of the previously sealed record remains
sealed.” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1 (2017).
2
Mother has five other children who are neither the subject of this appeal nor in her
custody. However, this Court refers to all of mother’s children, including K.G., by their initials
to protect their privacy.
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Physical Neglect—Inadequate Supervision.” The City of Roanoke Juvenile and Domestic
Relations District Court (“the JDR court”) subsequently terminated mother’s parental rights to
J.S.G., and he was adopted out of foster care. A paternal relative received custody of Z.G.
In 2017, mother gave birth to her third child, J.J.G., and agreed to place J.J.G. with
mother’s aunt, Sheila Mike, who subsequently received custody. In 2019, the Department again
became involved with mother after she gave birth to her fourth child, C.G. Mother signed a
safety plan, placing C.G. with Mike. After a domestic violence incident between mother and
Mike, the Department obtained an emergency removal order and C.G. entered foster care. The
incident resulted in the Department making a finding of Level One Physical Neglect against
mother. The JDR court subsequently terminated mother’s parental rights to both C.G. and J.J.G.
On September 15, 2020, approximately two months after K.G.’s birth, the police and the
Department responded to a domestic violence incident between mother and stepfather. Mother
had allegedly spit on stepfather who then told mother to leave his home or he would contact
child protective services and “get her baby taken away from her.” After mother and K.G. left the
home, the Department unsuccessfully attempted to locate them. Two days later, the Department
met mother at her workplace. Mother denied that the incident with stepfather had occurred and
refused to say where K.G. was located. Mother told the Department that she purposely birthed
K.G. out-of-state so that the Department could not find and take K.G. away from her. Based on
this incident, the Department made Level One Physical Neglect findings against mother.
On September 18, 2020, three days after the incident with stepfather and the day after the
Department went to mother’s work, mother brought K.G. to the Department as requested. The
JDR court entered emergency and preliminary removal orders and awarded temporary legal
custody of K.G. to the Department. The Department placed K.G. with Mike, who still had
custody of K.G.’s older half-sibling. The JDR court then adjudicated that K.G. was abused or
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neglected, or at risk of being abused or neglected, and subsequently entered a dispositional order,
which mother did not appeal.
Given mother’s “history with the Department” and the recent involuntary termination of
her parental rights to two of her children, the Department did not require mother “to work on any
services.” The Department’s foster care goal was to return K.G. to her putative father’s home,
not to mother’s care. While mother was not required to complete services, the Department
provided her options for participating in counseling, undergoing a mental wellness assessment,
and obtaining substance abuse treatment at a family partnership meeting. When the Department
inquired about mother’s current address, she refused to provide it and indicated that she “really
didn’t have any desire to work with the Department.”
Nonetheless, the Department offered mother weekly visitation with K.G. At the first
scheduled visit, mother was initially present, but K.G. arrived 30 minutes late, resulting in
mother leaving before K.G.’s arrival because she thought the visit was limited to 30 minutes.
The Department scheduled another visit approximately six weeks later. When the Department
went to pick up K.G., no one was home. The Department attempted to reschedule the visit again,
but mother did not return the Department’s calls. Accordingly, no visitations occurred between
mother and K.G. The Department had no contact with mother for more than one year after K.G.
entered foster care.
In November 2021, mother gave birth to her sixth child, M.M. The Department filed a
petition for emergency removal because M.M. was born exposed to THC. Following M.M.’s
removal, and in contrast to her behavior concerning K.G., mother maintained contact with the
Department while M.M. was in foster care. She provided the Department with a copy of her lease
and participated in parenting classes. Mother claimed that she also went to her intake appointment
with Blue Ridge Behavioral Health. The Department reported that mother was “actively working
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the service plan” with respect to M.M. until the JDR court awarded custody of M.M. to a relative.
On February 7, 2022, the JDR court terminated mother’s parental rights to K.G. Mother appealed
that ruling to the circuit court.
At the circuit court hearing, the Department recommended termination of mother’s parental
rights to K.G., who was two years old at that time. The Department emphasized mother’s history
with the Department, including the removal and termination of her parental rights to her other
children. The Department also stressed mother’s lack of cooperation and involvement regarding
K.G.’s case. And although mother had maintained contact with the Department regarding her
younger child, M.M., she did not ask the Department about K.G. or participate in any visitation with
K.G. that the Department had attempted to facilitate.
The Department then presented evidence that K.G. was doing “wonderfully” in her current
placement and had developed a “close bond” with her older half-brother in the home. K.G. attended
daycare and was “meeting her milestones.”
Mother testified about her housing and employment situation. Mother had to move out
“temporarily” from her apartment following a grease fire. Consequently, for the two months before
the circuit court hearing, mother had been living with the same relative who had custody of M.M.
Mother further testified that she had been working at the same job for approximately five months.
The Department had not required mother “to do anything,” and she admittedly did not maintain
“direct contact” with the Department regarding K.G. Despite the lack of visits through the
Department, mother had used FaceTime to see K.G. because mother had maintained contact with
Mike, with whom K.G. lived. Mother believed that Mike intended to adopt K.G. so mother would
be able to see K.G. “any time.” On cross-examination, mother admitted that her contact with K.G.
had been “really iffy” and the last time she had contacted K.G. on FaceTime was approximately
four or five months earlier.
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After hearing all the evidence and arguments, the circuit court terminated mother’s parental
rights under Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). The circuit court found it was in K.G.’s best interests
to terminate mother’s parental rights and that the conditions resulting in the prior abuse or neglect
are unlikely to be substantially corrected or eliminated, despite reasonable efforts of the
Department. Mother appeals.
ANALYSIS
“‘On review of a trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights, we
presume the trial court “thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory
requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.”’” Joyce v.
Botetourt Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 75 Va. App. 690, 699 (2022) (quoting Norfolk Div. of Soc.
Servs. v. Hardy, 42 Va. App. 546, 552 (2004)). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore
tenus, its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.” Simms v. Alexandria Dep’t of Cmty. & Hum. Servs.,
74 Va. App. 447, 470 (2022) (quoting Fauquier Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway,
59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011)).
Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to K.G. under Code
§ 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). She contends that the Department provided her with no services and
“failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the circumstances” surrounding the
termination of her parental rights to her other children still existed. In addition, mother alleges
that the Department failed to offer “any evidence of an allegation” of abuse or neglect of K.G.
She claims that the Department’s evidence of the previous termination of her parental rights to
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other children was insufficient, standing alone, to support the termination of her parental rights to
K.G. under Code § 16.1-283(B).3
Code § 16.1-283(B) permits a court to terminate a parent’s parental rights if:
1. The neglect or abuse suffered by such child presented a serious
and substantial threat to his life, health or development; and
2. It is not reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in
such neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated
so as to allow the child’s safe return to his parent or parents within
a reasonable period of time. In making this determination, the
court shall take into consideration the efforts made to rehabilitate
the parent or parents by any public or private social, medical,
mental health or other rehabilitative agencies prior to the child’s
initial placement in foster care.
Mother acknowledges that the Department did not have to offer her any services under
Code § 16.1-283(B). “Subsection B does not create specific time frames, ‘nor does it mandate
that a public or private agency provide any services to a parent after the child enters foster care.’”
Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 269 (2005) (quoting Kate D. O’Leary,
Termination of Parental Rights in Virginia, 17 J. Civ. Litig. 17 (2005)).
The JDR court adjudicated K.G. as an abused or neglected child under Code § 16.1-228,
as a child whose parent “creates or inflicts, threatens to create or inflict, or allows to be created
or inflicted upon such child a physical or mental injury by other than accidental means, or creates
a substantial risk of death, disfigurement or impairment of bodily or mental functions.” The JDR
court also adjudicated that K.G. was “at risk of being abused or neglected by a parent or
3
At the beginning of the circuit court hearing, the Department moved to amend its
petition requesting the termination of mother’s parental rights to add that it was seeking
termination under Code § 16.1-283(E)(i), which provides that a parent’s parental rights may be
terminated “if the court finds, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best
interests of the child and that (i) the residual parental rights of the parent regarding a sibling of
the child have previously been involuntarily terminated . . . .” The circuit court denied the
Department’s motion, finding the Department had failed to provide advance notice to mother of
the amendment.
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custodian who has been adjudicated as having abused or neglected another child in the care of
the parent or custodian.” The JDR court subsequently entered a dispositional order, which
mother did not appeal.
“[T]he statutory definitions of an abused or neglected child do not require proof of actual
harm or impairment having been experienced by the child. The term ‘substantial risk’ speaks in
futuro . . . .” C. Farrell v. Warren Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 416 (2012)
(quoting Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1183 (1991)). Here, the
evidence proved that mother had an extensive history with the Department and that the
Department removed K.G. only after a domestic violence incident between mother and
stepfather. The Department knew this was not the first incident of domestic violence involving
mother. When the Department initiated its investigation, it could not find mother or K.G. And
even after the Department located mother, she refused to reveal K.G.’s whereabouts. Mother
reported that she intentionally gave birth to the child in North Carolina so that the Department
could not “take [K.G.] away from her.” It was not until the day after the Department went to
mother’s work that she finally brought K.G. to the Department’s offices. Although K.G. was
physically unharmed she was at substantial risk of harm, especially considering mother’s history
with the Department and with her other children, including previous founded dispositions of
abuse and neglect and Level I dispositions for physical neglect.
“Virginia’s jurisprudence recognizes that ‘past actions and relationships over a
meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Id. at
425 (quoting Winfield v. Urquhart, 25 Va. App. 688, 695-96 (1997)); see also Geouge v.
Traylor, 68 Va. App. 343, 375 (2017). “[S]ubsection (B) cases start with the abused or neglected
finding and require the trial court to make a judgment about a child’s best interest based on that
finding.” C. Farrell, 59 Va. App. at 409.
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The record supports the circuit court’s finding that it was in K.G.’s best interests to
terminate mother’s parental rights. The circuit court received evidence that K.G. was removed
from mother’s care following a report of domestic violence and that the Department was aware
of previous incidents of domestic violence involving mother. The circuit court also considered
that the Department did not require mother to complete services because of the recent
termination of mother’s parental rights as to her other children. Moreover, following K.G.’s
removal, mother had not contacted the Department for more than one year to inquire about K.G.
While mother indicated that she had contacted K.G. with permission of her custodian, she also
admitted this contact had been “iffy” and only by FaceTime. Meanwhile, K.G. was doing well in
foster care and had developed a bond with her older sibling. The circuit court further considered
evidence of mother’s strikingly different conduct following M.M.’s removal. She maintained
contact with the Department, completed an intake assessment with local mental health services,
and provided the Department with updated contact information, all in order to regain custody of
M.M. Mother made no similar efforts for K.G. or for any of her other children’s previous cases.
At the time of the circuit court hearing, K.G. had been in foster care for approximately
two years—almost her entire life. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a
lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming
his responsibilities.” Simms, 74 Va. App. at 463 (quoting Harrison v. Tazewell Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 162 (2004) (internal quotation omitted)). Based on this record, the
circuit court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B).
“When a lower court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, this Court need only
determine whether any of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment.” Castillo v.
Loudoun Cnty. Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 574 n.9 (2018); see also Fields v.
Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8 (2005) (the Court affirmed termination of
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parental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination
of parental rights pursuant to another subsection). Accordingly, having found that the circuit
court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B), this Court
need not reach the question of whether mother’s parental rights also should have been terminated
under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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