Tracy Lynn Cline v. City of Roanoke Department of Social Services ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Athey, Callins and Frucci
Argued at Salem, Virginia
TRACY LYNN CLINE
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1963-23-3 JUDGE STEVEN C. FRUCCI
OCTOBER 29, 2024
CITY OF ROANOKE DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
David B. Carson, Judge
John S. Koehler (Ruth Blaskis; The Law Office of James Steele,
PLLC; The Law Office of Ruth Blaskis, on brief), for appellant.
James P. Cargill, Guardian ad litem for the minor child (Timothy R.
Spencer, City Attorney; Jennifer L. Crook, Assistant City Attorney;
James P. Cargill, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Tracy Lynn Cline (“mother”) appeals the order of the circuit court terminating her
parental rights to her minor child, D.R., under Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), and (C)(2) and
approving the foster care goal of adoption. Mother contends that the circuit court erred in
finding sufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights and that adoption was not in the best
interests of D.R. For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court.
BACKGROUND1
“On appeal, ‘we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below, in this case the Department.’” Joyce v. Botetourt Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
1
The record in this case was sealed. We unseal only the facts stated in this opinion to
resolve the issues presented. Brown v. Virginia, 302 Va. 234, 240 n.2 (2023). The rest of the
record remains sealed.
Servs., 75 Va. App. 690, 695 (2022) (quoting Farrell v. Warren Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59
Va. App. 375, 386 (2012)). So viewed, the evidence established the following relevant facts.
Mother and Timothy Alan Redman (“father”)2 are the biological parents of D.R. D.R. is
sixteen years old and has been diagnosed with Down syndrome, autism, and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder; he is predominantly nonverbal.
I. D.R.’s First Placement in Foster Care
The Roanoke City Department of Social Services (the “Department”) first became
involved with the family in 2011, when D.R. was three years old, due to concerns about mother’s
mental health, alcohol abuse, and potential physical abuse of D.R. because of visible bruises and
scratches on his body. The Department began providing mother with several services in 2012 to
prevent removal, including case management, in-home care, mental health support and
counseling; mother “minimal[ly] compli[ed]” with the services the Department recommended.
D.R. entered foster care for the first time in 2013 because mother reported “being overwhelmed
with caring for [D.R.]” and was “in a constant state of crisis,” which created a hostile
environment for D.R. While D.R. was in foster care, the Department assisted mother in finding
safe and stable housing. Mother regained custody of D.R. about five months later “with her
agreement to be compliant and continue services.”
II. D.R.’s Second Placement in Foster Care
The Department intervened again in 2017, after it received a physical abuse report
regarding the strangulation of D.R. by mother’s longtime boyfriend (hereinafter referred to as
“Jasper”) with whom she had a history of domestic violence. D.R. had visible marks on his
neck. After an investigation, the Department made a disposition of “founded” for level-two
2
Father separately appealed the termination of his parental rights. See Redman v. City of
Roanoke Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 1913-23-3.
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physical abuse against Jasper, and he was not permitted contact with D.R. until he completed
services to address the ongoing domestic violence concerns. Shortly after the strangulation
incident, D.R. was found walking alone on the street in the early morning. D.R. was reportedly
knocking on doors and shining a flashlight into houses. He was dressed in jeans that were
stained, had no shoes on, and had dirt on his feet, hands, and face. D.R. was unable to identify
himself and no reports of a missing child had come in, so he was transported to the Roanoke City
Police Department. Because there was insufficient information to locate D.R.’s caregivers or to
determine his identity, the Department decided to take him into emergency custody.
Eventually, upon returning to the Department’s office, a worker recognized D.R. and
assisted in identifying him. The police located mother at Jasper’s house where mother and
Jasper had been sleeping when D.R. left the home. Mother and Jasper stated they were unaware
that D.R. should not be in contact with Jasper despite the previous founded complaint for
physical abuse. Because of concerns over D.R.’s supervision and Jasper’s continued
involvement in his life, D.R. remained in foster care.
The Department again provided mother with services such as mental health counseling
and medication management in order to return D.R. home to her. Mother assured the
Department that she was no longer having contact with Jasper, and she was able to have
weekend visitations with D.R. because of her progress. However, during one of the weekend
visits, Jasper was found to be in the house with D.R. This resulted in D.R. being removed from
the visit and mother’s visitations were supervised at D.R.’s residential placement. Mother
maintained regular visits, participated in services, obtained housing, achieved financial stability,
and ultimately regained custody in July 2019, after D.R. had been in foster care for two years.
One of the conditions of the reunification was that D.R. have no contact with Jasper.
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III. D.R.’s Third Placement in Foster Care
Approximately seven months after D.R. returned home, the Department received a report
that mother and Jasper had a physical altercation at her home while D.R. was present. The
Department determined that mother had violated the Department’s requirement that prohibited
contact between D.R. and Jasper, so D.R. entered foster care for a third time in February 2020.
Thereafter, the Department filed a foster care plan in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
District Court of Roanoke City (“JDR court”) with the primary goal of relative placement and
the concurrent goal of adoption. The JDR court approved the plan and ordered D.R. to remain in
foster care. The Department later changed the goal to adoption and petitioned for termination of
mother’s parental rights. The JDR court approved the change and terminated mother’s parental
rights. Mother timely appealed to the circuit court, and, after a hearing, the circuit court
overturned the JDR court’s orders, and directed the Department to return D.R. to mother’s
custody. D.R. returned to mother’s care in June 2021.
IV. D.R.’s Fourth Placement in Foster Care
In late 2021, father moved in with mother and D.R. following his release from
incarceration. While living together, father and mother used methamphetamine. Mother kicked
father out of her home near the end of 2021. In January 2022, the Department received a report
of domestic abuse between mother and the biological father of her adult son. D.R., then fourteen
years old, was present in the house during the incident.
In February 2022, the Department asked mother to complete a hair-follicle drug screen,
but she refused. The JDR court later ordered her to submit to the screening, which was positive
for methamphetamine and cocaine. The Department immediately removed D.R. from mother’s
care, for the fourth time, based on the results of her drug test and her lengthy history with the
Department.
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The JDR court entered emergency and preliminary removal orders and adjudicated that
D.R. had been, or was at risk of being, abused or neglected. The Department then filed a foster
care plan with the primary goal of relative placement and a concurrent goal of adoption, which
the JDR court approved, and the circuit court affirmed. This Court upheld the dispositional order
on appeal in a consolidated opinion addressing mother and father’s appeals. See Redman v.
Roanoke City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Nos. 0098-23-3, 0156-23-3, 2024 Va. App. LEXIS 265 (May
14, 2024). The JDR court later entered orders approving the Department’s permanent foster care
goal of adoption and terminating mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed the JDR court’s
orders to the circuit court.
At the circuit court hearing, Dr. Klaire Mundy, a licensed psychologist, testified that she
had conducted two parental capacity evaluations on mother, one in 2018, and another in 2022.
Mother acknowledged to Dr. Mundy that she had discontinued Department-required services
after D.R. returned to her care. Mother also admitted to Dr. Mundy that D.R. had been exposed
to domestic violence in her home.
Dr. Mundy reported that mother had a history of trauma, which led “to a risk of chronic
illness, social problems, increased risk for toxic relationships, [and] increased risk for poor
quality of life.” Indeed, Dr. Mundy opined that mother had a “very poor pattern of engaging in
relationships that” caused harm to both her and D.R. Moreover, Dr. Mundy found that although
mother loved D.R., she had been “unsuccessful in incorporating the tools that she ha[d] been
taught through counseling.” Dr. Mundy concluded that mother “ha[d] not taken advantage of all
the things that she has had in front of her to get to the rehabilitative place that she needs to be to
keep herself and [D.R.] secure.”
The Department also offered testimony that D.R. was doing “really well” while in foster
care and had made “a tremendous amount of progress” in the months preceding the circuit court
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hearing. D.R. had demonstrated growth in schooling, and his foster parent was thoroughly
engaged in D.R.’s services. During mother’s testimony, she admitted that she was involved in a
physical altercation in her home in January 2022, while D.R. was present. Mother also
acknowledged that she had used methamphetamine in 2021.
After considering the evidence and arguments, the circuit court terminated mother’s
parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), and (C)(2), and it approved the foster care goal
of adoption. Mother appeals.
Mother argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights because the
Department failed to prove that termination was in D.R.’s best interest. Mother contends that the
Department did not prove that: she failed to remedy the conditions that led to D.R.’s foster care
placement; D.R. suffered abuse and neglect that substantially created a serious and substantial
threat to his life, health, and development; she failed to maintain contact with D.R. She further
argues that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite D.R. with her.
ANALYSIS
“In matters of a child’s welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making
the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child’s best interests.” Castillo v. Loudoun Cnty.
Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of
Hum. Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991)). “On review of a trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights, we presume the trial court ‘thoroughly weighed all the evidence,
considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best
interests.’” Joyce, 75 Va. App. at 699 (quoting Norfolk Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Hardy, 42 Va. App.
546, 552 (2004)). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled
to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to
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support it.” Simms v. Alexandria Dep’t of Cmty. & Hum. Servs., 74 Va. App. 447, 470 (2022)
(quoting Fauquier Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011)).
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) authorizes a court to terminate parental rights if:
The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or
unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months
from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy
substantially the conditions which led to or required continuation
of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the
reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health
or other rehabilitative agencies to such end.
“[S]ubsection C termination decisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that
created the original danger to the child, but on the demonstrated failure of the parent to make
reasonable changes.” Yafi v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va. App. 539, 552 (2018) (quoting
Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 271 (2005)). “Considerably more
‘retrospective in nature,’ subsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent has been
unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which [s]he has been offered
rehabilitation services.” Toms, 46 Va. App. at 271 (quoting City of Newport News Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. v. Winslow, 40 Va. App. 556, 562 (2003)).
Mother argues the record contains evidence that she was willing to remedy the
circumstances leading to D.R.’s placement in foster care. She notes that she engaged in therapy and
medication management since the Department became involved with the family. Mother also
highlights that, although not required by the Department, she participated in group therapy and put
her name on a waiting list for individual therapy following D.R.’s fourth removal from her care.
We are unpersuaded by mother’s argument. Since D.R. first entered foster care in 2013, the
Department provided mother with numerous services, including referrals for outpatient therapy,
case management, medication management, and parenting classes. Although mother initially
engaged in those services, she did not continue to do so after the Department returned D.R. to her
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care. Moreover, despite mother’s engagement in some services over the years, she continued to
engage in negative relationships that exposed D.R. “to violence and domestic violence and drug
use.” Indeed, while D.R. was in mother’s care, mother was involved in several domestic violence
incidents in D.R.’s presence and she had used illegal narcotics. Although mother claims that she
had engaged in therapy after D.R.’s most recent removal, the record reflects that she already had
significantly more than a “reasonable period of time” to remedy the conditions that led to D.R.’s
removal.
The record also contains evidence that D.R. was thriving in foster care. D.R. was in foster
care for a total of three years and ten months for the first three removals. Since the most recent
removal, D.R. had been in care for 13 months at the time of the circuit court’s hearing. A child
languishing in foster care is left with the prospect that he or she has but one shot at a positive and
productive childhood, and “[i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy
period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her]
responsibilities.” Simms, 74 Va. App. at 463 (quoting Harrison v. Tazewell Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 42 Va. App. 149, 162 (2004)). Based on this record, the circuit court’s termination of
mother’s parental rights is not “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Id. at 470 (quoting
Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. at 190). 3
3
“When a lower court’s judgment is made on alternative grounds, this Court need only
determine whether any of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgment.” Castillo, 68
Va. App. at 574 n.9; see also Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8
(2005) (the Court affirmed termination of parental rights under one subsection of Code
§ 16.1-283 and did not need to address termination of parental rights pursuant to another
subsection). Given our conclusion that the circuit court did not err in terminating mother’s
parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), we do not address whether it properly relied on
Code § 16.1-283(B) or (C)(1) when it terminated mother’s parental rights.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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