Tre'don Marquise Stuckey, s/k/a Tredon Marquise Stuckey v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Beales, Causey and Senior Judge Petty
TRE’DON MARQUISE STUCKEY, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS
TREDON MARQUISE STUCKEY
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 0636-23-1 PER CURIAM
OCTOBER 15, 2024
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND
COUNTY OF JAMES CITY
Holly B. Smith, Judge
(Charles E. Haden, on brief), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Lucille M. Wall, Assistant
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court of the City of Williamsburg and James City
County convicted Tre’don Marquise Stuckey of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. On appeal, Stuckey argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously
holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been
authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned,
extended, modified, or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b).
BACKGROUND
“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, [as] the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v.
Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
(2016)). “This principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of
the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth
and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 463, 467-68
(2015) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980)).
Sheila Cook, a housekeeper at the Super Inn Williamsburg, testified at trial that on March
11, 2022, she “was stripping the beds” in Room 204 when she “happened to look down in the floor
and there was a gun.” She recalled that the firearm “was between the bed and the wall where the
window is at,” and she stated that she did not touch the firearm. Cook then notified her boss,
Yogesh Trivedi, about the firearm.
Trivedi, the manager of the Super Inn Williamsburg, testified at trial that Cook alerted him
to the firearm, which he saw “near next to the bed on the floor.” Trivedi then called the police.
After the police were called but before they had arrived, Stuckey came running up the stairs of the
motel from the direction of a nearby Hardee’s and Wawa. Trivedi recounted that Stuckey told him
to open the door to Room 204 because he had forgotten something inside. Trivedi informed
Stuckey, “I already called the officer. You have to wait.” When Trivedi asked Stuckey what he had
left in the room, Stuckey replied, “It’s legal.” When asked to clarify, Stuckey told Trivedi that the
item was a firearm. Trivedi again called the police and he spoke with Officer Briana Sutton of the
James City County Police Department. Trivedi noted that Stuckey left the motel before Officer
Sutton arrived. During cross-examination, Trivedi testified that a woman had checked into Room
204 around 2:20 a.m. the night before while a second individual remained in the car. Counsel for
Stuckey introduced into evidence a receipt showing that Stuckey’s acquaintance, Hannah Paige
LaRue, had rented Room 204 for two guests.
Officer Sutton testified at trial that while she was on the phone with Trivedi, she could “hear
a male shouting” and “talking about a gun and getting into a room.” When Officer Sutton arrived at
-2-
the motel after Stuckey had already left, she went into Room 204 where she found a firearm on the
floor. She reviewed video surveillance footage from the motel and, after recognizing Stuckey based
on her prior dealings with him, she secured a warrant for his arrest for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. At trial, the Commonwealth presented still photographs from the surveillance
footage showing Stuckey at the motel, and it also introduced into evidence photographs of the
firearm found in Room 204. Officer Sutton further testified that after Stuckey’s arrest on March 25,
2022, she interviewed him at the law enforcement center. She recalled that during the interview,
Stuckey admitted to being a felon. Although he initially denied being at the motel on the morning
in question, once Officer Sutton alerted him to the surveillance footage, Stuckey admitted to being
at the motel that morning. Stuckey acknowledged that he had spoken to a man at the motel, but he
maintained that he was looking for a friend, and he denied ever being in physical possession of a
firearm. At trial, the parties stipulated that Stuckey told Officer Sutton that he knew he was not
supposed to have a firearm because he was a convicted felon.
After the Commonwealth presented its evidence, Stuckey’s counsel moved to strike, stating,
“We’re not going to present any evidence. So I guess I could kind of incorporate everything with
what I’m going to argue on a motion to strike.” Counsel for Stuckey argued that the
Commonwealth presented “no evidence he [Stuckey] was ever in that room, and they’ve got no
evidence that he was ever having exercising [sic] dominion and control over this firearm that was
found there.” The trial court convicted Stuckey of the charged offense. The trial judge noted that
Cook found the firearm “not hidden, but between -- on the floor in between the bed and the wall in a
about two-feet space.” She emphasized that Stuckey “initially -- to an officer that he knows --
denied being at the hotel at all and then later admitted he was there in the morning and admitted that
he spoke with Mr. Trivedi, not necessarily calling him by name, but by a gentleman there.” The
trial judge then concluded,
-3-
I think that the Commonwealth has met out its burden that on March
11th this gentleman did knowingly and intentionally possess, by
leaving it in a room, um, and wanting to get that back, a firearm, after
being convicted of a felony.
So I do so find the evidence sufficient and enter a finding
today.
Stuckey appeals to this Court.
ANALYSIS
On appeal to this Court, Stuckey contends, “The trial court erred in denying Stuckey’s
motion to strike the charge of possession of a firearm by a non-violent felon in violation of Va.
Code § 18.2-308.2, where the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to prove that Stuckey possessed
the firearm or exercised dominion and control over the firearm.” Stuckey argues that
the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to exclude the reasonable
hypothesis of innocence that someone else, possibly Hannah Paige
LaRue or the unidentified male accompanying her to the motel
room, inadvertently left the firearm in the motel room and that
Stuckey went to the motel room on behalf of that person to try to
retrieve the firearm but never actually succeeded in retrieving or
possessing the firearm.
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting
Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the
relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting
Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the
conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion
-4-
might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72
Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).
“A conviction for the unlawful possession of a firearm can be supported exclusively by
evidence of constructive possession; evidence of actual possession is not necessary.” Smallwood
v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625, 630 (2009) (quoting Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144,
148 (2008)). “Establishing constructive possession requires proof ‘that the defendant was aware
of both the presence and character of the [item] and that it was subject to his dominion and
control.’” Watts v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 217, 232-33 (2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 476 (1984)). The Commonwealth is not
required to prove that the defendant’s possession was exclusive. Smallwood, 278 Va. at 630.
“Whether evidence is sufficient to prove constructive possession ‘is largely a factual’ question
and requires circumstantial proof ‘that the defendant was aware of the presence and character of
the [firearm] and that the [firearm] was subject to his dominion and control.’” McArthur v.
Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 352, 368 (2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Smallwood, 278
Va. at 630).
It is well-established that in considering a sufficiency challenge, “[c]ircumstantial
evidence is competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence provided that the
circumstantial evidence is sufficiently convincing.” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512
(2017) (quoting Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 468 (2000)). The Commonwealth
“need exclude only reasonable hypotheses of innocence that ‘flow from the evidence itself, and
not from the imagination’ of the defendant.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 629
(2019) (quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512). “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient,
the combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances . . . may lead a reasonable
mind irresistibly to a conclusion.” Pijor, 294 Va. at 512-13 (alteration in original) (quoting
-5-
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)). “In other words, in a circumstantial
evidence case, such as the case currently before us, the accumulation of various facts and
inferences, each mounting upon the others, may indeed provide sufficient evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt of a defendant’s guilty knowledge of contraband.” Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57
Va. App. 495, 505 (2011) (en banc).
Here, the totality of the evidence supports the trial court’s rejection of Stuckey’s
hypothesis of innocence and its conclusion that the firearm recovered from the motel room had
been under Stuckey’s dominion and control. Cook and Trivedi both testified that they found a
firearm in the recently vacated motel room. Trivedi specifically recalled that Stuckey then ran
up the stairs of the motel and told him to open the door to Room 204 because Stuckey had
forgotten something inside. When asked what had been left in the room, Stuckey informed
Trivedi that the item was a firearm and that “[i]t’s legal.” Furthermore, after hearing that the
police were on their way, Stuckey left the motel before Officer Sutton arrived.1 Officer Sutton
testified that during her post-arrest interview of Stuckey, he initially denied being at the motel on
the morning in question, but he later admitted to being at the motel that morning after learning about
the video surveillance footage. Still photographs from that video surveillance footage showed
Stuckey at the motel. Therefore, considering the totality of the evidence, a rational finder of fact
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Stuckey was aware of the firearm that was found
in the motel room and that the firearm was subject to his dominion and control. Consequently,
we certainly cannot say that no rational factfinder could have found that the evidence was
sufficient to support Stuckey’s conviction.
1
This Court has recognized that “it is today universally conceded that the fact of an
accused’s flight, . . . and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt,
and thus of guilt itself.” Walker v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. App. 737, 749 (2024) (alteration in
original) (quoting Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 102 (1991)).
-6-
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, and we uphold
Stuckey’s conviction.
Affirmed.
-7-