Halifax Regional Long Term Care, Inc., etc. v. Lynnette M. Nelson, etc. ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges AtLee, Friedman and Callins
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
HALIFAX REGIONAL LONG TERM CARE, INC.
T/A THE WOODVIEW
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0685-23-2 JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS
NOVEMBER 26, 2024
LYNNETTE M. NELSON, AS ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF IDA C. DONAWAY, DECEASED
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY
S. Anderson Nelson, Judge
S. Virginia Bondurant Price (Juliet B. Clark; Alicia M. Penn;
Carlyle R. Wimbish, III; Michelle L. Warden; McGuireWoods
LLP; Wimbish Gentile McCray & Roeber, PLLC, on briefs), for
appellant.
L. Steven Emmert (Robert W. Carter, Jr.; Mary Estfanous; Sykes,
Bourdon, Ahern & Levy, PC; Law Offices of Robert W. Carter, Jr.,
on brief), for appellee.
Following Ida C. Donaway’s death at the Woodview nursing home, Lynnette M. Nelson,
Donaway’s daughter and administratrix of Donaway’s estate, sued Halifax Regional Long Term
Care, Inc., the owner and operator of Woodview. Nelson sued Halifax for negligence and
wrongful death, and, after a jury trial, the trial court awarded judgment to Nelson. On appeal,
Halifax argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to set aside the jury’s verdict for
two reasons: first, the evidence did not support damage awards for statutory beneficiaries Craig
Donaway and Christin Dukes; and second, the jury verdict was excessive and speculative in light
of Donaway’s statutory life expectancy. Halifax also contends the trial court erred in denying its
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
motion to bifurcate the survival and wrongful death claims and in allowing testimony from two
witnesses.
We agree with Halifax that the trial court erred when it denied Halifax’s motion to set
aside the jury’s award for statutory beneficiaries Craig and Christin. Therefore, we reverse and
vacate the trial court’s judgment as to Craig and Christin. We affirm, however, the judgment of
the trial court denying Halifax’s motion to set aside the jury verdict based on Donaway’s
statutory life expectancy, denying Halifax’s motion to bifurcate, and in allowing the witness
testimony. In short, we reverse and vacate in part and affirm in part.
BACKGROUND1
Ida C. Donaway was an 86-year-old woman with a lengthy medical history. She suffered
from multiple strokes, a brain bleed that required surgery, Fibrillation (AFib), high blood
pressure, and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). In 2012, Donaway suffered her
third stroke and was transported to the hospital by ambulance. The hospital released Donaway to
Woodview because she had lost the ability to speak, struggled to eat and swallow, was
incontinent, and required skilled nursing care.
At the time of her admission, Woodview staff determined that Donaway was “at high risk
to get pressure ulcers.” Based on Donaway’s status as a high risk patient, and because “she was
immobile [and] incontinent, she should have been turned and repositioned every hour while she
was in the bed, every hour while she was in the chair, and her heels should have always been off
of the bed or off of the chair.” Donaway relied upon Woodview staff to turn and reposition her
to prevent ulcers from developing and deteriorating. Within a month of her admission, however,
Donaway developed pressure ulcers in her heel and sacral area. Donaway’s ulcer in her sacral
1
“In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we view it ‘in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.’” Pergolizzi v.
Bowman, 76 Va. App. 310, 317 n.1 (2022) (quoting Starr v. Starr, 70 Va. App. 486, 488 (2019)).
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area emitted an odor and her temperature and white blood cell count both elevated, all of which
indicated that the ulcer was infected. Because of this, Woodview staff cultured Donaway’s
sacral pressure ulcer, which confirmed that the ulcer was infected.
Woodview referred Donaway to the Halifax Regional Wound Clinic. Although
Donaway’s doctor prescribed her antibiotics, she developed a fever and her ulcers deteriorated.
Donaway’s doctor admitted her to Halifax Regional Hospital for eight days, where she received
treatment. Donaway also had a feeding tube and a Foley catheter while she was in the hospital.
After being discharged from the hospital, Donaway was admitted to Meadowview Terrace,
another nursing home, where she continued to receive treatment, but her ulcers did not heal.
Donaway passed away on May 17, 2013. Her death certificate stated that her immediate
cause of death was “severe” COPD, which she had suffered from for “years.” The death
certificate also stated that “cerebrovascular accident, atrial fibrillation, adult failure to thrive,
dementia, and sacral wounds” contributed to Donaway’s death.
Nelson, Donaway’s daughter, filed a complaint asserting a survival claim for negligence
and a wrongful death claim. Nelson claimed that Woodview staff breached their duties to
prevent and properly treat Donaway’s pressure ulcers and that this failure led to Donaway’s
death. Nelson sought $6,000,000 in damages, plus interest and costs. Halifax filed an answer,
denying Nelson’s allegations.
Halifax also moved to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages at trial. Halifax
argued that Code § 8.01-56 prohibited Nelson from recovering for both Donaway’s personal
injuries and her wrongful death. Halifax contended that because Nelson declined to elect
between the two remedies, “the only way to prevent the prejudicial intermingling of evidence
related to those disparate claims [was] for [the trial court] to bifurcate the issues of liability and
damages at trial.” Halifax argued that if Nelson offered evidence of damages at the same time as
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evidence of liability, the jury would be confused and may award damages that Nelson was not
entitled to recover as a matter of law. Nelson objected to Halifax’s motion. After considering
the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied Halifax’s motion, stating that it did not see any
“potential prejudice.” The trial court held that the jury could be instructed “properly” on the two
claims. Because the matter was complex and the nature of the evidence would be the same in
two trials, the trial court found that trying the matters together would better serve judicial
economy.
Before trial, Woodview admitted to breaching the standard of care, thereby resulting in
Donaway’s development of pressure ulcers in the heel and sacral area. The parties disputed,
however, the cause of Donaway’s death, as well as the proper measure of damages resulting
from the admitted negligence.
During the two-day jury trial, the parties presented evidence about Donaway’s condition.
Nelson offered Connie Lambert, a registered nurse and a former director of nursing at a
long-term care facility, as an expert in pressure ulcer prevention “in a setting like the
Woodview.”2 Halifax objected to Lambert’s testimony, arguing that it was not relevant, given
their admission of negligence. The trial court overruled the objection. Lambert reviewed
Donaway’s records from Woodview and, based on her “education, training, and experience,”
opined that Woodview staff violated the standard of care concerning pressure relief by failing to
regularly turn and reposition Donaway in her bed. Lambert explained that based on Donaway’s
high risk of developing ulcers, the staff should have turned her every hour. After examining
Donaway’s records from her time at Woodview, Lambert discovered that there were 86 different
shifts, each shift being eight hours long, when the staff did not turn or reposition Donaway.
2
Lambert did not care for Donaway at Woodview.
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Nelson also offered the deposition testimony of Judith Anderson, a family nurse
practitioner, who assessed Donaway while she was at Woodview. Halifax objected to the
admission of Anderson’s testimony, again arguing that this testimony was irrelevant because
Halifax had admitted negligence. The trial court overruled the objection. After reviewing the
progress notes that related to her interaction with Donaway, Anderson acknowledged that she
regularly described Donaway’s ulcers as “controlled.” Anderson testified that she based this
assessment “on information provided to [her] by the Woodview’s nurses that there had not been
deterioration of the wound.” Had she been informed that Donaway’s ulcers had deteriorated,
Anderson claimed that she would not have described it as “controlled” in the progress notes.
Anderson also testified that Donaway’s “elevated” white blood cell count and temperature
indicated that Donaway’s ulcers were likely infected.
Nelson testified that she regularly visited her mother at Woodview and never witnessed
Woodview’s staff reposition Donaway. After Donaway entered the hospital, Nelson saw that
when the hospital staff moved Donaway to care for the pressure ulcers, Donaway’s face would
“kind of grimace or cringe.” When Donaway transferred to Meadowview, her ulcers had not
completely healed, and Nelson noticed that Donaway continued to “scrunch her face up and look
like she was in a little bit of pain” when Meadowview staff would turn and reposition her.
Nelson felt “horrible” when she saw her mother in pain and said it “broke [her] heart.” Nelson
described this time as “a roller coaster,” because she wanted to help her mother, but “it didn’t
work.”
Nelson also testified that she was with Donaway when she died and that her mother’s
death “affected [her] life horribly.” Kerry Nelson, Nelson’s husband, testified that he and his
wife felt “[d]isbelief, guilt, sadness, [and] sick” upon Donaway’s death. Nelson introduced no
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evidence regarding the existence of Craig Donaway and Christin Dukes, Donaway’s
grandchildren, or the impact of Donaway’s death on them.3
Dr. Catherine M. Kelso, an expert witness on pressure ulcer development, treatment, and
complications, opined that Woodview’s failure to reposition Donaway led to the development
and deterioration of her sacral pressure ulcer. Kelso explained that the ulcer deteriorated and
“was not permitted to improve because of the repetitive trauma of the unrelieved pressure.”
Once Donaway was admitted to the hospital, her ulcers were “as bad as it could get,” according
to Kelso. Because Donaway’s ulcers were “very severe” and the pain “was a stressor,” Kelso
testified they “trip[ped] off her chronic conditions.” Kelso opined that Donaway’s ulcers were
“interrelated” with the conditions listed on Donaway’s death certificate, as it was “the trauma
from the pressure ulcer that put her through the stress of all the procedures she had to have” to
treat the ulcer, as well as the Foley catheter. As part of her review, Kelso also considered
Virginia’s statutory table of life expectancies in Code § 8.01-419. Using this table, Kelso
testified that Donaway’s life expectancy, as an 86-year-old female when she entered Woodview,
was 6.6 years.
Dr. Jill Allen, who prepared Donaway’s death certificate, testified that Donaway’s cause
of death was severe COPD. Allen listed other medical conditions, including Donaway’s sacral
ulcer, that contributed to her death but testified that the ulcers did not result in the underlying
cause of death.
Both parties offered proposed jury instructions. Relevant to this appeal, Halifax offered a
proposed instruction that should the jury have found that Woodview staff’s negligence was the
3
When asked, Kerry Nelson testified that he did not know the last time Donaway saw her
“grandkids” but that he believed “it would have been some time in February, probably.” In
addition to Craig Donaway and Christin Dukes, who are children of Donaway’s deceased child,
Donaway had three grandchildren through Nelson. At trial, the parties did not explore to whom
Kerry Nelson referred when referencing the “grandkids.”
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proximate cause of Donaway’s injury and death, their verdict should have included damages for
the “sorrow, mental anguish and loss of solace” of Donaway’s statutory beneficiaries.
Donaway’s statutory beneficiaries were her daughters, Nelson and Pam Farlow, and her
grandchildren, Craig Donaway and Christin Dukes. The trial court provided the jury with
Halifax’s instruction.
The jury found in Nelson’s favor and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of
$700,000 to Nelson, $400,000 to Farlow, and $150,000 each to Craig Donaway and Christin
Dukes. The jury also awarded $87,100.17 in medical expenses, and $13,225.30 for funeral and
burial expenses. In addition, the jury awarded pre-judgment interest on the $1,400,000 damage
award, beginning on May 17, 2013, the date of Donaway’s death.
Halifax moved to set aside the jury’s verdict, arguing that the total amount of damages
was excessive. Although the trial court denied Halifax’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict, it
agreed to limit the prejudgment interest to the date Nelson filed the complaint, as opposed to the
date of Donaway’s death. The trial court then entered a final order awarding judgment in the
amount of $1,500,325.47 plus applicable interest. Halifax appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Set Aside the Jury Verdict
Halifax challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion to set aside the jury’s verdict on
two grounds. Halifax contends that the trial court erred because Donaway’s grandchildren and
statutory beneficiaries, Craig and Christin, failed to prove their damages. Halifax also argues
that the jury’s verdict was excessive and speculative.
“It is well-settled that ‘a party who comes before us with a jury verdict approved by the
circuit court “occupies the most favored position known to the law.”’” N. Va. Kitchen, Bath &
Basement, Inc. v. Ellis, 299 Va. 615, 622 (2021) (quoting Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard,
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244 Va. 51, 57 (1992)). “As a general rule, [w]e will not set aside a [circuit] court’s judgment
sustaining a jury verdict unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id.(alterations in original) (quoting Parson v. Miller, 296 Va. 509, 523-24 (2018)). “‘[W]here the
trial court has declined to . . . set aside a jury verdict,’ this Court ‘consider[s] whether the
evidence presented, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, was sufficient to support the
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.’” Boyd v. Weisberg, 75 Va. App. 725, 736 (2022)
(alterations in original) (quoting Ferguson Enters., Inc. v. F.H. Furr Plumbing, Heating & Air
Conditioning, Inc., 297 Va. 539, 547-48 (2019)).
A. Statutory Beneficiaries Craig and Christin
Halifax argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to set aside the jury’s award in
favor of Craig and Christin, as statutory beneficiaries, because the evidence did not support the
award. We agree. Because Nelson failed to present evidence of Craig and Christin’s “sorrow,
mental anguish and loss of solace” from Donaway’s death, we reverse and vacate the judgment of
the trial court awarding $150,000 to Craig and Christin, respectively.
In a wrongful death action, “the surviving spouse, children of the deceased and children of
any deceased child of the deceased” are statutory beneficiaries. Code § 8.01-53(A). In such cases,
the statutory beneficiaries “eligible to receive [a damages] distribution shall be fixed (i) at the time
the verdict is entered if the jury makes the specification or (ii) at the time the judgment is rendered if
the court specifies the distribution.” Code § 8.01-53(B). The jury or the court may award damages
to statutory beneficiaries for their “[s]orrow, mental anguish, and solace.” Code § 8.01-52(1). Yet
merely being entitled to the possibility of recovery by statute does not circumvent a statutory
beneficiary’s responsibility to supply evidence to support a jury verdict.
Here, it is undisputed that Craig and Christin were, as Donaway’s grandchildren, statutory
beneficiaries. During the trial, Halifax offered a jury instruction that included Craig and Christin as
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statutory beneficiaries because they had not “renounced any entitlement that they ha[d]” under the
statute. The trial court thereafter properly provided a jury instruction that listed them as
beneficiaries.4 Separate and distinct, however, from listing Craig and Christin as beneficiaries is
whether the jury’s verdict awarding Craig and Christin $150,000 each is plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.
Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Nelson as the prevailing
party below, the trial court erred in denying Halifax’s motion to set aside the jury verdict for Craig
and Christin. No evidence at trial demonstrated that Craig and Christin experienced sorrow, mental
anguish, or loss of solace following the death of their grandmother, Donaway. Although Nelson
and her husband, Kerry, testified to their distress and sadness, the testimony heard at the trial did not
mention Craig or Christin. In fact, even Nelson’s counsel admitted at trial that there was “no
evidence to support distribution of any recovery to them.” It appears that the jury was unaware of
their existence or involvement until closing arguments, when Nelson’s counsel stated that they were
“grandchildren [Nelson was] not about to drag into this courtroom.” Because the jury verdict
awarding damages for statutory beneficiaries Craig and Christin was without evidence, we reverse
and vacate the judgment of the trial court.
4
Nelson contends that Halifax’s argument here is waived because “[t]he listing of the
grandchildren as beneficiaries in the instruction and on the verdict form, without objection,
consigned the question to the jury.” Accordingly, Nelson argues that Halifax “now argues that
no evidence justified listing the grandchildren among the beneficiaries” and that this “objection
had to be raised when the instruction was offered.” We disagree. As stated, Craig and Christin
had not renounced their entitlement under the statute. Thus, their names properly appeared on
the jury instruction and verdict form. After the jury awarded a $150,000 jury verdict to both
Craig and Christin, Halifax argued that the record was “completely devoid of evidence to
support” awards to Craig and Christin. On review, this Court may set aside a trial court’s
judgment sustaining a jury verdict if it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Ellis,
299 Va. at 622. Because no evidence supports the jury’s $150,000 verdict to both Craig and
Christin, we reverse.
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B. Excessive and Speculative Verdict
Halifax argues that the jury’s verdict was excessive and speculative. Halifax argues that the
trial court erred when it denied its motion to set aside the verdict for insufficient evidence of
causation and damages based on Donaway’s statutory life expectancy of 6.6 years. Halifax alleges
that the only evidence put forth at trial related to Donaway’s life expectancy was based upon the
statutory life expectancy table. Halifax’s argument is without merit.
We review the trial court’s decision to accept the jury’s damage award for an abuse of
discretion. City-to-City Auto Sales, LLC v. Harris, 78 Va. App. 334, 348 (2023) (discussing
excessive damages verdicts). “An award of damages must be set aside if the amount ‘is so great’
that it ‘shock[s] the conscience of the court’ and ‘create[s] the impression that the jury’ was
‘motivated by passion, corruption[,] or prejudice,’ or misunderstood ‘the facts or the law, or if the
award is so out of proportion to the injuries suffered as to suggest that it is not the product of a fair
and impartial decision.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 285 Va.
295, 311 (2013)).
Code § 8.01-419 includes a table of life expectancy for parties to present as evidence
whenever “it is necessary to establish the expectancy of continued life of any person from any
period of such person’s life, whether [s]he be living at the time or not.” The table provides that an
86-year-old female’s life expectancy is 6.6 years. Code § 8.01-419. Donaway entered Woodview
at the age of 86 in 2012, so according to the table, Donaway had a life expectancy of 6.6 years.
Donaway, however, died at the age of 86 in 2013.
Halifax asserts that “Donaway’s beneficiaries were not entitled to recover damages for
sorrow, mental anguish, and loss of solace after 2019” because based on the table, “Donaway would
have died regardless of [Woodview’s] negligence.” Halifax argues that “[i]n order to support an
award of damages in this situation, there would need to be testimony of the value to the
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beneficiaries of Ms. Donaway’s life between 2013—when she died—and 2019, when she statutorily
would have been expected to pass according to the only life expectancy evidence presented.”
Because Nelson “presented no testimony connecting any of the beneficiaries’ harms to the relevant
time frame,” Halifax argues that “the jury must have resorted to speculation or conjecture to come
up with the damages it awarded.”
As Nelson argues, however, “Code § 8.01-419 does not create a ceiling on damages.”
Rather, the Code explicitly provides that the table is evidence of a deceased person’s life
expectancy, similar to “other evidence as to the health, constitution and habits of such person.”
Code § 8.01-419. The trial court admitted the life expectancy table into evidence for the jury’s
consideration and instructed the jury to “consider the life expectancy figure introduced as evidence
along with any other evidence relating to the health, constitution and habits of . . . Donaway in
determining her life expectancy.” The jury also heard evidence of Donaway’s other ailments, as
well as Nelson’s testimony regarding Donaway’s pain due to the ulcers, and the mental anguish
Donaway’s family felt from seeing her in pain and from her death. Based on the totality of the
evidence, the damages award was not so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court, nor does
the record reflect that the jury was influenced by passion, corruption, or prejudice. We therefore
affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Halifax’s motion to set aside the jury’s verdict.
II. Motion to Bifurcate
Halifax argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to bifurcate the issues of
liability and damages5 at trial. Because we disagree with Halifax, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
5
In Halifax’s third assignment of error, it states that the trial court erred in denying its
“motion to bifurcate the survival and wrongful death claims.” Yet, in its opening brief it assigns
error to the trial court’s “decision not to bifurcate liability and damages.” Because Halifax’s
opening brief focuses on the issues of liability and damages, we also address the issue as one of
bifurcation between liability and damages.
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Bifurcation is a “practical means to assure that each party receives a fair opportunity to
present their case to the jury without prejudice to the other.” Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 277 Va.
59, 78 (2009). “A determination in a civil trial regarding the bifurcation of a jury’s consideration
of issues is a matter for the trial court’s discretion.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 265 Va. 383, 393
(2003). Before ordering or denying bifurcation, a trial court considers “whether any party would
be prejudiced by granting or not granting such request, as well as the impact on judicial
resources, expense, and unnecessary delay.” Id. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
bifurcate for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 392. “The amount of the . . . damages award alone is
not determinative of whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. at 393. Instead, “an abuse
of discretion must be viewed from the perspective of the facts and circumstances known to the
trial court at the time of its ruling.” Id.Halifax argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to consider the
potential for prejudice to the jury in hearing evidence of both liability and damages in Nelson’s
wrongful death and survival claims. Halifax acknowledged that its negligence caused Donaway’s
pressure ulcers, which resulted in injury and damages. Based on its admission, Halifax argues that
“the only issue for the jury in the first phase of a bifurcated trial would have been whether those
ulcers proximately caused . . . Donaway’s death.” Halifax contends that “[this] question . . .
requires expert physician testimony . . . [and] is completely separate from the extent of damages”
Donaway suffered. Halifax also alleges that the trial court failed to recognize the prejudice of not
having a bifurcated trial because the jury heard “overlapping testimony” and ultimately “awarded an
extraordinary amount of damages,” which implies that the jury “conflated” the two causes of action.
On the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Halifax’s
motion to bifurcate. From the outset, a trial court may order bifurcation if necessary, but is not
required to order bifurcation in all cases where the plaintiff alleges both wrongful death and
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survival claims. See Wade, 265 Va. at 392-93. Here, the trial court expressly considered the
parties’ arguments regarding bifurcation. The trial court found any potential prejudice could be
resolved by appropriate jury instructions, and the jury was instructed that Nelson could only recover
from one of her claims; notably, Halifax does not challenge on appeal that the jury instructions the
trial court provided were inadequate to address any potential prejudice. And nothing in the record
reflects any confusion by the jury in following the instructions given. See Stump v. Doe, 250 Va.
57, 62 (1995) (stating that a jury is presumed to follow jury instructions).
As discussed, supra, we disagree with Halifax that the jury’s verdict was “extraordinary,”
and thus reject Halifax’s argument that the amount of damages was evidence that “the jury conflated
the two causes of action.” The trial court also considered the complexity of the case, which
involved detailed medical issues, and that the nature of the medical evidence would be the same if
the trial was bifurcated. The trial court also cited “judicial economy and efficiency” in denying
Halifax’s motion. Based on the circumstances in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Halifax’s motion to bifurcate.
III. Admission of Witness Testimony
Finally, Halifax contends that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the two
nurses, Lambert and Anderson. We review the trial court’s decision about the admissibility of
witness testimony for abuse of discretion. Preferred Sys. Sols., Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284
Va. 382, 396 (2012). Although the trial court has discretion, it is not “free to simply act in any
way it may deem desirable under the circumstances.” Lucas v. Riverhill Poultry, Inc., 300 Va.
78, 92 (2021). Rather, “the circuit court ‘has a range of choice, and . . . its decision will not be
disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.’” Id.
at 93 (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham and Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352
(2011)).
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Halifax contends that the trial court erred in permitting Anderson and Lambert to testify
about “irrelevant matters.” Halifax alleges that Anderson’s detailed testimony about Donaway’s
medical progress notes from Woodview for the purposes of revealing that the Woodview staff
did not adequately document the ulcers’ condition was irrelevant to Donaway’s cause of death.
Halifax also alleges that this testimony prejudiced Halifax “by suggesting that its employees
were bad at documenting and monitoring the ulcers as they developed, and that they provided
misleading information about the condition of the ulcers to the healthcare provider[s].”
Regarding Lambert’s testimony, Halifax argues that it was likewise irrelevant and
prejudicial. Lambert testified about “pressure ulcer prevention” in nursing homes and explained
that nursing staff should regularly turn a patient to prevent the development of such ulcers.
Lambert reviewed Donaway’s medical charts from Woodview and testified that Donaway was
not given adequate nursing care. Halifax argues that “whether and how . . . Donaway’s ulcers
developed or how they were documented was never at issue in this trial,” as Halifax had already
admitted that the ulcers developed as a result of their negligence. Halifax also alleges that
Lambert’s testimony was prejudicial because the testimony suggested that “Woodview was a bad
actor that deserved to be punished with a significant damages award.”
“‘[T]he responsibility for balancing the competing considerations of probative value and
prejudice rests in the sound discretion of the trial court,’ and ‘exercise of that discretion will not
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse.’” Townes v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 299
Va. 34, 53 (2020) (quoting Gross v. Stuart, 297 Va. 769, 771 (2019)). “Evidence is relevant if it
‘tends to cast any light upon the subject of the inquiry.’” Id. (quoting McNeir v. Greer-Hale
Chinchilla Ranch, 194 Va. 623, 629 (1953)); see also Va. R. Evid. 2:401. “[E]vidence that is
factually relevant may be excluded from the jury’s consideration if the probative value of that
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evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. (quoting Norfolk &
Portsmouth R.R. v. Wilson, 276 Va. 739, 743 (2008)).
Halifax admitted that Woodview’s negligence led to the development of Donaway’s
ulcers. Halifax, however, did not concede as to the extent of the severity of Donaway’s ulcers,
and in fact, acknowledged in the trial court that Nelson could “certainly put on evidence of the
extent of that injury.” In overruling Halifax’s objection to Lambert’s testimony, the trial court
found that “the frequency and the duration of the injury is an issue for the jury.” We agree and
find that Lambert’s testimony about the duration of Woodview’s failure to turn and reposition
Donaway was admissible for the purposes of establishing the extent, duration, and scope of
Donaway’s injuries. Likewise, Anderson’s testimony was relevant as to the issue of the scope
and deterioration of Donaway’s ulcers. Anderson testified that she relied upon the Woodview
staff’s assessment that Donaway’s ulcers were “controlled,” but later found that Donaway’s
wounds were infected and had deteriorated.
Because Halifax’s admission of Woodview’s negligence was limited to the development
of the ulcers, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of Anderson and
Lambert as evidence of the full extent of the deterioration of Donaway’s condition over time,
which led to an infection and the need for additional medical care, and thus important evidence
for the jury to consider in determining causation and damages. We therefore affirm the trial
court’s decision to admit this testimony.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is reversed and vacated in part, and
affirmed in part.
Reversed and vacated in part, and affirmed in part.
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