Demetrius Lamar Bazemore v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED
Present: Judges Beales, Fulton and Lorish
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
DEMETRIUS LAMAR BAZEMORE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0031-24-1 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
NOVEMBER 12, 2024
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
Matthew A. Glassman, Judge1
Lauren E. Brice, Assistant Public Defender (Virginia Indigent
Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Linda R. Scott, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a jury trial, the Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk convicted Demetrius
Lamar Bazemore of possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-308.2. On appeal, Bazemore argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the evidence. He also argues that the trial court erred in excluding a hearsay statement
made by the passenger in his vehicle during the traffic stop.
I. BACKGROUND
“Under familiar principles of appellate review, we will state ‘the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, [as] the prevailing party in the trial court, and will accord the
Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.’”
1
The Honorable Matthew A. Glassman presided at the jury trial and at the sentencing
hearing, and the Honorable W. Richard Savage, III, sitting as a judge designate, presided at the
suppression hearing.
Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517, 520 (2010) (quoting Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va.
568, 570 (2002)).
Suffolk Police Officer Clay S. Strobel testified at the suppression hearing and at trial that,
around 2:00 a.m. on June 9, 2022, he was on patrol when he saw a red Chevrolet pass him with
“no front license plate.” He noted that “usually most vehicles from my experience that don’t
have front plates have expired registration and they don’t have a correct registration. That those
more than likely can, those can relate to stolen vehicles.” Officer Strobel then turned his patrol
car around and began following the vehicle. He recounted that “when I was following behind
the vehicle I saw both occupants of the vehicle make multiple furtive movements.” He further
recounted that “the driver, he reached down like next to his seat towards the center console. And
the passenger, he looked behind him multiple times. And you could also see him when he was
looking behind him you could see like his left shoulder dip down and you could see him reach
behind towards the back of the driver’s seat.” Officer Strobel testified the movements of the
driver and the passenger concerned him because “[u]sually with those movements from my
training and experience, those usually are contributable with, like those movements are not
normally made by occupants of a vehicle. And when they are they usually are concealing
firearms or contraband.”
Officer Strobel then pulled over the vehicle “outside of the Sector 1 police station,”
where there were “multiple street lights” that “illuminated the vehicle.” He could see the driver
and the passenger “looking behind them waiting to see like where I was approaching them
from.” Officer Strobel approached the vehicle on the passenger side. He shined his flashlight
into the vehicle, and he “could see the seat behind the driver seat was pulled down, but the other
seat was up.” He noted that the folded-down seat “raised more of a suspicion of the furtive
movements made toward that direction.” Officer Strobel recalled that, when he approached the
-2-
vehicle, the passenger was “blading his body a little bit and he was breathing very rapidly.” The
passenger’s body movement impeded Officer’s Strobel’s ability to see the vehicle’s center
console.
Officer Strobel “advised the driver of the reason for the stop, which was the expired
registration.” He then stated, “I asked for their identification and I advised them the reason for
the stop. The driver provided his ID card because he wasn’t licensed. And then the passenger
provided his driver’s license which was out of New York.” Demetrius Bazemore was the driver
of the vehicle while his cousin, Tyriece Bazemore, was in the front seat and the vehicle’s sole
passenger. Officer Strobel also “asked for the registration of the vehicle, and they didn’t have
registration. They provided the title to the vehicle.” However, “[t]he title wasn’t signed” and “it
wasn’t notarized either. The driver advised that he had just bought the vehicle.”
Once Suffolk Police Officer Cody L. Cobb arrived to assist with the traffic stop, Officer
Strobel “asked the driver to step out of the vehicle to talk,” and he testified that he did so “[j]ust
for the movements made.” Officer Strobel also noticed that the driver’s eyes were bloodshot.
When asked, the driver “advised that he had smoked marijuana about an hour ago.” Officer
Strobel then checked the driver’s and the passenger’s identifying information using a police
database. He learned that the driver “has a gang affiliation, drug user. And he had previous
charges with firearms.” The driver also “had a charge on there for robbery.” Officer Strobel
noted that, based on his training and experience, gang-affiliated individuals “usually are known
to carry firearms.” Furthermore, given the driver’s criminal history, it was “more likely to be a
firearm in the vehicle.”
Officer Strobel next spoke to the passenger, who told the officer about from where he and
the driver were coming, which was inconsistent with what the driver had just told the officer.
Officer Strobel then had the driver and the passenger stand next to each other outside the vehicle
-3-
and “asked them is there anything illegal in the vehicle.” He also “advised them of like the
furtive movements” he had observed earlier. Although the driver and passenger had “maintained
eye contact” with Officer Strobel during their earlier interactions, “they looked away” when he
asked them about the contents of the vehicle. Officer Strobel then told the driver and the
passenger that he “was going to frisk the vehicle,” and the driver responded that there “ain’t
nothing in there.” Given the furtive movements and the nervousness of the driver and the
passenger, the driver’s involvement with gangs, and the driver’s criminal history, including
charges involving firearms and robbery, Officer Strobel determined that he had “a reasonable
belief that there would be a weapon in the vehicle.” He emphasized that his “concern was for
my safety and my other officer’s safety.”
After searching the driver side compartment of the vehicle, Officer Strobel noticed that
“in the center console there was a big bag of green, leafy substance,” which he believed to be
marijuana. He recalled that “there was two bags. One bag was located on the center console,
and one bag was like wedged down behind, in between the two seats.”2 He left the bags of
marijuana in the vehicle and returned to where the driver and the passenger were standing near
the vehicle. Without specifying what he had just found in the vehicle, Officer Strobel “asked
them whose it was.” Neither the driver nor the passenger responded to Officer Strobel’s
question. Officer Strobel then told them that they “both would be detained until someone, like,
told me whose it was.” As Officer Cobb began placing the passenger in handcuffs, the driver
“said it’s his and it’s clean anyways.” Officer Strobel testified that he understood the driver to be
2
The parties stipulated at trial that the total weight of the recovered marijuana was eight-
and-a-half ounces. In Virginia, “a person 21 years of age or older may lawfully possess on his
person or in any public place not more than one ounce of marijuana.” Code § 4.1-1100(A).
However, “any person who possesses on his person or in any public place . . . more than four
ounces but not more than one pound of marijuana . . . is guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.” Code
§ 4.1-1100(C).
-4-
“referring to, like, a firearm,” not to the marijuana. Based on his experience in law enforcement,
Officer Strobel understood the term “clean” in the context of firearms to mean that “it’s not
stolen” and that “it’s legally purchased and legally owned.”
After the officers placed the driver and the passenger in handcuffs, Officer Strobel
“searched the rest of the vehicle.” He recalled that “the marijuana was there, underneath there
was a scale. And then in the rear of the vehicle behind, like, the driver’s seat where the one seat
was laid down, underneath, like, clothing there was a[n] assault rifle” with a loaded magazine.
He clarified that there were two jackets covering the firearm. Next to the firearm, he found a
wallet inside a black Adidas bag containing what appeared to be counterfeit one-hundred-dollar
bills. In the front pocket of the Adidas bag, there was a white envelope bearing the driver’s
name. Officer Strobel asked the driver “whose bag it was,” and the driver said it was probably
his own bag. Officer Strobel then arrested the passenger for possession of a concealed weapon
but he did not arrest the driver until later – after confirming that the driver was a convicted felon.
Before trial, counsel for Demetrius Bazemore filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from Officer Strobel’s search of the vehicle. Acknowledging that “[t]he stop was
totally legit,” Bazemore’s trial counsel argued that “there was no indicia that they [the driver and
the passenger] were armed. Really no reason for the search.” He contended that Officer Strobel
merely “had a hunch that they might be armed and he acted on it.” He clarified, however, that
“once the marijuana is discovered it’s fair game from there. I’ll concede that. So it’s the initial
search that we’re contesting.” After hearing argument, the trial court denied Demetrius
Bazemore’s motion to suppress, stating, “I find that he [Officer Strobel] did have a reasonable
articulable suspicion that would justify the search.”
-5-
Two days before the jury trial, Demetrius Bazemore’s defense counsel filed a discovery
response pursuant to Rule 3A:11(d)(5)3 stating that he may call Tyriece Bazemore as a witness.
However, on the first day of the trial, defense counsel informed the trial court that he did not
“anticipate calling any witnesses” and that he was ready to proceed with the trial. During cross-
examination of Officer Strobel, defense counsel attempted to introduce a hearsay statement from
Tyriece Bazemore in which Tyriece said he owned both the firearm and the marijuana that were
found inside the vehicle. Officer Strobel had recorded the statement in a criminal complaint.
Defense counsel proffered to the trial court that, in the criminal complaint, Officer Strobel had
written, “I then placed Mr. [Tyriece] Bazemore in custody. As he [Tyriece Bazemore] stated, the
green, leafy substance and the firearm was his.”
The attorney for the Commonwealth objected to the admission of the statement, arguing
that the statement was inadmissible hearsay because the trial court had not declared Tyriece
Bazemore an unavailable witness and because the defense had not “exercised due diligence” in
attempting to procure Tyriece Bazemore’s appearance at trial. Defense counsel countered that
the hearsay statement was admissible under Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:804(b)(3)4 as a
statement against interest. However, defense counsel conceded that Tyriece Bazemore is “under
subpoena. He’s on the witness list. I had contact with him and he, basically, blew me off and
that’s where we’re at. Had he been here, would I put him on the stand? I don’t know because
he’s still somewhat a dangerous witness. But he didn’t respond to a subpoena.” The trial court
Rule 3A:11(d)(5) requires the accused to “[p]rovide to the Commonwealth a list of the
3
names and, if known, the addresses of all persons who are expected to testify on behalf of the
accused at trial or sentencing.”
4
Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:804(b)(3) defines a “[s]tatement against interest” as either
“[a] statement which the declarant knew at the time of its making to be contrary to the
declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or to tend to subject the declarant to civil liability,”
or as “[a] statement which the declarant knew at the time of its making would tend to subject the
declarant to criminal liability, if the statement is shown to be reliable.”
-6-
asked defense counsel the manner in which Tyriece Bazemore had been served with the
subpoena, and defense counsel replied, “Posted but to a relative who told us that she would pass
it. I’ve had phone conversations, as has my investigator, with this witness, but he wouldn’t tell
us physically where he was. That’s where we’re at, Judge.” The trial court then asked defense
counsel, “And if you — he was going to be a material witness, why didn’t you ask for court
intervention or a continuance or something of that nature?” Defense counsel responded that
“every witness has their ups and downs, and that was a tactical decision to go forward without
him because you put a witness up there, he can get crushed on cross-examination. I know that.
You know that. The Commonwealth knows that.” After hearing argument, the trial court
sustained the Commonwealth’s objection.
The jury found Demetrius Bazemore guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted
violent felon. By final sentencing order entered on December 8, 2023, the trial court convicted
him of the offense. Bazemore appeals to this Court.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Motion to Suppress
On appeal, Demetrius Bazemore argues, “The trial court erred by denying
Mr. Bazemore’s motion to suppress where the law enforcement officer did not have the requisite
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a ‘frisk’ of the vehicle.”
The Supreme Court has often stated, “The defendant has the burden to show that, when
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trial court’s denial of
the motion to suppress was reversible error.” Sidney, 280 Va. at 522. “We review de novo the
trial court’s application of the law to the particular facts of the case.” Branham v.
Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 279 (2012). However, we are “bound by the trial court’s findings
of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and we give due
-7-
weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
officers.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198 (1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). We “presume — even in the absence of specific
factual findings — that the trial court resolved all factual ambiguities or inconsistencies in the
evidence in favor of the prevailing party and gave that party the benefit of all reasonably
debatable inferences from the evidence.” Hill v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804, 808 (2019).
“When considering whether to affirm the denial of a pretrial suppression motion, an
appellate court reviews not only the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing but also the
evidence later presented at trial.” Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 414 (2017). “In
contrast, as an appellate basis for reversing a criminal conviction based on an erroneous pretrial
ruling, evidence at trial becomes relevant only if the defendant renews his pretrial motion at
trial.” Id. at 414 n.2.
Only in doing so does an appellant satisfy Rule 5:25 by inviting the
trial court to reconsider its pretrial ruling in light of the actual
evidence presented — rather than merely relying solely upon the
charging documents, pretrial proffers of the parties, or cursory
evidentiary presentations as the trial court sometimes must do
when deciding the issue prior to trial.
Id. In this case, Demetrius Bazemore did not renew his motion to suppress at trial.
After a police officer initiates a traffic stop, “the Fourth Amendment permits police to
conduct a pat down of a person and a protective sweep of his or her vehicle for weapons under
certain circumstances.” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 13 (2021). “A vehicle sweep
justified by officer safety concerns is permissible if it occurs during an investigatory detention
that falls short of an arrest.” Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). The vehicle sweep “is permissible
if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officer in
believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.”
-8-
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
The “police may conduct a protective sweep of the vehicle based on the assumption that when
the stop concludes, the individual presumably ‘will be permitted to reenter his automobile’ and
‘will then have access to any weapons inside.’” Bagley, 73 Va. App. at 15 (quoting Long, 463
U.S. at 1052). “Such a protective search is authorized even if the suspect is under police restraint
at the time the search is conducted, because the suspect may be able to escape such restraint, or
may later regain access to the vehicle if he is not arrested.” Gross v. Commonwealth, 79
Va. App. 530, 537 (2024) (quoting United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2007)).
“To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able to articulate more than an
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ that criminal activity is afoot.” McCain v. Commonwealth,
275 Va. 546, 552 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000)). Indeed, the
officer must “supply a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity on the
part of the particular person stopped.” Id.The requisite level of belief, when calibrated to reasonable
suspicion, is less than probable cause, less than a preponderance,
and certainly less than beyond a reasonable doubt. All that is
required is a suspicion — a reasonable one that is not “the product
of a volatile or inventive imagination” or one “undertaken simply
as an act of harassment.”
Hill, 297 Va. at 817 (emphases in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28). In short, “[t]he
standard requires proof of only a reasonable belief that the suspect might have a weapon and gain
control of it.” Bagley, 73 Va. App. at 16 (emphasis in original).
To determine whether Officer Strobel had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a
protective sweep of Bazemore’s vehicle, “we must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances —
the whole picture.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). “Circumstances relevant in this analysis include
characteristics of the area surrounding the stop, the time of the stop, the specific conduct of the
-9-
suspect individual, the character of the offense under suspicion, and the unique perspective of a
police officer trained and experienced in the detection of crime.” McCain, 275 Va. at 554. The
Supreme Court of the United States has emphasized that this analysis “allows officers to draw on
their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418). The inquiry is not
whether an individual factor, viewed alone, “is susceptible to innocent explanation,” but whether
the various factors, “[t]aken together,” are sufficient “to form a particularized and objective
basis” for an officer’s suspicion. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78.
In Hill v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804, 816 (2019), two narcotics detectives saw the
defendant alone in his parked car making up-and-down glances and curious movements within
the vehicle. As soon as the defendant saw the detectives begin walking toward his vehicle, he
“turned away from them and started digging frantically between the driver’s and passenger’s
seats.” Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the two narcotics
detectives had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant may have been reaching for a
weapon. Id. at 817. Likewise, in Gross, 79 Va. App. at 539, officers pulled over the defendant
after he sped through a stop sign. When the defendant, who had already pulled over, realized
that the officers were approaching his vehicle on foot, he made a series of movements within the
vehicle that gave the officers reason to believe that he could well be searching for and reaching
for a weapon. Id. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we found that the officers had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that the defendant was armed and dangerous during
the traffic stop. Id. at 539-40. Thus, we held that the officers could do a protective sweep of the
defendant’s vehicle for officer safety. Id. at 540.
- 10 -
In this case, Officer Strobel testified that, in the early morning hours, he saw a vehicle
pass him without a front license plate. He began following the vehicle because “usually most
vehicles from my experience that don’t have front plates have expired registration and they don’t
have a correct registration.” As he followed the vehicle, Officer Strobel saw both the driver and
the passenger “make multiple furtive movements.” He noted that the driver “reached down like
next to his seat towards the center console,” while the passenger “looked behind him multiple
times” and “reach[ed] behind towards the back of the driver’s seat.” Strobel also testified that he
“followed behind the vehicle until it was a more reasonable amount of time to safely stop the
vehicle” so he did not try to immediately tell Demetrius Bazemore to pull his vehicle over while
the furtive movements in it were already occurring. After soon stopping the vehicle, when
Officer Strobel approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he noticed that one of the back
seats was folded down, which “raised more of a suspicion of the furtive movements made toward
that direction.” In addition, Officer Strobel testified that, when he interacted with the passenger
and the driver, he noticed that “you could tell they’re very nervous. The passenger’s breathing
was, like, very heavy, like, very fast.” Strobel further testified that the passenger had turned his
body to block the officer’s view of the vehicle’s center console.
Furthermore, Officer Strobel stated that he “asked for the registration of the vehicle, and
they didn’t have registration.” He noted that “[t]he driver provided his ID card because he
wasn’t licensed.” Using the driver’s identifying information, Officer Strobel learned that the
driver had a gang affiliation and that he had prior charges involving firearms – as well as a
robbery charge. Officer Strobel testified that, based on his training and experience, gang-
affiliated individuals “usually are known to carry firearms.” Officer Strobel further testified that,
given the driver’s criminal history, there was “more likely to be a firearm in the vehicle.” In
addition, the driver and the passenger gave Officer Strobel conflicting answers about where they
- 11 -
were coming from before the traffic stop. In short, based on the totality of the circumstances
before us in this case, with each individual fact mounting upon the others, Officer Strobel
certainly had reasonable, articulable suspicion that Demetrius Bazemore was armed and
dangerous during the traffic stop. Therefore, Officer Strobel could do a protective sweep of the
vehicle for officer safety. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying
Demetrius Bazemore’s motion to suppress.
B. The Hearsay Statement
Bazemore also argues that “The trial court erred by excluding the passenger’s statements
that ‘the green leafy substance and the firearm was his.’”
“The admissibility of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a
ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Wolfe v.
Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 97, 106 (2016) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16
(1988)). “On appellate review of issues involving the admissibility of evidence, the Court views
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the party who prevailed
below.” Haas v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 1, 5 n.1 (2019), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
299 Va. 465 (2021).
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Va. R. Evid.
2:801(c). “Hearsay evidence is inadmissible at trial unless it falls into one of the recognized
exceptions to the rule.” Clay v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 96, 104 (2000) (en banc), aff’d,
262 Va. 253 (2001). “A person seeking to have hearsay declarations admitted must clearly show
that they are within an exception to the rule.” Id.Under the hearsay exception found in Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:804(b)(3), a statement
made by a declarant who is unavailable may be admissible if the declarant knew that the
- 12 -
statement tended to subject him to criminal liability and if the statement is shown to be reliable.5
“Unavailability is a threshold question, to be resolved before a court considers the content of the
statement to determine whether it was against the declarant’s penal interest and was sufficiently
corroborated to be considered reliable.” Bailey v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 499, 507 (2013).
In order to fall under the “declaration against interest” exception to
the hearsay rule, the party offering the statement must prove that
the declarant is unavailable, that the statement was against the
declarant’s interest at the time it was made, and that the declarant
was aware, at the time the statement was made, that it was against
his interest.
McDonnough v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 120, 127 (1997). “In Virginia, a declarant is
unavailable if the party seeking to introduce the statement has been unable by diligent inquiry to
locate the declarant.” Id. “Due diligence requires only a good faith, reasonable effort; it does
not require that every possibility, no matter how remote, be exhausted.” Id. at 129.
“Determining whether the offering party has met its burden and, thus, whether the declarant is
‘unavailable,’ is left to the trial court’s discretion.” Id. at 127 (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth,
22 Va. App. 46, 50 (1996)). “Whether a party has used due diligence is a factual question that
will be reversed on appeal only if it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Id.Here, although Demetrius Bazemore’s trial counsel identified Tyriece Bazemore as a
potential witness and provided a Suffolk address for him, defense counsel admitted to the trial
court that he made a tactical decision to allow the jury trial to proceed without actually being
able to call Tyriece Bazemore as a witness. At the beginning of the jury trial, defense counsel
announced that he was prepared to proceed. He neither advised the trial court that a subpoenaed
material witness was not present nor did he request a continuance. During voir dire, he stated he
5
For purposes of the “declaration against interest” exception to the hearsay rule, a
“reliable” statement is “one where ‘there is anything substantial other than the bare confession to
connect the declarant with the crime.’” Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 408-09 (1978)
(quoting Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 748 (1923)).
- 13 -
did not “anticipate calling any witnesses.” He later attempted to introduce Tyriece Bazemore’s
hearsay statement during cross-examination of Officer Strobel, but he admitted that even if
Tyriece Bazemore had appeared at trial, he may not have called Tyriece Bazemore to testify
because “he’s still somewhat a dangerous witness.” Defense counsel candidly admitted that it
“was a tactical decision to go forward without him because you put a witness up there, he can get
crushed on cross-examination.” He also made no effort to have the trial court enforce the
subpoena of Tyriece Bazemore. Consequently, the record before this Court on appeal shows
that, rather than demonstrating due diligence, defense counsel sought to take advantage of
Tyriece Bazemore’s absence for mere tactical purposes. In short, given the foregoing and
Demetrius Bazemore’s lack of providing any corroboration that he had even obtained posted
service after subpoenaing Tyriece Bazemore, Demetrius Bazemore had not shown that the trial
court was plainly wrong in finding that Demetrius had failed to satisfy the due diligence
requirement — or that Tyriece Bazemore was actually unavailable as a witness. Therefore, we
certainly cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit Tyriece Bazemore’s
hearsay statement at trial.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment, and we uphold
Demetrius Bazemore’s conviction.
Affirmed.
- 14 -